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Statement o f Purpose 
The purpose of this paper is to survey the literature of 
consociational theory, assess its validity as a conceptual model, 
and to analyse both its relevance and utility as a potential 
framework of conflict regulation in South Africa. The paper is 
divided into five chapters: an overview of consociational theory 
as it is presented by its leading exponents; a critique of the 
theory's methodology and major suppositions; a modified model of 
consociational democracy in light of the theoretical criticisms; 
an application and evaluation of the modified model to South 
Africa; and, finally, some observations about consociational 
democracy's possible viability as a transitory mechanism between 
the present system and black majority-rule in a unitary system. 
The objective is to illustrate that consociational government is, 
normatively, an inadequate constitutional system for South Africa 
and, more broadly, for polities characterised by extreme ethnic 
or economic conflict. 
2 
I n troduction 
The argument that democracy is incompatible with societies racked 
by intense socio-political conflict is compelling. In a society 
divided into highly politicised groups, with each group 
perceiving political behaviour solely in zero-sum terms, the 
democratic process becomes an object of conquest and domination. 
In effect, democratic precepts - - representation, legitimacy, 
rotation of power -- are subverted when the dominant group: 
seizes control of the state machinery; allocates to its segment a 
disproportionate share of the state's resources and services; and 
entrenches a political hegemony at the expense of less powerful 
groups.v' Groups which neither share in state power nor hold any 
future possibility of sharing in it become disaffected and will 
inevitably perceive the existing political structures and 
institutions as unjust . A crisis of legitimicay ensues, the 
causes of group antagonism compound, and political instability (a 
salient characteristic of most plural societies) increases 
commensurately. Until the late 1960s, this interpretation 
prevailed in comparative political literature: democracy, at 
least in the Anglo-American form, was unworkable in highly 
divided societies. 1 
The industrial revolution and the large-scale urbanisation 
and modernisation it spawned contributed further negative effects 
1 Some argue 
integration under 
Alvin Rabushka and 
(Columbus, 1972) 
that democracy may even retard political 
conditions of intense social conflict. See 
Kenneth Shepsle, Politics in Plural Societies, 
3 
to democracy's viability in conflict polities. Technological 
innovations, particularly radio and television, heightened social 
and political consciousness among groups within a society and 
facilitated their mobilising efforts. Although the new conduits 
of communication performed some socially integrative functions, 
the political integration of these societies was hampered by a 
perception among some groups of their socio-economic inequality, 
or relative deprivation, vis a vis other more politically and/or 
~ 
economically advanced groups.L Accordingly, new analytical 
models of democracy in societies characterised by severe social, 
economic, and political conflict were proposed as a response to 
the challenges created by modernisation. 
Consociational democracy (derived from Johannes Althusius' 
consociato , a description of of political rule prevalent in the 
European Low countries) was one model which initially emerged as 
an interpretive paradigm, but is currently promoted for its 
normative qualities. In his The Political Kingdom of Uganda, 
Apter was the first modern political theorist to propose and 
define consociational behaviour. He wrote that a consociation 
seeks in political unity a common denominator to unite 
all of the groups within a country for purposes of 
common action .. . . [it) sacrifices precision in 
organization and militancy in outlook in order to allow 
2 It is suggested that "material increases in what [Karl) 
Deutsch termed social communication and mobilization tend to 
increase cultural awareness and excerabate inter-ethnic 
conflict." See Walker Connor, "Nation-building or Nation-
destroying?" World Politics 21,i., 3 (April 1972), p.328 
diverse interests to congregate. 3 
Following Apter's initial contribution, Arend Lijphart and 
Gerhard Lehmbruch, although working independently, published 
concurrent works which attempted to identify patterns of 
political behaviour in ideologically divided European countries. 
Their conclusions became the foundation for a new model of 
comparative typology: consociational democracy. In the main, the 
model was an attempt to define more clearly the relationship 
(first proposed by Almond) between political culture and 
democratic stability. 4 Since its modern inception, the theory 
has taken on a variety of interchangeable terms 
proporzdemokratie, contractarianism, concordant democracy but 
C' 
its theoretical tenets have generally remained consistent. J 
The theory holds that if democratic processes are to prevail 
in societies experiencing intense levels of conflict between 
social groups, then special conflict-regulating structures and 
rules must be employed. These regulating mechanisms are designed 
3 David Apter, The Political Kingdom of Uganda, (Princeton, 
1961), p.5, p.24 
4 Cf . Gabriel 
Comparative Politics 
Almond, "Comparative 
XVIII (1956), 391-409 
Political Systems", 
5 The seminal works of the consociational school include: 
Arend Lijphart, The Politics of Accommodation, (Berkeley, 1968) 
and Democracy in Plural Societies, (New Haven, 1977); Gerhard 
Lehmbruch, "Consociational Democracy in the International 
System", European Journal of Political Research, 3, 3 (1975), 
377-391; Bingham Powell, Jr., Social Fragmentation and Political 
Hostility -- an Austrian Case Study, (Stanford, 1970); and Val 
Lorwin, "Segmented Pluralism: Ideological Cleavages and Political 
Cohesion in the Smaller European Democracies", Comparative 
Politics, 10, 2 (January 1971), 141 - 175. 
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to ensure continued social isolation at the mass level and 
overarching cooperation and power-sharing between each group's 
political elite. The theory's exponents maintain that democratic 
processes will not survive in a deeply divided polity unless such 
practices are undertaken; this in itself is an inducement to its 
use, as otherwise antagonistic groups would rather rule together 
in the extant system than risk the potential for violence, chaos, 
and repression which would result by the system's breakdown. The 
consociational model ' s chief contention is that democracy is 
possible in plural societies, but not in the majoritarian form 
depicted by the Anglo-American democracies . Consociational theory 
is applied solely to plural countries where the pluralism is of 
such a salience that institutionalised organisation and political 
mobilisation are confined within each conflict group; intergroup 
political alliances are tenuous if not non-existent. 6 Nordlinger 
describes how this involves: 
when a sizeable proportion of invidiuals who share some 
class or communal characteristics become subjectively 
aware of their similarity to other such individuals, 
value that similarity positively and attribute some 
importance to it in defining their relations with 
individuals who do not share that social characteristic 
-- then these social differences may be said to draw 
people into segmental divisions or segments . 7 
In the four principal cases of consociational democracy --
Switzerland (since 19~3), the Netherlands (1917-67), Belgium 
6 Lorwin, "Segmented Pluralism", p.1~1 
7 Eric Nordlinger, Conflict Regulation in Divided Societies, 
(Cambridge, Mass., 1972), p.7 
6 
(since World War I, and especially since 1970), and Austria 
(1945-66) each was characterised by this phenomenon of 
segmented pluralism, i.e. the evidence of sociologically distinct 
groups, blocs, pillars, segments, or familles spirituelles. 8 It 
is when these segments become politically salient that the 
futility of majoritarian-style democracy (and the zero-sum 
calculations attendant to it) in divided societies becomes 
evident. 
Consociational theory recognises and seeks to mitigate the 
political competition and antagonism which exists between these 
groups as they vie for access to the instruments of power. Due 
to the inherent competition in majoritarian systems, the dominant 
social group will almost always acquire and control executive 
power in the polity. Because of the rigidity and entrenched 
nature of the social groups, it is impracticable for a segment 
to undertake a strategy which seeks a maximisation of votes 
between groups. 9 Each segment's political organ, the party, 
receives its support almost exclusively from its segmental 
members. Therefore, given equal and constant birth rates among 
groups, a party's electoral strength will remain static over a 
sustained period of time. 
8 Other examples of consociational 
Lebanon (1943-75); Colombia (1958-74); and 
Canada, Malaysia (1955-69), and Uruguay. 
democracy include: 
to a lesser extent 
9 Gerhard Lehmbruch, "A Non-Competitive Pattern of Conflict 
Management in Liberal Democracies", in Consociational Democracy, 
ed. Kenneth McRae (Toronto, 1974), p.91 
I 
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In a majoritarian regime, a system of winner-takes-all means 
that the largest segment wields political power. However, under 
conditions of virtually ineluctable segmentation, there will be 
no rotation of office; the forces of government and opposition 
will remain unchanged as the dominant segment relies on its sheer 
electoral predominance to ensure its perpetuation . As Rabushka 
and Shepsle note, "[t]he symbols of democracy remain [but] the 
substance atrophies." JO Consociational theorists stress this'* 
point in their claim that majoritarian-style politics is 
inherently undemocratic in a segmented society: there will always 
exist groups for whom political power and executive-level 
representation are unattainable . Consequently, the aim of 
consociational democracy is to manipulate a society's pluralism 
in order to create the conditions under which political power can 
be shared, a maximisation of interests aggregated, and 
compromises obtained between all significant segments in the 
system. In essence, it seeks to ensure that democratic processes 
prevail in systems hostile to traditional, majoritarian 
assumptions of democracy. 
Consociational Democracy and Segmented Pluralism 
In consociational theory, the segment, pillar, bloc, conflict 
group, or famille spirituelle, is the focus of the analysis. Its 
organisational structure and the flexibility of its agenda 
10 Rabushk.a and Shepsle, Politics in Plural Societies, p.90 
determine the intensity of the polity's social conflicts and, 
therefore, become the -~eterminants of democratic stability.~ 
Generally, the greater the degree of segmentation in a society, 
the greater is the need for regulated political behaviour. The 
size, organisation, and ideological interests of each segment 
will affect the success or failure of the consociational 
8 
experiment. Accordingly, Lijphart and others argue that specific 
structural pre-conditions pertaining to a system's segmentation 
should be present in order to adequately fulfill the requirements 
for successful consociation. 
Cross-Cutting Pressures 
During its incipient stages, consociational theory was most noted 
for its contention that cross-cutting cleavages (i.e. interests 
which intersect lines of segmental division) are not, contrary to 
the prevailing academic assumptions, a necessary condition of 
conflict management. The benefits of cross-cutting are not 
necessarily desirable given that its absence can be substituted 
with overarching political cooperation at the elite level. 11 
Moreover, theorists contend that consociational elites can only 
operate successfully if crosscutting is minimised: interests 
which are shared by members of opposing segments have the 
ultimate effect of diluting each elite's authority over its 
11 Lijphart, The Politics of Accommodation, p. 200 
followers. 12 Nordlinger rejects the popular notion that a 
significant amount of cross-cutting will induce 'psychic strain' 
to the point where the individual would be willing to throw his 
ideological lot with one bloc permanently. 13 This would only 
occur, he maintains, if the cross-cutting pressures were to 
manifest themselves with "equal intensity" and "concurrently"; 
hence, it is possible to pursue conflicting or contradictory 
interests at different points in time. 14 The consociationalists 
hold that a lack of cross-cutting cleavages will not in itself 
create conflict. The intention is to translate this lack of 
societal cohesion into political advantage by ensuring that the 
elites of each segment rule over an ideologically pure and 
accountable flock -- the loyalty and deference which ensue will, 
9 
theoretically, provide the elites with the authority to engage in 
the politics of power-sharing. However, both Lijphart and 
Daalder argue that a cross-cutting cleavage along economic lines 
is beneficial to a consociational democracy because it will 
ensure a relatively equal level of economic means and resources 
for each segment and will therefore keep societal conflict 
confined to ideological issues. 15 
12 Arend Lij phart, 
Politics in Europe, ed. 
1969), p.68 
"Typologies of Democratic Systems", in 
Arend Lijphart (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 
13 Nordlinger, Conflict Regulation, pp.93-96 
14 Ibid. 
15 Hans Daalder, "On the Origins of the Consociational 
Model", Acta Politica 19 (January 1984'), p.108; Arend Lijphart, 
"Time Politics of Accommodation", Acta Politica 19 (January 
10 
Segmental Isolation 
While conceding that every segment must possess a minimum of 
social heterogeneity (i.e. some cross-cutting of interests among 
the segments), Lijphart observes that "[g]ood social fences may 
make good political neighbours . 1116 It is necessary for a 
consociational democracy to maintain clear , distinct lines of 
division between its segments for two reasons. First, the 
ensuing isolation between blocs at the mass level is intended to 
mitigate hostility between them, hostility which would 
conceivably have more opportunity to manifest in situations of 
greater social contact. 17 Second, only in an isolated bloc can 
an elite hope to create the ideational and social structures 
necessary to ensure that its members remain united and supportive 
of its political brokering. The majority of the cleavages 
experienced in the four European cases were/are ideological, and 
therefore susceptible to segmental crossover -- unlike, for 
instance, cleavages based along racial , ethnic, and to a lesser 
degree, linguistic lines. Thus, Houska argues that 
(w]ith the barriers to defection so low, subcultural 
organization became crucial for the elite efforts to 
1984), p.14 
16 Arend Lijphart, "Cultural Diversity and Theories of 
Political Integration", Canadian Journal of Political Science, 4 
(1971), p.11 
17 Lehmbruch, "Consociational Democracy", p . 381 
11 
define and maintain group boundaries. 18 
The permeability of the ideological cleavage requires that the 
elite create isolated structures which induce a dependence 
(psychological and otherwise) among their rank-and-file on their 
leadership. 
Lorwin argues that the cornerstone of 'segmented pluralism' 
is the notion of voluntary association. This precept dictates 
that the freedom to choose one's segment must be available to 
all: 
the individual can change at almost anytime --
definitively and entirely, or momentarily and 
partially, by simplY- reading an opposition newspaper or 
splitting his vote.r9 
Thus, the "availibility of individual alternatives distinguishes 
the politics of segmented pluralism" from those societies in 
which the predominant cleavages are non-ideological. 2° Communal 
antagonism based on ineluctable qualities of segmentation 
conflict with the concept of voluntary association. This is an 
important contention, for it significantly reduces the utility of 
the model's application to societies divided by ascriptive 
criteria. This paradigmatic constriction will be addressed in 
more detail in Chapter Three. 
18 
Joseph Houska, =-I=n=f,_,,l"--'u=e=n=c=i=n=ga,..__.:.M=a=s=s""---=-P-=o'-'l"-'1=-· t=i=c=a=l=---B=e=h=a::..;v:...:i=-· o=u=-r 
(Berkeley, 1985), p.35 
19 Lorwin, "Segmented Pluralism", p. 14-3 
20 Ibid. 
12 
Four Mechanisms of Consociational Theory 
While Lijphart's model of consociational democracy has undergone 
revisions and theoretical modifications, the principal strands of 
the theory remain intact. To provide elite cooperation as a 
substitute for minimal levels of cross-cutting at the mass level 
in divided societies, four major mechanisms must be 
institutionalised within the system's political structure: the 
grand coalition, proportional representation, segmental autonomy, 
and the minority veto. As the fundamental building blocks of a 
consociation, it is important to describe briefly their functions 
and necessity . 
Grand Coalition 
A grand coalition unites all the major segmental elites in an 
effort to share political power equitably among conflict groups. 
It is designed to permit an aggregate of interests to be 
articulated and also to create a forum in which such interests 
can be politically accommodated. The traditional antagonism that 
is germane to the majoritarian roles of government and opposition 
is eschewed in order to undertake accommodative political 
behaviour. 21 Only by allowing all segments to participate in a 
dispensation which diffuses the decision-making process among the 
various groups can widespread legitimacy be cultivated in a 
21 Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies, p.27 
13 
deeply divided society. 22 A consociational democracy's foremost 
task is to engender legitimacy; the grand executive is proposed 
to encourage the participation of competing segments and, 
ideally, for them to engage in a mutual give-and-take at the 
highest levels of decision-making. If groups are afforded the 
opportunity to formulate policy and make decisions directly 
affecting them, then they will endeavour to ensure that the 
political arrangement endures. Thus, the grand coalition creates 
legitimacy by offering all segments a stake in the political 
system. 
Proportional Representation 
The major consequence of proportional representation in a 
consociation is the reduction of conflict over contentious issues 
of governing. The proportionality rule is proposed because it 
allows for all segments, regardless of their size, to be 
represented in the decision-making process. 23 This has far-
reaching consequences when it is recalled that interests are 
aggregated in a consociation and that unanimity is the normative 
goal . As a result, even the smaller segments, which would 
otherwise be politically impotent in a majoritarian democracy, 
have the potential to influence public policy. 
22 Ibid. , p. 2 9 
23 Arend Lijphart , "Majority Rule Versus Democracy 
Divided Societies", Politikon 4, (1977), p.123; see also 




A system of proprotional representation also creates 
polities characterised by multipartism. The various subcultures 
form political party extensions of their social segments, thus 
the party becomes the instrument by which to mobilise the segment 
and engage in organised political behaviour. More important, 
multipartism induces coalition politics, which in turn elicits 
the need for intrasegmental compromises as the principal method 
of mediating conflict and encouraging effective decision-
making.24 Steiner elucidates the integral link between 
proportional representation and the necessity of, in his 
phraseology, "amicable agreement" . 25 Ci ting the case of 
Switzerland (where the two have been fundamental to the Federal 
Council's process of accommodation since 19~8), he concludes that 
the smaller the geographic size of the nation, the easier it is 
to apply the proportionality rule. 26 Presumably, smaller nations 
will have smaller populations and thus smaller elites; the time-
consuming process of building trust and engendering goodwill 
between the segments is consequently shortened and facilitated. 
The benefits of proportional representation are manifold. 
First, it "allows the segments to define themselves" by providing 
24 Arend Lijphart, 
Conflict Management in 
p. 7 
"Electoral Systems, Party Systems, and 
Segmented Societies", (Pretoria, 1985), 
25 Jurg Steiner, Amicable Agreement Versus Majority Rule: 
Conflict Resolution in Switzerland (Chapel Hill, 197~), pp.35-~2 
26 Jurg Steiner, "The Principles 
Proportionality". In MacRae, p.100 
of Majority and 
for the "representation of the segments without any need for a 
prior determination of which groups qualify as constituent 
segments. 1127 It also creates a balance of power between the 
consociation's executive and its legislature. In the 
15 
legislature, the segments can influence votes, hence public 
policy, commensurate to its electoral strength. The executive, 
conversely, is bound by the rule of concurrent majority so that 
matters affecting all segments are agreed upon. Thus, 
proportional representation is intended to satisfy both the small 
segments, which would not normally be represented in a system of 
vote plurality (such as exists in the majoritarian Westminster 
system), and the larger ones, which expect to influence policy in 
proportion to their numerical strength. 
Evidence of the uses of proportional representation in a 
consociational democracy is not necessarily restricted to the 
electoral process. In Austria, Belgium, Switzerland, and the 
Lebanon, the civil service bureaucracies and parastatals of each 
were proportionately staffed by the major segments. 28 When the 
proportionality rule is applied, much of the debate about who 
(i.e. which segment) receives what is rendered superfluous 
because group ratios will determine the allocation of state 
resources. This de facto distribution precludes a form of 
competition which is endemic to most majoritarian democracies but 
27 Lijphart, "Electoral Systems", p.13, p.12 
28 Lorwin, "Segmented Pluralism", p.152 
16 
destabilising in segmented societies. 29 
In Austria, the ministries of Justice, Social Welfare, and 
state-owned industries were headed by the Socialist Party, while 
Defence, Education, and Commerce were allotted to members of the 
Catholic Conservative Party: "a shift of votes between the two 
parties decided the conditions of their collaboration. 1130 Thus, 
branches of the governmental decision-making apparatus were 
equally shared. In the same vein, during the period 1943-1975 
the Lebanon distributed its executive and legislative positions 
according to the numerical preponderance of its eight major 
religious denominations: the Prime Minister was a Sunni Muslim; 
the President, a Christian Maronite; and the Chamber of Deputies 
was comprised of a fixed proprotion of representatives from the 
various religious groupings. 31 
In some consociations, there is a deliberate effort to 
over-represent a segment in order to entice it into participating 
in governmental structures and therefore to lend them legitimacy. 
The Belgian cabinet since 1970 has been legally required to be 
composed of an equal number of Flemish-speaking and Francophone 
ministers, despite the nation's overwhelming preponderance of the 
29 Nordlinger, Conflict Regulation, p.23 
30 Rodney Stiefbold, "Segmented Pluralism and 
Democracy in Austria". In Politics in Europe, ed. 
(New York, 1974), pp.123-124 
31 Nordlinger, Conflict Regulation, p.23 
Consociational 
Martin Heisler 
former. 32 Similarly, Colombia allocated an equal number 
(paridad) of Liberals and Conservatives in its Senate, civil 
service, Supreme Court, and Chamber of Representatives 
positions. 33 In short, proportionality removes from the 
decision-making agenda a significant amount of what would 
ordinarily be contentious issues of resource and role 
distribution. As a result, policy (but not the composition of 
the policy-makers) is left to the elites to decide. 
17 
32 Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies, pp.~0-~1 
33 Robert Dix, "Consociational Democracy the Case of 
Colombia", Comparative Politics 12, 3 (1980), p.308 
I 
Segmental Autonomy 
Segmental autonomy is defined by Lijphart as "rule by the 
minority over itself in the area of the minority's exclusive 
concern. 1134 In effect, it involves the decentralisation and 
18 
devolution of powers to the segment in order to assuage demands 
for group autonomy. 35 It benefits the consociation by minimising 
the policy load of the grand coalition (indeed, policy pertaining 
solely to one group's 'own affairs' would be perceieved more as 
an inconvenience than anything else by contending elites) and 
consequently reduces the chances of conflict. 36 In 
consociational theory, power devolution (or federalism) is 
structured in two forms: corporate and territorial. In both 
instances, 
the essential institutions [are] ... a government of the 
federation and a set of governments of the member units 
in which both kinds of government rule over the same 
territory and people and each kind has the authority to 
make decisions independently of the other. 37 
Corporate federalism is known as the "personality principle": 
power is deferred to a group within a polity to govern itself 
regardless of the spatial distribution of its members. This type 
34 Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies, p.~1 
35 Martin Heisler and Guy Peters, "Scarcity and the 
Management of Political Conflict in Multicultural Polities", 
International Political Science Review 1 (1980), p.332 
3b Jeffrey Obler, Jurg Steiner, and Guido Dierickx, 
Decision-Making in Smaller Democracies (Beverly Hills, 1977), 
pp.18-19 
37 
Wil 1 iarn Riker, =F-=e~d-e~r=a=l=i=s=m==~-""'0-=r~i=g~i=n,._., ___ O=p""'e-=r~a-t=i=· =o=n,._,_, 
Significance (Boston, 196~), p.5 
19 
of segmental autonomy was most pronounced in post-War Austria, 
where socio-organisational structures in both segments were so 
rigid and complete that these social cocoons had "the effect of 
reducing the all-or-nothing implications of electoral victory or 
defeat. 1138 That is, many of the demands of the masses could be 
satisfied by the segment's organisational structures through the 
autonomy granted by power devolution. Indeed, Scholten argues 
that 
in its totalistic manifestations, [segmentation] 
imposed upon the population an overbearing domination 
by the subcultural elites which was felt from waking-up 
to going to (and in) bed, from birth to death 
(including how to dispose ff the body) and which was 
backed up by legislation. 3 
Territorial autonomy usually takes the form in a structure of 
federalism in which the constituent segments of the polity 
coincide with geographic units. 40 Lijphart contends that 
federalism, as it exists in Switzerland (19 cantons and six demi-
cantons) and Austria {nine laander), is desirable because it 
induces an intensification of systemic pluralism; the segments 
become more isolated and cohesive, while the opportunities for 
38 Stiefbold, "Segmented Pluralism", p. 17 3; see 
Lehrnbruch, "Non-Competitive Pattern", pp.92-93 
also 
39 Ilja Scholten, "Corporatist and Consociational 
Arrangements", in Political Stabilitv and Nee-Corporatism ed. 
Ilja Scholten {Beverly Hills, 1987), p.9 
40 Arend Lijphart, 
and Empirical Links", 
Rhoodie {London, 1978), 
"Consociation and Federation: Conceptual 
in Intergroup Accommodation, ed. Nie 
p. 30 
20 
intersegmental contact at the mass level are greatly reduced. 41 
In addition a federal structure of power devolution involves a 
number of consociational-style devices such as: the over-
representation inherent to a bicameral system, with each unit 
wielding an equal share of power in a Senate-type body; the power 
of minority veto attendant to the right to amend the polity's 
constitution; and segmental autonomy, which flows from the 
decentralisation of power from the central government to the 
federated uni ts. 42 
Both Lewis and Nordlinger conclude that the corporate type 
of segmental autonomy is more desirable than a territorially-
oriented one. They argue that the intersegmental contact arising 
from corporate federalism would be the result of free choice and 
therefore not a problem requiring regulation, whereas the 
isolation associated with territorial federalism may lead to 
demands for secession from groups within the existing system. 43 
The two authors imply that while segmental isolation is probably 
a beneficial method of mitigating conflict, it should be 
corporately and not geographically based. 
Minority Veto 
A fourth mechanism cited by Lijphart as necessary for a 
41 Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies, p.~2 
42 Lijphart, "Consociation and Federation", p. 31 
43 Lewis, Politics in West Africa, pp.~9-55; Nordlinger, 
Conflict Regulation, p.108 
21 
consociation is the right of every segment to veto a policy 
directly affecting its interests. The mutual veto, or negative 
minority rule, is akin to Calhoun's notion of 'concurrent 
majority', which dictates that all interested parties must 
unanimously agree before a decision can be made. 44 The inclusion 
of the minority veto is somewhat paradoxical: it is a right 
conferred upon each segment, but it is provided with the 
intention that it will not be invoked. The spectre of 
immobilisme its employment creates will (theoretically) provoke 
the appropriate conciliatory behaviour because the threat of 
system breakdown will force elites to accommodate each other. 45 
Again, this regulatory device is designed to ensure the 
participation of the polity's smaller segments, which, under 
majoritarian conditions, are not necessarily able to influence 
decisions affecting them. 46 All participating groups are thus 
afforded a measure of political equality, the absence of which 
would, in Easton's view, lead to "fear, semi-paralysis in the 
resolution of important intergroup differences, and ultimately to 
the appeal to violence to settle an impossible situation. 1147 
Lijphart notes that it is a mechanism which has received 
"informal recognition" in the Netherlands, Switzerland, and 
44 Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies, p.36 
45 N dl. C fl. R 1 . 6 or inger, on ict egu ation, pp.25-2 
46 Ibid. 
47 David Easton, The Political System (New York, 1967), 
p. 303 
22 
Austria, and to a lesser degree in Belgium where all legislation 
pertaining to language issues must be approved by a majority of 
the representatives from both contending linguistic groups. 48 
These four mechanisms of consociational democracy by no 
means comprise an exhaustive list of all conflict-regulating 
structures and strategies, nor are they fully operative in all 
the European cases. For instance, Switzerland's radically 
decentralised power arrangement defers most decision-making 
authority to its various cantonal units, while its executive 
Federal Council deals only with issues directly affecting the 
entire system. The Netherlands, conversely, is characterised by 
an extreme concentration of decision-making power in it central 
government, where even regional issues are sometimes addressed. 
Nevertheless, the four devices briefly outlined constitute the 
nonnative political structure of a consociation and are the bases 
for the theoretical framework which will be reviewed in Chapter 
Two. 
48 L. . h t D . Pl 1 S . . 1JP ar, emocracy in ura oc1et1es, p.38 
23 
Conditions of Consociational Democracy 
The consociational school identifies a pattern of consistent 
conditions which exert a positive influence on the political 
integration of fragmented political systems. The model, 
therefore, prescribes a number of favourable conditions which 
should be present in order to facilitate conflict-regulating 
practices. 
An obvious characteristic shared by the four consociations is 
their relatively small size, both demographically and spatially. 
While most theorists stress that the political consequences of 
this factor are instrumental to the conflict regulation process, 
Lijphart dismisses its necessity. Claiming that smallness 
indirectly influences more salient variables such as neutrality, 
policy load, and external threats, he maintains that it is more 
directly responsible for ensuring that the segmental elites are 
small. 49 It is reasoned that smaller elites have more frequent 
and closer contact with each other, and are thus afforded more 
opportunities to foster mutual trust and goodwill. 50 The other 
conditions are clearly interdependent and, therefore, linked 
causally. 
49 Lijphart, "Typologies", p. 72 
50 
Steiner, 
Lijphart, Democracv in Plural Societies, pp.65-68; 
"Principles of Majority and Proportionality", p.100 
Neutrality 
As with most democracies, consociational government must strike 
"a balance between its capabilities and the demands placed upon 
it. 1151 However, the balance required in consociational systems 
is more complex, obscure, and precarious than that in 
majoritarian systems. The inherent instability necessitates the 
circum-scription of the central government policy load. This 
process involves limiting both the scope and the amount of 
decision-making which the executive undertakes. 
Due to the elites's preoccupation with managing domestically 
divisive issues, a high-profile, interventionist foreign policy 
is not only unlikely, it is imprudent. Intersegmental public 
policy wrangling precludes an active role in foreign affairs by 
virtue of the latter's susceptibility to group partisanship. 52 
Accordingly, the need to confine the elites to the minimum amount 
of conflict-prone issues is what makes a declared neut~ality a 
desirable feature of consociational democracies. Lehmbruch 
advises that a segmented polity's foreign policy should be a 
reflection of its "norms of internal conflict management", i.e. 
non-confrontational and amicable. 53 With the benefit of 
hindsight in the Lebanese case, Dekmejian concludes that to be 
successful a consociation must cultivate stable 
51 Lijphart, "Typologies", p. 71 
52 Hans Daalder, "The Consociational Democracy Theme", World 
Politics 24, 3 (July 1974), p.610 
53 Lehmbruch, "Consociational Democracy", p. 388 
relations between the states of a region thereby 
minimizing external interference in ;he delicate 
equilibrium of the segmented polity. 4 
Lebanon is an empirical example which clearly depicts a 
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phenomenon endemic to all consociational democracies: the state's 
human and material resources are limited to the point where it is 
impracticable to pursue a partisan foreign policy. It is because 
each segment seeks to maximise the allocation of state funds to 
itself that state treasuries in consociational democracies are 
under tremendous fiscal pressure. Active interventionism is 
expensive and usually refelcts only one set of group interests; 
it is not amenable to divergent ideas about the use of force and 
power in the international or regional context. It is therefore 
divisive and decidedly un-consociational. In addition, a neutral 
polity is blessed with a circumscribed policy agenda. A reduced 
policy load facilitates elite efforts at negotiation to the 
extent that fewer issues will need to be addressed and that 
consequently there will be fewer opportunities for conflict to 
emerge. 
Policy load at the national level is further curtailed 
through the decentralisation of policy issues to the regional 
sites of decision-making. The central government simply does not 
have the time (nor is it feasible) to negotiate every policy that 
is a source of dispute for the nation's conflict groups. In 
54 Richard Hrair Dekmejian, 
Crisis the Case of Lebanon", 
(January 1978), p.258 
"Consociational Democracy in 
Comparative Politics, 10, 2 
Swizerland, the canton is the locus for most policy decision-
making; only the "emotional" issues are suspended from 
deliberation until the highest (and last) point of decision-
making departure . 55 An effort is made to ensure that as much 
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decision-making as possible is undertaken at the regional level, 
which, correspondingly , provides for a degree of segmental 
autonomy (if the groups are separated spatially) and allows the 
national elites to focus on system-threatening conflict issues. 
Thus, the limited and diffuse decision-making structure of a 
consociation is required to minimise the amount of policy 
questions that demand accommodation amongst the various 
segments. 56 
External Threat s 
External threats have played a decisive role in the creation and 
perpetuation of consociational democracies. Both Switzerland and 
the Netherlands formed their central armies when their larger, 
hegemonic neighbours (the Habsburg Empire and France, 
respectively) threatened invasion. 57 Clearly, the smaller the 
territory and resources of a state, the more susceptible it will 
be to perceptions of national insecurity and vulnerability. As a 
55 James Dunn, "Consociational Democracy and Language 
Conflict", Comparative Political Studies 5, 1 (April 1972), p.17 
56 Daalder, "The Consociational Democracy Theme", p. 610 
57 William Riker, "Federalism". In Handbook of Political 
Science -- Governmental Institutions and Processes Volume 5, ed. 





result, a reactive unity is provoked; a national defense 
mechanism emerges as groups which are not ordinarily predisposed 
toward uniting suspend their differences to thwart the greater 
threat of potential invasion or intervention by foreign powers. 58 
In the four principal cases, consociations were either formed or 
fortified during periods of intense external instability: Austria 
attempted its consociational experimment less than ten years 
after a bloody civil war because its segments viewed 
accommodation as a superior alternative to a continued Allied 
occupation in the post-World War II era; the Netherlands forged 
its historic compromise as the battles of World War I raged 
around its borders; and both Switzerland and Belgium accepted 
Socialists into their cabinets during the First and Second World 
Wars respectively. 59 
National Unity 
The model's theorists contend that a consociational democracy 
will not survive without a bare minimum of support for its 
legitimacy and permanence. Likewise, the success of a 
consociation is 
possible only if its members' desire to continue to 
live together as a community is at least as strong as 
their desi~e to satisfy their separate and antagonistic 
interests. o 
58 Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies, p.66 
59 Lijphart, "Typologies", p. 70 
60 A. Ranney and W. Kendall, "Basic Principles for a Model 
of Democracy". In Empirical Democratic Theory, ed. Charles Cnudde 
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Thus, a consociation will not survive without a minimal amount of 
overarching loyalties between the constituent segments. A 
commonly-shared national consciousness is usually manifest in the 
presence of national symbols such as an anthem, flag, holidays et 
cetera. 61 In most cases, national unifiers are the product of an 
organic process, evolving historically rather than created and 
imposed by state fiat. Indeed, despite its pluralism, the 
Netherlands enjoyed a sense of national unity that predated its 
modern democratic processes by almost 300 years. 62 However, 
while a moderate nationalism is desirable, extreme nationalism 
clearly is not. The latter are ordinarily segmentally-based (as 
the Flemish nationalist movment in Belgium attests) and therefore 
the nationalistic ideology is not coterminous with the extant 
territorial boundaries of the system. 63 Competing nationalisms, 
especially exclusionary ones, will inevitably lead to further 
socio-political fragmentation, demands for secession, and even 
civil war. Obviously , it is unlikely that consociational 
democracy could prevail in such a hostile and unstable political 
environment . 
Balance of Segments 
(Chicago, 1969), p.~9 
61 Lehmbruch, "Consociational Democracy", p. 380 
62 Lijphart, The Politics of Accommodation, pp.79-82 
63 L. . h t D . Pl 1 S . . 8 2 lJP ar, emocracy in ura ocieties, p. 
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A consociation benefits from a multiple balance of segments 
because, generally, a greater number of segments and their 
approximate equal size will exert a positive effect on the 
balance of contending forces. 64 Lijphart argues that three or 
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four segments are ideal: more, and the negotiation process tends 
toward immobilisme as a greater number of interests will neeed to 
be accommodated; less, i.e. two, "entails either a hegemony or a 
precarious balance", and competitive zero-sum perceptions 
ensue. 65 
It is important that no single segment comprises the 
majority of the population nor can otherwise exert more potential 
influence under majoritarian assumptions of democracy. 66 If this 
condition is not fulfilled, then it will be difficult to dissuade 
the predominant group from dispensing with consociational 
politics; its numerical superiority will, in most cases, provide 
it with the resources to acquire and maintain power unilaterally, 
either democratically or exclusively. If a dominant group 
attempts to rule unilaterally, the dynamics of deep social 
segmentation will ensure that the regime is perceived as 
illegitimate by those groups permanently excluded from political 
power. The dominant group wll consequently be forced to adopt 
64 Dekmejian, "Consociational Democracy in Crisis", p.256 
65 Thi· s t was no , 
Socialists and the 
consociation for 21 
Societies, p.56 
however, the case in Austria, where the 
Catholic Conservatives formed a stable 
years. Cf. Lijphart, Democracy in Plural 
66 Lijphart, "Typologies", p. 69 
more authoritarian means of regulating group conflict and 
opposition to its rule; the probability of democracy prevailing 
under such conditions will narrow significantly. In essence, 
consociational democracy bases its existence on the assumption 




Central to consociational theory is the emphasis placed on the 
performance of the political elites of each subculture. These 
elites are responsible for brokering deals with each other and 
maintaining the loyalty (and the corresponding authority which 
flows from it) of their respective rank-and-file. Their 
behaviour is pivotal to the politics of accommodation: only they 
can provide the decision-making effectiveness which facilitates 
stable democracy. Conversely, non-elites, in Nordlinger's view, 
are "too numerous, too scattered, too fragmented, too weak, and 
too unskilled" to undertake the delicate negotiations germane to 
consociation. 67 
Types of Elites 
Stiefbold distinguishes three elite roles which play significant 
parts in all four principal cases, but particularly in Austria. 
The highest level of elites is the "top elite", the individuals 
67 Nordlinger, Conflict Regulation, p.~O 
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who negotiate the deals with other subcultural elites and wield 
the ultimate decision-making authority; within each segment, 
there is also the "partisan elites" who are responsible for 
maintaining a high degree of ideological unity among the 
segmental members; and the technocratic elites, who occupy vital 
positions in media organisations, the bureaucracy, and interest 
groups. 68 While all three roles are intrinsic to the complex 
processes which underpin consociation, it is primarily the top 
elites which engage in the political accommodation between 
conflict groups and are, therefore, the focus of analysis. The 
system-sustaining compromises are undertaken by them; it is their 
respective behaviour and attitudes which foster the circumstances 
under which democratic stability is procured. 
Elite Attitudes 
According to Lijphart, the crucial ingredient of a successful 
consociational democracy is the willingness of elites to 
compromise; this amenability therefore comprises one of the 
model's prerequisites. 69 Cooperative attitudes are essential, he 
argues, but will probably be present in any case because 
the prospect of participating in government is a 
powerful stimulus to moderation and compromise ... it 
minimizes the risk of being deceived by the other 
parties or by one's own undue optimism concerning their 
68 Rodney Stiefbold, "Segmented Pluralism and Consociational 
Democracy: Problems of Stability and Change". In Politics in 
Europe, ed. Martin Heisler (New York, 1974), pp.152-153 
69 Lijphart, "Typologies", p. 65 
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willingness to be accommodating. 70 
Thus, due to the potential for system paralysis in segmented 
societies, the political effectiveness of the executive 
(reflected in the degree of legitimacy it engenders) is directly 
bearing on the willingness of one segment to accommodate the 
interests of another (or others). Without this intention, the 
system's viability as a democracy is ill-fated. 
Daalder argues that the 1917 Pacifitae in the Netherlands 
was, in the main, achieved through elite compromises. In 
exchange for mutual concessions, each segment received what it 
sought but only because the elites realised that without 
compromise the Dutch polity was destined for immobilisme and 
perhaps even civil war. 71 Separate analyses by Bluhm and Powell 
of Austria's post-War consociation provide similar conclusions 
about elite behaviour. Bluhm asserts that although Austria had 
democratic institutions and a high level of socio-economic 
development, ultimately an "integrating situation without an 
~!] 
integrating intention would have remained barren 11 ;1i.. while Powell 
observes that a "cooperative spirit" pervaded Austria's deeply 
divided (though fully functional) political system. 73 In 
70 Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies, p.31 
71 Daalder, 
p.108 
"On the Origins of the Consociational Model", 
72 William Bluhm, 
Political Integration 
p.257 
Building an Austrian Nation 
of a Western State (New Haven 




addition, the case of Colombia presents further evidence of the 
need for accommodatively-disposed elites in a consociational 
democracy . Although Colombia cannot be classified as a fully-
fledged democracy along with the four principal consociations, 
Dix argues that it nevertheless underwent a "highly successful" 
consociational period between 1958-1974 -- after which it evolved 
into a stable, rotating majoritarian democracy. 74 The success of 
Colombian elite cooperation is particularly significant if 
contrasted against the years directly preceding the coalition 
between its two rival segments when civil war claimed almost 
100,000 lives. Thus, there was no peaceful alternative to 
political accommodation; it was the prospect of continued 
political stalemate and violence which persuaded the elites to 
offer mutual concessions. 75 
The Self- Denying Prophecy 
This last observation hints at the second aspect of elite 
behaviour which Lijphart found consistent in the European 
consociations: the willingness to compromise in order to avoid 
system dissolution. Lijphart refers to this as the 'self-
denying' prophecy, i.e. the elites will be compelled to engage in 
accommodative behaviour with each other rather than risk the 
chaos and potential for violence which would follow the breakdown 
74 Dix, "The Case of Colombia", p. 304 
75 Ibid. , pp. 311- 317 
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of the democratic process. 76 Again, one of the best 
illustrations of shared perceptions is drawn from the Dutch 
Pacifitae of 1917, which involved a grand compromise among the 
Netherlands' five major segments concerning state-funding of 
education, universal suffrage, and the introduction of 
proportional representation. Daalder maintains that because none 
of the five was powerful enough to impose its will on the rest a 
package deal addressing the primary demands of each group was 
struck. 77 Essentially, each segment was cognisant of its own 
limits of political power vis a vis the other groups; the 
interests which each segment sought to procure (or protect) could 
only be realised if certain concessions to the other subcultures 
were forthcoming. In a similar vein, Nordlinger cites the 
reality of each group's limited political resources as a 
motivating factor behind elite conciliatory behaviour. He 
concludes that 
the desire for governmental power is most likely to 
engender regulatory behavior when n~ one party has 
sufficient support to govern alone. 8 
Thus, if stability is to be developed, retention or acquisition 
of political power in a segmented society can only be achieved 
through a system of mutual trade-offs negotiated between conflict 
groups and a submission to 'second-best' policy choices. 
76 Lijphart, "Typologies", p. 6L!-
77 Daalder, "The Consociational Democracy Theme", p. 616 
78 Nordlinger, Conflict Regulation, p. 50 
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Convergence of Interests 
Lijphart's third condition for successful elite behaviour 
involves a II commitment to system maintenance. 11 79 A minimum level 
of convergent interests among the subcultures is required in 
order for regime legitimacy to develop. Without this, the 
effectiveness of the political system would be severely hindered 
by the disaffection of those segments which do not share similar 
interests. Thus, 
cooperation at the elite level is facilitated to the 
extent that the leader's motivation is provided not 
only by a perception of common interests but also by 
common background and outlook. 80 
Despite group antagonism, the elites must force a negotiated 
understanding which recognises intersegmental tensions but also 
seeks to ensure a peaceful co-existence. If consociation is to 
prove viable in deeply segmented societies, then the elites must 
be aware of the futility of zero-sum strategies. Accordingly, 
this must manifest itself in the shared perception that 
cooperation and consesnus are the only democratic alternatives to 
the intransigence that political competition engenders. Daalder 
concisely observes that, in a consociation, "(n]uances and mutual 
acceptance become the prevailing modes of debate rather than one 
79 Lijphart, "Typologies", p. 65 
80 Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies, p.168 
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of exclusive claims and unsolvable combat. 1181 In the Austria 
case, Powell contends that the Catholic and Socialist subcultures 
even agreed "not to take actions to establish an independent 
power base, or greatly enhance their own position at the expense 
of other factions . 1182 This is indicative of the profound need 
for suspicion between groups to be eschewed in order to foster a 
political environment conducive to accommodative behaviour. 
Rules of the Game 
The fourth condition regarding elite behaviour stipulates the 
institutionalisation of the 'rules of the game'. Lijphart 
maintains that this is also a crucial condition because it 
determines the nature and scope of a system's accommodative 
practices . 83 In his study of the the Netherlands, he concludes 
that one of the essential rules requires that 
on issues considered vital by a bloc, no decisions can 
be made without either their coniurrence or at least 
substantial concessions to them. 4 
Others from the consociational school, particularly Lehmbruch, 
elaborates on this idea by claiming that there is a patterned 
routinisation of conflict-regulating behaviour. Citing the 19~3 
rapprochement between the bourgeoisie and the working-class in 
Switzerland, he argues that the accommodation was necessitated by 
81 Daalder , "Origins of the Consociational Model", p. 101; 
see also Bluhm, Building an Austrian Nation , p.120 
82 Powell, Social Fragmentation, pp . 8~-85 
83 Lijphart, "Typologies", p. 65 
84 Lijphart , The Politics of Accommodation, p.125 
the unstable external environment but was internalised and 
perpetuated after the war had ended. 85 Thus, once cooperation 
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has been initiated it should be a rule of the game that it ought 
not be discontinued simply because its raison d'etre is no longer 
required . Clearly , the consociational model indiscriminately 
regards any and all forms of coalescent behaviour as desirable. 
The rules of the game dictate that the segmental elites 
forego extremism and pursue a course of rationality and 
pragmatism . What can be done takes precedence over what ought to 
be done. Stiefbold impresses this regulating precept by 
asserting that "rational choice" is a critical factor affecting 
the decsion-making outsomes of a consociation. 86 It is the 
aspect of a working consociation that will determine the system's 
effectiveness and legitimacy, hence it stability. 
Accommodation and Rational Choice 
The concept of rational choice is closely allied with the actual 
unit of accommodation -- the compromise. Nordlinger defines a 
compromise as a "mutual adjustment of conflicting interests and 
values . 1187 With a compromise, one elite will yield on an issue 
that another elite finds of vital importance in the hope that 
85 Lehmbruch, "Consociational Democracy", p. 382 
86 Stiefbold, 
Democracy", p.120 
"Segmented Pluralism and 
87 Nordlinger, Conflict Regulation, p. 27 
Consociational 
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such a concession will in the future bring about a reciprocal 
yielding by the latter on an issue of importance to the former. 88 
Compromises in a consociation can take several forms. There are 
'package deals', which usually require concurrent concessions by 
segmental elites; 'log-rolling' or 'trade-offs' usually involve 
concessions or compromises on a policy issue which are meant 
either to be reciprocated later, or to engender goodwill and 
mutual trust so that future negotiations can be more amicable. 89 
The 1917 Dutch Pacifitae is an example of a package deal. With 
the external threat posed by Germany, the Dutch elites attempted 
to unite their divided nation and strengthen their own political 
power bases by agreeing to a deal which awarded each segment the 
concession it sought. The confessional parties (one Catholic and 
two Protestant-Calvinist denominations) demanded state funding of 
their school systems on par with that of the secular state 
system; the Socialists sought universal suffrage; and the 
Liberals sought the inclusion of proportional representation in 
Parliament as a response to their waning electoral support under 
conditions of plurality. Thus, the deal accommodated each 
interest, and although from an ideological perspective it may 
have been a heavy price to pay, this first act of political 
88 For an in-depth analysis of the role of political 
bargaining see Bingham Powell, Jr., and Rodney Stiefbold, "Anger, 
Bargaining, and Mobilization as Middle-Range Theories of Elite 
Conflict Behavior". Comparative Politics 9 (July 1977), pp.379-
398 
89 Lehmbruch, "Non-Competitive Pattern", p. 92 
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cooperation came to be the institutionalised method of decision-
making in the Netherlands for the following 60 years. 90 
Steiner contends that the essence of consociational 
decision-making is bound to the notion that all segments must not 
only have their say but also must agree to a decision. 91 This is 
brought about primarily through the institutionalisation of 
extra-parliamentary committees such as the Social and Economic 
Council in the Netherlands and the Consultative Committee in 
Austria. Both are bodies comprised of a cross-section of 
national interests which seek to advise their respective 
executives on public policy. The SEC is a ~5-member organisation 
(one-third labour, one-third management, and one-third 
governmental appointees) established in 1950 to filter 
contentious issues before they come to the elites for bargaining. 
The primary function of the Council is to make the issue as 
ideologically diluted as possible before reaching the elites; in 
effect, it attempts to depoliticise problems before they prove 
unresolvable at the elite level. 92 
Similarly, another aspect of consociational decision-making 
which takes place outside the executive is the political 
90 It is important to note here that while accommodative 
practices were the norm in the Dutch polity, the Socialist Party 
was frequently excluded from the executive coalition during the 
1917-1967 consociational period. 
91 Steiner, Amicable Agreement, p.5 
92 Franz Lehner, "Consociational Democracy in Switzerland". 
European Journal of Political Research 12 (198~), pp.30-31 
bargaining between ministries in the civil service. In this 
manner, policy-making is relegated to the bureaucracy in the hope 
that it will lose some of its contentiousness . This 
'technocratisation' is undertaken to obscure from public view the 
dilution of an issue so that neither the mass supporters nor the 
mass opponents of a particular policy are subject to its 
compromise one way or the other; the emotionalism is removed, 
therefore rational policy choices can be made and deals struck. 93 
Accordingly, the modus operandi of elite level bargaining is also 
employed within the bureaucracy as segments controlling different 
portfolios within the civil service accommodate each other, 
ensuring a minimum level of competence and effective management 
of state resources and services. Thus, many decisions which 
would otherwise be unobtainable at the elite level can somehow be 
manageable through a process of bureaucratic de-idologisation. 
Political Security and Quality of Leadership 
Nordlingers proffers an aspect of elite behaviour neglected by 
consociational scholars, the import of which has profound effects 
on coalescence. Claiming that the willingness to accommodate is 
directly contingent upon the elite members' own perceptions of 
personal-political security, he cautions that perceptions of 
one's own rank-and-file are as important for conflict regulation 
93 Daalder, "The Consociational Democracy Theme" , p . 60 7 
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as those of one's opposing groups. 94 Becasue elites require 
support and legitimacy from their respective masses to broker 
their deals, they must be secure in their authority in order to 
ensure that the compromises they undertake will be acceptable to 
a vast majority of their supporters. Indeed, Nordlinger argues 
that to indulge in conciliatory behaviour involves a high level 
of risk; it is easier to adhere to the more popular hardline 
espoused by the partisan elites than risk cutting a deal that 
one's supporters may or may not accept. 95 Elites, therefore, are 
in constant jeopardy of being branded as "sell-outs" by those who 
claim to be the true bearers of segmental interests. Political 
insecurity can exacerbate intergroup strife still further as the 
"insecure" elite members 
come to exaggerate the aggressiveness of opposing 
conflict groups ... [whose] demands are likely to be 
perceived as more than strenuously articulated demands, 
they may be unrealis~ically interpreted as direct 
threats and attacks. 
While conversely, 
secure leaders will be more willing to take those risks 
attendant upon regulate~ efforts, and the risks 
themselves are smaller. 
Thus, elite self-perceptions become a key variable of elite 
behaviour, and consequently exert an impact on the application of 
94 Nordlinger, Conflict Regulation, p.6~ 
95 Ibid., p. 66 
96 Ibid., p. 67 
97 Ibid., p. 66 
l!-2 
consociational methods. 
In turn, the question of elite attitudes toward their own 
role in consociational politics raises other issues which are 
instructive to understanding the model's intricacies. Of 
particular relevance is the quality of elite leadership and its 
effect on the hierarchical relations between elites and their 
followers. Lijphart argues that the quality of elite leadership 
is the "crucial factor" determining the model's success because 
consociation, in effect, "entails government by the elite. 1198 
Precisely because it is elite behaviour which must substitute for 
fragmentation at the mass level, their efforts are the only ones 
which provide, in Nordlinger's view, a "direct and positive 
contribution" to the regulating process. 99 All other actors 
operating in the political arena lack the authority and resources 
to enage in the politics of accommodation. 
Elite Predominance 
Following Nordlinger, a structured elite predominance comprises 
three inter-related components. First, the elites must be 
conferred with the ultimate decision-making authority, abetted by 
an organisational hierarchy within each group. This requires the 
presence of mass parties with nationally-oriented organising and 
98 Lijphart, The Politics of Accommodation, p.211, p.126 
99 Nordlinger, Conflict Regulation, p. l!-0 
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mobilising capabilities. 100 Second, relatively apolitical, or at 
least depoliticised, masses will aid inter-elite negotiations by 
ensuring that threats of political out-bidding will be 
minimised. lOl The downward flow of information is also muted in 
an attempt to keep mass interest in politics at a low level and, 
consequently, to diminish the occasions for conflict to arise. 
And third, acquiescent attitudes (mass deference and passivity) 
are normative corollaries of the secrecy required by 
accommodation; the dilution of ideology and the amenability of 
group interests to compromise necessitate relatively compliant 
and depoliticised masses. 1~ 
With their leadership as the intrinsic component of 
consociation, the elites are dependent upon a "structured 
predominance" over their followers to ensure themselves the 
bargaining latitude to manoeuvre above the mass level of populist 
politics. 103 Inter-elite negotiation involves a mutual dilution 
of ideology; the elites must wield the political leverage to 
compromise zealous ideals which are invoked by the partisans to 
sate their supporters. As Lorwin notes, the "allure of 
pluralism" in a segmented society requires a rigid organisation 
of the blocs to counter the effects of competitive bidding among 
lOO Nordlinger, Conflict Regulation, pp. 73-87 
!Ol Ibid. 
lO, Ibid. 
103 Ibid., pp. 73-71,i. 
groups; pluralism's inherent 'uncertainty factor' requires elites 
to erect structures which will prevent their flock from straying 
to other segments. 104 Accordingly, every aspect of the segmental 
member's public life must fall under the aegis of the segment and 
its elite. In post-War Austria, the accountability of segmental 
members was so extreme that even one's choice of restaurant or 
sporting club was politically reflective. 105 Thus, a concerted 
effort is made to make the bloc members dependent on elite 
leadership; the elites, reasons Houska, "seek to remove any 
incentive from social and political choices and instead seek to 
make them statements of identity. 11 106 In doing so, the elites are 
able to limit the contact of its members with those of other 
segments. The intention is to keep them segmentally pure and 
accountable. The drawback, however, is that segmental members 
are forced to govern their behaviour in accordance with the rules 
dictated by the group leadership; consequently, a greater degree 
of personal freedoms are circumscribed for the sake of greater 
elite control. The strict ideological structures that are 
particular to consociational democracies are therefore 
necessitated to confer upon the elites the authority to broker 
deals for the segment as a whole. 
104 Lorwin, "Segmented Pluralism", p.157 
105 Houska, Influencing Mass Political Behavior, p. 7 
106 Ibid. , p. t,i,Q 
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This is not to suggest that the elites wantonly rule over 
their follwers with the complicitous aid of authoritarian 
institutions. Clearly, the elites do not operate within a 
vacuum. Rather, it is apparent that they are as dependent on 
mass trust {and its pursuant legitimacy) as the masses are on 
elite leadership, in much the same manner as exists in 
majoritarian systems. In The Civic Culture, Almond and Verba 
address this relationship in their discussion of "power and 
responsiveness". They claim that it is necessary for elites to 
strike a balance between the exercise of state power {in all its 
manifestations) and the corresponding mass perceptions of its 
use. 107 Public perceptions of the use and abuse of power are the 
prime determinants of the levels of regime legitimacy. Among 
others, the case of Colombia is indicative of this 
interdependence. Although it experienced a successful quasi-
consociational government for 16 years, Colombia was racked by 
intense civil strife during a previous coalition between its two 
conflict groups. The violence continued through the 1945-49 
National Union, despite entreaties from both segmental elites for 
it to cease. 108 This provides an instructive example of the 
futility of conflict-regulating arrangements in situations where 
the elites are not conferred with the authority of those they 
purport to represent. In sum, to gain legitimacy the leadership 
107 Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture 
(Princeton, 1963), pp.476-477 
lOB Dix, "The Case of Colombia" , p. 317 
must be effective; to be effective, the leadership requires an 
organisational structure which enables it to keep its rank-and-
file cohesive, strong, and accountable. 
Secrecy, Deference . and Passivity 
It is obvious that consociational elites are forced to walk a 
fine line. They must gain concessions which satisfy their 
supporters while concurrently negotiating the deals that will be 
acceptable to the other elites. Consequently, most elite-level 
bargaining occurs behind closed doors. Secrecy, Lijphart 
maintains, is an inevitable cognate of the consociational 
decision-making process; every effort is made to remove 
potentially volatile intersegmental issues from the public 
forum. 109 The contentiousness of policy-making necessitates the 
insularity of elites and a concomitant shrouding of their 
efforts. Daalder points out that mass passivity thus becomes 
both a consequence and a precondition of consociational decision-
making. 110 The masses must defer a significant amount of 
decision-making authority and must then be content to forgo an 
equally significant amount of downward flowing information about 
their country's political machinations. As Lijphart observes, 
elites must employ "complicated arguments and the juggling of 
economic facts and figures incomprehensible to most individuals" 
109 Lijphart, The Politics of Accommodation, p.137 
110 Daalder, "The Consociational Democracy Theme", p.608 
in order to "make politics dull and to keep popular interest at 
low ebb . " 111 Accordingly , a low level of public interest in 
politics will facilitate the task of obtaining political 
compromises . Elites must be allowed to invoke the dictates of 
rational choice, rather than let grassroots emotionalism and 
1.J,,7 
extremism sabotage the susceptibility of an issue to bargaining. 
Consociational theorists contend that the masses in the European 
cases acknowledge and accept this reality -- despite its prima 
facie democratic shortcomings. It is this acceptance which 
constitutes an essential contribution to the consociation's 
viability. 
Historical Traditions of Accommodati on 
The most glaring omission in Lijphart's model is any reference to 
the constructive role played by historical traditions of elite 
accommodation in the European systems. Indeed, some in the 
school stress the factor's pre-eminence as the predictive 
variable o~ stability in a consociation. 112 Lijphart, however, 
remains steadfast in his dismissal of its benefits for conflict 
regulation . 113 Despite this lack of consensus, Lehmbruch and 
111 
p.137 
Lijphart, The Politics of Accommodation, pp.129-130, 
112 See Daalder, "The Consociational Democracy Theme", 
pp.601.J,,-621; and Bluhm, Building an Austrian Nation, pp.65-66 
113 In more recent analyses Lijphart concedes that it is a 
significant factor in some empirical cases, but nevertheless 
maintains that it is not a prerequisite. See Lijphart, Democracy 
in Plural Societies, pp.103-105 
Daalder forcefully argue that the potential for elite 
accommodation is directly contingent upon past conciliatory 
behaviour between the segments of a polity. 114 Both identify as 
significant the historical evolution of consensus-oriented 
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political structures in the principal cases. Daalder notes that 
these successful examples are rooted in centuries of 
accommodation and "the longstanding pluralist traditions which 
militated against the individualist and majoritarian assumptions 
of popular sovereignty. 11115 
The gradualist tradition is also evident in Austria history. 
It can be traced back to the Habsburg era when the conflict of 
interests and nationalisms endemic to that fragmented empire had 
"since time immemorial made necessary a supply of broker talent 
to hold them together. 11116 Similarly, Steiner observes that the 
spirit of amicable agreement in Switzerland has been firmly 
entrenched since the formation of the proportionately represented 
Federal Council in 1848, and that occasions of compromise are 
evident as early as 1291. 117 In the Lebanon, the segmental 
autonomy of the religious sects was a power-relations compromise 
of the ruling Ottoman Empire, as were the treaties of 1861 and 
114 Hans Daalder, "On Building Consociational Nations: Cases 
of the Netherlands and Switzerland". In MacRae, pp.107-124; 
Lehmbruch, "Non-Competitive", p.94 
115 Daalder, "The Consociational Democracy Theme", p.617 
116 Bluhm, Building an Austrian Nation, pp. 65-66 
117 Steiner, Amicable Agreement, pp. 35-36 
186~ which conferred upon the Lebanese polity a quasi-
independence within the Turkish Empire in the form of a self-
governing, multi-denominational advisory council. 118 Daalder 
asserts that rather than existing as cohesive political units, 
17th century Netherlands and Switzerland were "a motley 
~9 
arrangement of particularist communities", with no one community 
seeking to dominate the others. 119 The groups in both were united 
by the need to raise armies that could repell the threats of 
foreign invasions and ideologies. 120 In the Netherlands, group 
mobilisation and cooperation evolved as an historical response to 
the ideological threats of the French and Bourbon Revolutions. 
Thus, the historical traditions of mutual accommodation antedate 
·~1 democracy itself in the consociations.iL Furthermore, the 
organisational structures which were the foundations of 
contemporary consociational segmentation, and consequently 
accommodation, were created in the 19th Century as a response to 
"liberalism's bankrupt individualism. 11122 There is no doubt that 
with respect to the principal examples of consociation, their 
118 Lehmbruch, "Non-Competitive", p. 93 
119 Daalder, "On Building Consociational Nations", p.110 
120 Riker, "Federalism", pp. 91J..·9~ 
121 It is also argued that this historical phenomenon was 
evident in pre-consociational Colombia. See Alexander Wilde, 
"Oligarchical Democracy in Colombia". In Juan Linz and Alfred 
Stepan (eds) The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes, Part III 
(Baltimore, 1978), pp.35-37 
122 Houska, Influencing Mass Political Behavior, p. 5 
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institutionalisation can, to varying degrees, be traced to pre-
consociation patterns of political accommodation and intergroup 
cooperation. 
Conversely, it has also been strenuously argued that 
previous accommodative behaviour is not a sufficient nor even 
significant precondition of conflict management. In fact, if 
violent political eruptions preceded a consociational experiment 
(as was the case in Switzerland, Malaysia, Austria, and the 
Lebanon), then there may be a heightened desire to avoid further 
violence. 123 Lijphart articulates a similar argument about the 
Netherlands. He claims that while historical traditions may have 
played a part in the 1917 Pacifitae, they were at most "jointly 
operative" with the self-denying prophecy, i.e. the spectre of 
system-breakdown. 124 However, even Lijphart acknowledges that 
gradual conciliation between historically conflictual groups is 
beneficial to fostering trust and confidence between segments --
a critical requirement for the model's success. 125 
123 Nordlinger, Conflict Regulation, p. 51. The reasons for 
the perpetuation of violent conflict in the Lebanon are more 
difficult to ascertain, especially with respect to the role 
played by foreign powers. 
124 Lijphart, "Time Politics", p.12 
125 Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies, p.228 
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Summary 
Consociational democratic theorists present their model of 
conflict regulation as an alternative to both the winner-take-all 
Westminster system and the breakdown of democracy which would 
likely occur if the precepts of majoritarianism were adopted in a 
deeply divided society. The consociational model seeks to 
explain how conflict groups obtain and secure democratic 
stability in hostile circumstances. Its underlying assumption is 
that groups have more to gain through mutual cooperation than by 
risking the democratic breakdown associated with zero-sum 
perceptions of political activity. 
The theory's exponents contend that democratic stability 
will be difficult to realise if the model's necessary conditions 
-- minimised levels of cross-cutting interests, segmental 
isolation, voluntary group membership, elite predominance, a 
shared willingness to compromise, a minimum convergence of 
political and economic values, adherence to the rules of the 
game, politically secure leaderships, and a deferential and 
passive citizenry -- are lacking. Furthermore, a set of 
favourable conditions is proposed -- small population and 
territory, the presence of external threats to the polity, a 
declared neutrality and a minimised central government policy 
load, a degree of a national unity, a multiple balance of 
segments, and historical traditions of accommodation -- the 
absence of which greatly reduces the chances for successful 
conflict management. Both sets of conditions constitute the 
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analytical framework from which the theory draws its major 
prescriptions for democratic stability and conflict-regulation in 
divided societies. Accordingly, before the model can 
transplanted in other conflict polities (an exercise its 
proponents vigorously advocate), it is necessary to assess the 
main theoretical suppositions reflected in these conditions. 
Chapter Two will attempt to highlight the model's methodological 
and interpretative shortcomings while also focussing on those 
conditions which are beneficial to an understanding of conflict 
and its regulation in segmented societies. 
I 
Chapter Two 
A Critique of the Consociational Model 
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In recent years, an abundance of journal articles and books have 
emerged criticising the consociational model proposed by Lijphart 
et al .. The sheer volume reflects the intense interest and 
controversy generated by the theory, focussing specifically on 
its normative prescriptions for conflict regulation in 
fragmented, unstable societies. Some academics initially 
intrigued by the model's benefits for comparative system typology 
now attack its lapses in logic, consistency, and scientific 
thoroughness. 1 Criticism of the model can be generally separated 
into two groups, one questioning Lijphart's methodology and the 
other dissecting his logical conclusions drawn from the empirical 
cases and his analytical interpretations which form the corpus of 
the theory's prescriptions. In light of the enormity of the 
critical literature, this chapter will focus only on the comments 
which directly challenge the model's viability as a genuine 
academic concept. These criticisms will then be incorporated 
into a modified model of consociational democracy which will be 
discussed in Chapter Three and serve as the analytical framework 
for evaluating its potential for successfully managing conflict 
in South Africa. 
1 The most illuminating critical analyses are Brian Barry, 
"Political Accommodation and Consociational Democracy", British 
Journal of Political Science 5 (1975), pp.477-505 and "The 
Consociational Model and Its Dangers", European Journal of 
Political Research 3, 3 (1975), pp.393-412; M.P. van Schendelen, 
"Critical Comments on Lijphart's Consociational Democracy", 
Politikon 10, 1 (June 1983), pp.6-32; Ronald Kieve, "Pillars of 
Sand: a Marxist Critique of ConsociationalDemocracy", Comoarative 
PoliticalStudies 13, 3 (April 1981),pp.313-337; and Ilja Scholten 
(ed),Political Stability andNeo-Corporatism (BeverlyHills, 1987) 
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Methodology 
As a social science theory, specifically an addition to the field 
of comparative system typology, Lijphart's consociational model 
must necessarily adhere to widely accepted standards of 
methodological soundness. Its purported normative benefits for 
conflict regulation in an unstable societies demand that it first 
withstand rigorous inspection. 
Upon even the most cursory evaluation of the consociational 
model, one is struck by the absence of any quantitative data to 
buttress the theory's fundamental postulations. Indeed, the 
collective methodological approach of the consociational school 
~ 
places far too much emphasis on inductive reasoning.~ Although 
Lijphart has provided some nuance -- i.e., the inclusion of 
socially fragmented yet politically stable systems -- to Almond's 
original system typology it is obvious that there are serious 
faults about some of his most basic conclusions. He constructs a 
model of conflict regulation based on the empirical and 
historical evidence of four affluent, structurally diverse 
European democracies, asserting that at varying periods in their 
democratic evolution, Austria, Belgium, Switzerland, and the 
Netherlands constituted a new systemic typology -- one which 
identified patterns of non-competitive elite behaviour and 
decision-making as the principal determinants of democratic 
stability. Yet, he never discusses the types of conflict which 
2 Jurg Steiner, "The Consociational Theory and Beyond". 
Conparative Politics 13, 3 (April 1981), pp.350-352 
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were endemic to his four case studies; thus, he never examines 
how the model would operate under varying intensities and 
dynamics of group conflict. 
The theory focusses on elite behaviour in severely segmented 
societies but little attention is paid to how a social segment 
becomes politically salient. Because no data are provided 
indicating the degrees of intensity within and among conflict 
groups, it is reckless to assert (as some of the theory's 
exponents do) that the model is universally applicable to all 
systems afflicted by conflict that cannot otherwise be managed by 
conventional forms of democratic regulation. It is not 
sufficient simply to know that groups are differentiated by 
language or religion: there must be evidence to indicate which 
cleavages are predominant and if they are equally intense between 
all segments. For example, it can be conceded that language is a 
cleavage in Switzerland, but it can also be argued that there is 
more potential for discord between a German-speaking Bernese and 
a German-speaking Zuricher than between Swiss-French and Swiss-
Italian speakers. 3 Moreover, research conducted by Bohn suggests 
that there are sufficient levels of cross-cutting in Switzerland 
along economic and religious lines to mitigate the 
contentiousness of the linguistic cleavage. 4 Thus, it is evident 
3 steiner, "The Consociational Theory and Beyond", p.341; see 
also, van Schendelen, "Critical Comments", p.7 
4 David Earl Bohn, "Consociational Democracy and the Case of 
Switzerland". Journal of Politics 42, 1 {February 1980), p.167 
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that Swiss segments are far from the pure and distinct blocs that 
Lijphart portray them to be. 
This conclusion reflects a major flaw in the model's 
assumptions about segmentation: if the Swiss polity is not deeply 
divided, then why the need for consociation? As the theory is 
presented by its exponents, consociational democracy is the 
institutional and procedural compromise to the consensual view 
among elites that sharing power is the only recourse to 
untempered political competition between highly politicised 
segments; majoritarianism is not a viable framework. But if the 
conflict is not intense, then the political system could 
conceivably operate under traditional forms of majoritarian 
democracy because zero-sum perceptions of political behaviour 
between segments are not manifest. 
Can Switzerland, then, be classified as a consociation? 
Barry proffers a convincing argument, asserting that it cannot 
because the social fragmentation is not severe; the fact that 
political stability is procured in a relatively harmonious social 
context is not then surprising. He states: 
the fact of parties drawing support across cleavage 
lines is evidence for the relatively low salience of 
issues related to ascfiptive group membership rather 
than the cause of it. 
Bohn supports this contention by presenting Swiss marriage 
statistics which depict high levels of inter-marriage across the 
linguistic cleavage, concluding that 
5 Barry, "Political Accommodation", pp.4-87-4-88 
[n]one of the social isolation and underlying ethnic 
alienation predicted by the consociational model 
appeared in the data, except in the case of North Jura 
where therr is a signifiacnt absence of cross-
pressures. 
Even Daalder admits that it is important to bear in mind that 
social divisions do not necessarily translate into political 
conflict. 7 He criticises Lijphart's use of the term "blocs" to 
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describe the consociated subcultures because it "exaggerates both 
their likeness and their tightness"; as a result, Lijphart 
neither distinguishes which subcultures possessed higher degrees 
of political salience nor which issues caused them to become so. 8 
In this regard, the theory views consociational politics 
statically. Lijphart never addresses how and why elites would 
behave differently in a consociation were the type of societal 
conflict less amenable to management than those of the European 
cases. 
Types of Conflict 
As a model of conflict management, consociational theory exists 
as a normative framework for democratically resolving conflict 
caused by divergent interests between groups. Yet, the theory 
does not touch upon the orientation and intensity of the 
conflicts it seeks to regulate. This omission raises important 
b Bohn, "Consociational 
Switzerland", pp.175-179 
Democracy and the Case of 
7 Daalder, "On Building Consociational Nations", pp.121-122 
8 Daalder "Origins of the Consociational Model", p.113 
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questions concerning its application to other conflict societies. 
What~ of cleavages does consociational democracy manage best? 
Worst? Not at all? 
It is possible that consensus-style forms of governing and 
decision-making in the European cases were obtainable due, in 
part, to the muted nature of the cleavages. Although generally 
defined in ideological terms (clerical/anti-clerical) most 
consociated segments adhered to the 'rules of the game' and 
shared common purpose in system preservation. However, even 
certain types of ideological conflict appear unmanageable from a 
consociational perspective (as Barry illustrates in his study of 
Northern Ireland). 9 So it cannot be extrapolated that 
consociational democracy can manage all ideological conflict. 
Furthermore, there are countries in which democratic 
dispensations of any form are not practicable due to the 
intensity of social fragmentation, e.g. Lebanon, Sri Lanka, and 
Uganda. In intensely polarised societies, perceptions of severe 
relative deprivation among one or more out-groups toward the in-
group(s) manifest to the point where the legitimacy of the extant 
system -- the ruling elite, state institutions, and the political 
process as a whole -- is challenged. In such fragmented and 
volatile environments, political accommodation is almost wholly 
precluded. Furthermore, the type of conflict may also narrow the 
universe of countries in which power-sharing dispensations such 
9 See B arry, 
pp.395-1,l,08 
"The Consociational Model and Its Dangers", 
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as consociational democracy can be adapted. For example, extreme 
economic conflict in one system may hold more potential for 
successful management than, say, mild or less extreme ethnic 
conflict in another system. Moreover, Lijphart never discusses 
how different types of conflict might affect respective elites' 
ability to accommodate each other. A deeper discussion of this 
aspect of consociational regulation is required before the limits 
of the theory can be determined and its value for conflict 
management in divided systems ascertained. 
Favourable Conditions 
Lijphart's flawed methodology is further exposed when his set of 
favourable conditions -- factors and behaviour facilitating 
consociational government -- are rigorously analysed. Because he 
promotes his theory as both an analytical tool and normative 
framework of conflict regulation, these conditions should perform 
a predictive function. Pappalardo questions Lijphart's selective 
use of empirical data to support the validity of these 
conditions, asserting that 
a condition should actually be present at the time when 
a consociational system comes into being and/or 
throughout the whole period of its existence; and if in 
any system a consociational phase succeeds or is 
succeeded by a non-consociational one, the conditions 
under examination should be present in the former phase 
but absent in the latter; and it should vary over time 
concomitantl~ with the dependent variable 
[stability] . 
10 Pappalardo, "The Conditions for Consociational Democracy", 
p.367 
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It is necessary, then, to evaluate the influence some of the 
favourable conditions have had on political accommodation. 
The demographic and, in particular, territorial smallness of a 
system are cited as conditions favourably affecting its viability 
as a consociation. Following Pappalardo's criteria, as a 
condition it should alter as consociational mechanisms are 
employed and rescinded. Austria, Belgium, and the Netherlands 
have all experimented with both consociational and rnajoritarian 
forms of government, but none has undergone any changes in its 
territorial sovereignty. 11 Therefore, it is impossible to 
determine whether or not this factor played a facilitating role 
in obtaining interelite consensus. Likewise, Lijphart's 
assertion that sparsely populated polities encourage closer elite 
contact is also unconvincing. Productive, mutually beneficial 
interelite relationships are more a reflection of a shared desire 
among contending groups to accommodate one another than a cause 
of it. 12 The population size should not necessarily impact on 
interelite relations; the difference between a system with two 
million citizens and one with 20 million is only of remote 
11 Ibid. , p. 3 7 5 
12 Ibid., p.376. For instance, anglophone and francophone 
communities in Canada (a "semi-consociation" in Lijphart's 
phraseology), a polity with a land mass 50 times greater than the 
four European consociations combined and a population twice that 
of the most populous, engage insuccessful political accommodation 
between its anglophone and francophone communities. 
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relevance to the ability of its elites to coalesce. Rather, the 
more important elements for contending elites and the procurement 
of democratic stability is the number of divergent interests and 
their amenability to compromise -- and that will be rooted in the 
dynamics of the pre-eminent cleavage. 
Thus, it is because territorial and demographic smallness 
have remained constant (slowly rising populations 
notwithstanding) throughout consociational and majoritarian 
periods and because Lijphart provides no data to support his 
contention that they benefit consociation, that the condition can 
be expugned from the model's catalogue of favourable conditions. 
Overarching Loyalties 
The consociational model stipulates that minimised cross-cutting 
among segments is desirable because its absence ensures their 
purity and cohesion. Yet, Lijphart also contends that a minimum 
level of overarching loyalties should be present, i.e. a shared 
commitment among all groups to system maintenance and democratic 
principles. The problem is that Lijphart never defines the terms 
"minimised" and "minimum level" constitute. There is no use of 
any quantitative analysis (such as Rae and Taylor's oft-cited 
II index of fragmentation" 13) to indicate what he considers a 
desirable degree of cross-cutting interests nor, of equal 
importance, which interests should be cross-cut. This omission 
13 Cf. Douglas Rae and Michael Taylor, The Analysis of 
Political Cleavages (New Haven, 1970) 
I 
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is particularly glaring because it highlights the model's failure 
to address critical aspects of conflict and its management. 
Without any standard, it is not known whether some types of 
conflict are simply not democratically manageable or perhaps not 
manageable by consociational forms of regulation. In any event, 
the consociational school never stipulates how a value 
convergence between antagonistic groups must manifest. 
Consequently, it is difficult for social scientists to determine 
whether consociational democracy is practicable in other systems. 
External Threats 
Lijphart uses the post-war coalition between Austria's Catholic-
Conservative and Socialist parties to illustrate how, provoked by 
foreign intervention (i.e. the Allied Occupation), two conflict 
groups suspended their· differences and forged a 21-year 
consociation. However, the Austrian example is a paradox and 
does not provide evidence of the condition's benefits to 
political accommodation and systemic stability. Only ten years 
before consociation, the Austrian elites were unable to coalesce 
in the face of the Nazi-inspired anchluss. Indeed, the Austrian 
political system disintegrated into a civil conflict because of 
the military threat posed by Germany and the corresponding elite 
dissensus it induced. Thus, in the Austrian case, the presence 
of external threats did not consistently encourage the 
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appropriate accommodative behaviour. 14 
Similarly, the collapse of the Lebanese government in 1975 
is attributable ostensibly to the perceptions and behaviour of 
regional powers. The failure of Lebanese consociation was not so 
much a consequence of its elites' attitudinal or technocratic 
shortcomings (though they were many), but rather a consequence of 
foreign power (notably Syrian) military intervention on a scale 
far superior to anything which could managed by Lebanon's 
military forces. 15 The Lebanese experience underscores a problem 
with the external threat condition and its impact on consociation 
when the threat is not uniformly perceived, i.e. when external 
agitation is supported materially and/or psychologically by an 
internal segment but not by other segments. In this instance, an 
external threat can have a deleterious effect on the ability of 
elites to accommodate each other because consociated groups hold 
conflicting notions about its impact on the system's security. 
Thus, for the condition to be favourable, the model must require 
that an external threat be construed as such by all the 
consociated segments and that they share a common purpose in its 
neutralisation. Only by forging a united front against the 
threat are benefits to intergroup goodwill and political 
stability derived. 
14 Pappalardo, "The Conditions for Consociational Democracy" , 
p.376 
15 Dekmejian, "Consociational Democracy inCrisis", pp. 261 - 26q. 
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Multiple Balance of Segments 
The model stipulates the need for a multiple balance of segments 
(not more than three or four) of comparatively equal size and 
endowed with generally equal levels of political resources. For 
obvious reasons, balance is a paramount concern for coalitions: 
no single group should be in a position to impose its political 
will on the rest . If one were, there would be little support for 
consociation among the elite of this group, which would naturally 
prefer to influence policy commensurate with its numerical 
predominance or economic power or military capabilities. 
Segmental imbalance superimposed on a severely fragmented 
political system poses considerable obstacles to political 
stability and the viability of democracy. That no group has 
either the support-base or the coercive capability to rule 
unilaterally are indispensible to successful consociation. 
However, Lijphart does not present a convincing argument to 
support the need for a multiple balance. Austria's two-segment 
(i . e . two-party) coalition distinguished itself as the 
quintessence of successful power-sharing, and since 1966 it has 
been the model of stable, rotating two-party majoritarian 
government. Moreover, when multipartism manifested in the 
precarious inter-war period, the Austria system was destabilised 
by extremist parties sympathetic to the National Socialist cause; 
the ensuing political conflict heightened intersegmental 
tensions, inhibited interelite consensus, and provoked a bloody 
6'1-
civil war. 16 In addition, Lipset, among others, argues that a 
two-party system is the most desirable variant of democracy 
because it encourages the formation of coalitions within the 
parties, thus helping to obscure lines of cleavage between groups 
which would exist formally and publicly in a multi-party 
arrangement. 17 With only two groups, the bargaining process is 
simplified: there are fewer interests requiring accommodation, 
therefore less to be controversial about, and a greater 
opportunity to satisfy the maximum number of segmental interests 
is created: 18 
Although it affects the diversity of interests which require 
accommodation, the number of segments is less important than the 
type of conflict which creates the segments and its 
susceptibility to compromise and democratic resolution. The 
prime objective of the model -- indeed, for any model of conflict 
regulation should be to isolate and promote methods for the 
resolution of conflict. This can only be achieved, however, if 
conflict is democratically manageable, and all major segments 
must agree that it is. A democratically manageable conflict is 
one in which the elites of the major segments are both amenable 
to mutual accommodation and capable of ensuring the support of 
16 Pappalardo, "The Conditions for Consociational Democracy", 
p.368 
17 Seymour Lipset, "Some Social Requisites of Democracy". In 
Cnudde, p.178 
18 Pappalardo, "The Conditions for Consociational Democracy" , 
p.368 
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their followers for the obtained compromises; the number of 
segments created by the cleavage is of less importance. To wit, 
conflict-regulating structures may be more successful when 
adopted in a polity with multiple linguistic cleavages (as in 
Switzerland) or with multiple religious fragmentation (as in the 
Netherlands) than in a system characterised by merely one intense 
ethno-cultural cleavage (such as in Cyprus). The number of 
cleavages, therefore, exerts only marginal influence, while the 
relative balance in size and resources between competing segments 
is necessary to ensure that all contending elites value mutual 
accommodation (and its indispensability to consociational 
government) equally. 
Historical Traditions 
While there is no consensus within the consociational school 
concerning this condition, Chapter One noted that experiences of 
intergroup conciliation in the four cases were evident before the 
advent of their modern, democratic systems. It was determined 
that such manifestations were at the very least beneficial to 
consociational government in the 20th century, but at the same 
time were no guarantee of successful political accommodation. 
Moreover, in both Austria and Colombia segmental elites coalesced 
less than ten years after civil wars threatened anarchy and, in 
the latter case, caused the breakdown of democracy. Indeed, 
Colombia's National Front experiment was created as a means of 
ending the mutual distrust between the Liberal and Conservative 
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parties and the violence which it spurred. 19 Political elites 
came to acknowledge that there was more to be gained by seeking a 
second- best alternative to outright majority-rule (i.e. 
consociation) than from the continued strife and military 
intervention that the latter had provoked. Thus, consociation 
was proposed as the only democratic alternative. This 
calculation had little to do with past interelite relations, 
especially since Colombian society had been plagued by 
intermittent violence and deep-seated intergroup antagonism since 
the mid-19th century. Rather, it was rooted in the desire to 
avoid further violence by seeking a stable, bilateral form of 
governing -- to govern together or not at all. 
The manifestation of violence (the potential role of which 
in the success or failure of consociation is never adequately 
addressed by Lijphart) or the prospect of escalated violence may, 
in fact, encourage interelite accommodation. Thus, historical 
traditions of goodwill and accommodation between contending 
groups bode well for a consociation, but their absence does not 
necessarily constrain the elites' ability to coalesce. That is 
to say, the condition is favourable when present but not 
unfavourable if it is not. 
19 Richard Maullin, Soldiers, Guerrillas. and Politics in 
Colombia (Lexington, 1973), pp.6~-65. The use of coalition pacts 
as a means of preventing further intergroup violence is discussed 
in O'Donnell and Schmitter's recent theoretical treatment on the 
processes of democratisation. See Guillermo O'Donnell andPhilippe 
Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule Tentative 





Structural and behavioural conditions necessary to the creation 
and preservation of consociational democracy include: minimised 
cross-cutting of interests; segmental isolation; voluntary group 
association; elite predominance; politically secure leadership; 
willingness to compromise; adherence to the rules of the game; 
elite secrecy; and mass passivity and deference. Some of these 
conditions can generally be analysed as an interdependent set of 
behavioural factors which, upon closer examination, exposes the 
model's circular reasoning. This reasoning is employed by 
Lijphart to buttress the model's major postulation. 
Lijphart asserts that the willingness of elites to 
compromise is the linchpin of the politics of accommodation. It 
is submitted that because the segmental elites share similar 
perceptions about the avoidance of system breakdown that 
compromises are procured and stability is obtained. These shared 
perceptions create the impetus to adhere to the 'rules of the 
game'. Yet, the "rules" do not appear to be anything more than 
"rational political calculation". 20 The consociated elites in 
the European cases were not undertaking a novel, system-
sustaining pattern of behaviour because their systems did not, in 
fact, face imminent breakdown. This argument is supported by the 
model's inclusion of mass passivity and deference, elite secrecy, 
and a politically secure leadership as necessary conditions for 
20 Scholten, "Does Consociationalism Exist?", p. 335 
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consociational democracy. If mass passivity and deference to a 
secure elite leadership are necessary conditions for successful 
consociation, then the system already enjoys a significant degree 
of stability. 21 The fact that the masses must forego a downward 
flow of information about interelite compromises and are, 
generally speaking, unmobilised or demobilised, is indicative of 
a citizenry not imminently concerned with systemic dissolution: 
the threat simply does not exist. Likewise, a politically secure 
leadership implicitly requires that there are no challenges to 
the deals procured by the elites and that the segmental members 
trust their leaders to broker the necessary compromises; thus, 
high levels of depoliticisation and disinterest are already 
manifest. A system cannot be unstable (hence, in need of 
conflict-regulating structures which fall short of the 
majoritarian ideal) if its masses are depoliticised --
instability is characterised chiefly by political discontent: 
either groups distrustful and hostile toward each other or toward 
the prevailing political order. 
Barry asserts that the stability evinced in consociations 
such as Austria is more a product of elite "restraint" and mass 
docility than of consociational mechanisms. 22 While not on its 
own a penetrating attack on the model (Lijphart stresses the 
importance of the elites' willingness to compromise; restraint is 
21 van Schendelen, "Critical Comments", p.19 
22 Barry, "The Consociational Model and Its Dangers", p. '*05 
surely a behavioural cognate), Barry further argues that it is 
highly plausible that with the same intentional restraint the 
elites could have achieved a similar level of stability under a 
majoritarian governrnent. 23 Thus, he believes the role of mass 
political culture is a far more important arbiter of stability, 
particularly behaviour conducive to the enhancement of elite 
authority and the "attitude manifested in the offer and 
acceptance of a grand coalition. 1124 
In the four cases, therefore, the willingness to coalesce 
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and to sustain a consociational system was ipso facto indicative 
of their political maturity and stability. Consociational 
theorists' reasoning is circular: they substitute the effect with 
the cause. Accordingly, it is posited that political stability 
(or at the very least, a system possessing low levels of 
political competition and mass mobilisation) is a prereguisite 
for a consociational democracy but not, as the model's exponents 
contend, vice versa. 25 As a result, the most debilitating 
criticism directed at consociational theory is that it is at best 
a democratic model which can facilitate the perpetuation of (and 
perhaps even enhance) the stability of a divided system, but that 
23 Ibid. 
24 Barry, "Political Accommodation", p.500; see also Dutter, 
"The Netherlands as a Plural Society", pp.585-588 
25 For an attempt to confirm this thesis quantitatively, see 
G.R. Boynton and W.H. Kwon, "An Analysis of Consociational 
Democracy".Legislative Studies Quarterly3 (February 1981), pp.11-
25 
it has not been successfully practised in highly politicised 




This chapter dealt briefly with the most serious shortcomings of 
the consociational model. The failure of the model to identify 
different types of conflict and their corresponding 
susceptability to consociational techniques of conflict 
regulation is its most problematic feature. The theory lacks the 
analytical interpretation and basic empirical evidence to support 
its purported normative benefits for conflict regulation in 
divided societies. Without a better understanding of this aspect 
of conflict regulation, the model cannot be seriously implanted 
elsewhere. To this end, Chapter Three will attempt to modify the 
consociational model by identifying the theory's salient 
components while rejecting less germane aspects in order that the 
model may be properly applied to South Africa and its benefits 
and drawbacks for managing conflict there more clearly 
understood. 
Chapter Three 
A Modified Model of Consociational Democracy 
! 
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The most significant problems associated with the consociational 
model were highlighted in the previous chapter. It was noted 
that specific aspects of the model are characterised by faulty 
methodology and contradictory theoretical conclusions. These 
shortcomings call into question the prescriptive value of the 
model for other conflict polities. The purpose of this chapter 
is to elucidate some of the dynamics of group conflict and its 
regulation, and to modify the consociational model in light of 
these observations. Only then can the model's utility for 
conflict management in South Africa be evaluated. 
Chapter Two sought to expose the model's circular logic in 
its depiction of political stability in segmented societies. The 
causal relationship between stability and consociation is 
misconstrued so that the cause is determined to be the effect. 
The four systems under study were never seriously threatened by 
internal political collapse, and more important, each enjoyed 
relative levels of stability and mass depoliticisation 
immediately prior to their consociational experiments. Indeed, 
this stability was indispensible to consociation. However, it is 
also evident that the power-sharing dispensation of each 
perpetuated and perhaps even enhanced its democratic stability. 
The institutionalisation of the grand coalition, the principles 
of proportional representation applied to resource and role 
allocation, and the minority veto engendered degrees of 
legitimacy and inter-elite goodwill which played pivotal roles in 
this process. It is argued, in fact, that consociation 
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facilitated the transition to competitive majoritarianism in the 
Netherlands, Austria, and Colombia. This is perhaps 
consociation's most effective function: as a transitory 
mechanism, it provides a political framework in which contending 
groups may establish or strengthen their political relationships 
and common institutions to the point where the desired 
behavioural, attitudinal, and structural conditions are obtained 
and majoritarianism may be introduced. 
This chapter will briefly survey the relevant conditions for 
and the theoretical assumptions of consociation as a model of 
conflict regulation. In addition, it will append specific 
concepts to these retained aspects as a means of enhancing the 
model's typological and normative functions. With this modified 
model, a framework of consociational conflict regulation can then 
be applied to South Africa and its chances for success 
determined. 
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The Role of Affluence 
If it is accepted that relative stability is a pre-condition for 
consociation, then the nature of the stability must be 
detennined. Conspicuously absent from consociational democratic 
theory is reference to the significant levels of affluence in the 
four empirical cases. In his survey of democratic systems in the 
international system, Lijphart observes that all long-tenn, 
stable democracies -- including the European consociations -- are 
characterised by high levels of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), 
urbanisation, and industrialisation. 1 Yet, elsewhere in his 
consociational writings, there is no mention whatever of the 
obvious benefits such phenomena contribute to stable democracy. 
This is inconsistent with his earlier contention (outlined in 
Chapter One) that the only cross-cutting cleavage beneficial to 
consociational democracy is socio-economic; it is assumed that it 
be one of equitably distributed affluence rather than equitably 
distributed penury. 
The argument that affluence facilitates, if not ensures, 
political stability is not new. 2 Problems of resource scarcity 
will inevitably place greater strains on the state to satisfy the 
demands of those groups who perceive others as receiving a 
1 Arend Lijphart, Democracies: Patterns of Majoritarian and 
Consensus Governments in 21 Countries (New Haven, 198~), pp.~0-~2 
2 Lipset has argued that a high level of socio-economic 
development cross-pressures the working-class, affecting an 
amelioration of the most common source of modern political 
instability -- class conflict. See Seymour Lipset, Political Man 
(London, 1959), p.65 
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disproportionately greater share of state services and benefits. 
The competition between groups for control of the distribution of 
resources (i.e. access to political power) is consequently 
heightened, zero-sum perceptions ensue, and political instability 
becomes an unavoidable corollary. Heisler and Peters assert that 
scarcity is inimical to the regulation of intersegmental 
hostilities, but that conflict management in affluent polities is 
more easily obtainable because 
demands of organized interests tend to be satisfied 
through cooptation, logrolling, and the pork 
barrel .... [I]ts institutions work by accommodating 
contending groups through redundancy and other mrans 
that are not, in a narrow sense, cost-efficient. 
Indeed, Austria's post-war prosperity created a significant level 
of economic cross-pressures to evince a diminution of class 
anatgonisms, a mitigation of religious differences as rising 
standards of living induced secularisation, and a circumscription 
of the policy agenda, as an array of economic issues no longer 
required accommodation, thereby obscuring differences between the 
Catholic-Conservatives and the Socialists. 4 With no relative 
deprivation between competing segments, political dominance was 
not an overriding concern. Consequently, consociation was seen 
as a method by which to manage low intensity social conflict 
among groups with comparatively equal levels of socio-economic 
3 Martin Heisler and Guy Peters, "Scarcity and the 
Management of Political Conflict in Multicultural Polities". 
International Political Science Review 4, 3 (1983) p.327 
4 Powell, Social Fragmentation, p.87 
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development and in a system which could afford its built-in costs 
and redundancy. 
The contrasting cases of Belgium and the Sudan provide an 
effective illustration of the facility affluence brings to 
conflict regulation and the obstacles posed by its absence. In 
an effort to mollify the secessionist intentions of its African-
dominated south, Sudan's Muslim-dominated north implemented a 
policy of 'purposive depoliticisation' in which services and 
resources would be established and allocated separately in each 
region. The experiment failed, however, due to a stagnant 
Sudanese economy and a lack of "trained human resources". 5 Thus, 
the monetary cost of accommodation -- institutional duplication, 
log-rolling packages, and other forms of power devolution 
inhibited its viability in an economically underdeveloped nation. 
Belgium, conversely, has been able to underwrite a similar 
programme of public service duplication since the 1960s. 
'Dedoublement' entails separate ministries of education, regional 
development, and culture for the principal linguistic groups, in 
addition to providing the technocratic resources to fill one-half 
of Brussels' civil service appointments with Flemish-speakers 
despite the city's overwhelmingly (80%) francophone 
constituency. 6 Clearly, such accommodative practices can only be 
employed in affluent polities with an abundance of educated 
5 Heisler and Peters, 
Political Conflict", p.336 
6 Ibid., p. 333 
"Scarcity and the Management of 
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technocrats. 
Arguing along a similar line, Lehner concludes that 
consociational democracy possesses "high potential effectiveness" 
in growing economies, but is "least effective" in stagnating 
ones. 7 When a nation's economy is expanding (or holds potential 
for expansion) then it will be easier for the political system to 
appease more group demands and the general level of public 
satisfaction will be higher because more resources and services 
are available for distribution due to burgeoning state revenues. 
It follows, therefore, that a system characterised by recessive 
or depressed economic growth will hinder a fair and sufficient 
distribution of the state's limited resources and the level of 
competition (hence, conflict and instability) will rise 
inversely. 
However, more crucial than affluence for stability and 
consociation are relatively commensurate levels of socio - economic 
development among groups. The importance of the equitable 
distribution of systemic goods and services among groups and the 
benefits it affords conflict management cannot be overstated. 
With equal distribution, political resources 
can be used to negotiate for advantages -- for oneself, 
for a group, for an organization. Groups and 
organizations develop a thrust toward autonomy, 
internal and parochial loyalties, complex patterns of 
cohesion and cleavages. When conflicts arise ... access 
to political resources helps individuals and groups to 
prevent the settlement of conflict by compulsion and 
coercion and to insist instead upon some degree of 
7 Lehner, "Consociational Democracy in Switzerland", p.39 
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negotiation and bargaining. 8 
Accordingly, a consociation's desired balance should be reflected 
in access to generally equal amounts of political resources among 
groups rather than crude calculations of their numerical size 
(although the latter may causally affect the former). To be 
sure, the number of segments does play a significant role in the 
potential success of a consociation. The larger number of 
segments, the more acts of accommodation are required as each 
group attempts to realise its public policy objectives. The 
corresponding demands on the system will adversely affect its 
ability to obtain the necessary compromises and could conceivably 
create legislative and bureaucratic immobilisme. However, as 
previously stated, the number of segments is not nearly as 
important as the type of conflict, its degree of intensity and 
its amenability to regulation. 
In addition, an affluent polity in which there are 
relatively equal levels of income distribution and economic 
opportunity among groups is capable of administering to an array 
of patronage and resource allocation demands that are placed upon 
it by contending groups. 9 The more intense the conflict, the 
greater will be the competition between groups to co-opt 
supporters in an attempt to secure for themselves a greater share 
of the state's resources. The duplication of services and the 
8 Robert Dahl, Polyarchy (New Haven, 1971), p.77 
9 R. S . Milne , P=-=o-=l=i=-t=i=· c=s--=i=n=----=E=-t=h=n=i=c=a=l=l=-y...__--=B=i=--p __ o=-=l=a=r ____ ....,S=-t=a'"""t--=ea..=.s 
(Vancouver, 1981), pp.156-158 
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logrolling germane to consociation reflect its pork-barrel 
politics; it is an expensive form of government which has yet to 
be successfully adopted in countries undergoing significant 
socio-economic change or to countries with limited economic 
growth. For the forementioned reasons, these countries both 
cannot afford consociation nor do they possess the systemic 
stability wrought by economic cross-cutting among groups. 
Therefore, the wealthier the state, the more favourable are 
its chances of mitigating group conflict. It is also true, 
however, that affluence is not always beneficial to conflict 
regulation, especially in countries where certain groups enjoy 
economic privileges and higher standards of living that other 
groups do not. In these cases, the affluence enjoyed by some 
groups (usually those who control the state apparatus but not 
necessarily) is the source of political instability as the 
deprived groups agitate for greater economic benefits. 
The distinctions that a modified model should make, 
therefore, are that affluence aids accommodation only to the 
extent that the state has access to revenues and resources 
sufficient to afford the increased costs of consociation, and 
that economic or class divisions should not coincide with other 
salient cleavages. The economic cleavages which are the 
inevitable product of a free or mixed economic system should 
therefore not be pronounced and should ideally cross-cut existing 
social divisions. Accordingly, before consociation can be 
attempted, a nation should hold promise of economic prosperity; 
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economic cleavages should not be politically salient or otherwise 
intensify other cleavages; and relatively equal access to 
economic opportunities should be formally entrenched, manifest in 
the equitable allocation of state social and health services, 
pensions, education, and infrastructural development for all 
regions and groups. These conditions seek to ensure an economic 
stability that will facilitate and underwrite the introduction of 
consociational government. 
Accordingly, Chapter Four will evaluate how economic 
dynamics in South Africa will affect the ability of contending 
elites to obtain political compromises in the context of 
consociation. Specifically, since the proportionate allocation 
of resources and patronage among groups are consociational 
prescriptions, then it is necessary to understand more clearly 
how these concepts might impact on acconunodative behaviour in 
South Africa. 
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Types of Conflict and Their Management 
The consociational model is proposed by its exponents as a unique 
approach to conflict management in societies where 
majoritarianism is not practicable for various reasons. Yet, 
consociational theorists rarely distinguish between different 
types of conflicts and their susceptibility to democratic 
resolution, erroneously implying either that all conflicts 
possess similar dynamics of scope and intensity or that these 
dynamics are irrelevant to the model's ability to manage them. 10 
Because the distinction is seldom made, the model assumes that 
all conflicts can be analysed and managed by identical methods 
which, in turn, has led to overly optimistic claims about 
consociational democracy's relevance to non-consociated conflict 
polities. This problem is rooted in the model's limited 
empirical foundation: all four European conflicts were 
characterised by ideological cleavages. Even in Switzerland and 
Belgium, where there is linguistic diversity, such divisions are 
not reflected politically, i.e. there are no language-based 
consociated parties. Indeed, the European conflicts were "less 
ascriptive in character, less severe in intensity, less exclusive 
in their command of the loyalty of participants, and less pre-
lO In fact, Lijphart did not acknowledge the need for a 
distinction between types of conflict and different approaches to 
their management until recently, and only then was it made to 
justify the application of his model to South Africa. See Arend 
Lijphart, Power-Sharing in South Africa (Berkeley, 1985), p.96 
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emptive of other forms of conflict." 11 Thus, consociation was a 
successful means of managing low intensity ideological conflict 
-- but what are the chances of success in societies afflicted by 
more intense, explicitly volatile types of conflict? 
Some critics believe that the model's normative qualities 
are irrelevant when applied to cases in which group perceptions 
of relative deprivation between segments is acute and 
polemical. 12 Barry cites the breakdown of the 197~ power-sharing 
agreement between Protestant and Catholic elites in Northern 
Ireland and the continued constitutional impasse there as 
evidence of the model's impracticability in extreme cases of 
group conflict. 13 Moreover, the model has never been 
successfully applied to societies racked by intense social 
fragmentation. By definition, most intense conflicts would be 
precluded from consociational management because ipso facto they 
contradict the stability pre-condition which the modified model 
adopts as a sine qua non. 
It is difficult, however, to offer unassailable predictions 
about which conflicts can be democratically regulated and which 
11 Donald Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict (Berkeley, 
1985), p.572 
12 Dunn discusses the model's inapplicability to systems 
characterised by intense ethnic conflict, especially if rooted in 
linguistic antagonisms. See Dunn, "Consociational Democracy and 
Language Conflict", pp.3-39; see also Ohler, Steiner, and 
Dierickx, Decision-Making in Smaller Democracies, p.~1 




cannot. The conflict in Northern Ireland is instructive: 
although religiously-based, the conflict has deep historical 
roots and over this extended period certain ethnic dimensions 
have combined to amplify its intensity and prevent its 
resolution. The predominant conflicts of the European 
consociations were also ideological, but the difference with 
Northern Ireland lies in the intensity with which the constituent 
segments seek their respective political visions. Protestant 
groups generally demand the retention of constitutional links to 
Britain, while most Catholics desire political and territorial 
re-unification with the Republic of Ireland. Conversely, the 
various clerical and anti-clerical subcultures in the European 
consociations ostensibly sought more autonomy for themselves, but 
their collective political demands were invariably defined within 
the extant geo-political context of the prevailing constitutional 
order. Thus, it is apparent that a conflict's degree of 
intensity (manifested in the nationalist-political objectives of 
its segments) will at least partly determine whether or not it is 
susceptible to management. 
In defence of his theory's normative value, Lijphart 
contends that diverse ideological and religious interests are by 
their nature less amenable to reconciliation than ethnic ones 
(which may be rooted in linguistic, racial, or even religious 
identification) because the former's dogmatism makes 
accommodation more difficult to obtain. 14 It is then reasoned 
that because power-sharing arrangements are contingent upon the 
susceptibility of divergent group interests to compromise that 
the universe of cases to which the model is relevant expands to 
include ethnic conflict. 15 Yet, it is clear that certain types 
of conflict can be made more difficult to manage under 
consociational precepts than others. To claim, as blithely 
Lijphart does, that ideological conflict is less amenable to 
regulation than ethnic conflict (and that therefore ethnic 
conflict can be remedied by consociation because ideological 
conflict has been successfully managed) exposes a facile 
interpretation of ethnic conflict. 
By lumping ethnic conflict under the rubric of manageable 
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conflicts, Lijphart ignores the critical dichotomy that exists in 
the typology of multi - ethnic systems. A system comprised of two 
or more ethnic communities which share generally equal levels of 
socio- economic development and advantages (e.g. Surinam, Nigeria, 
the Lebanon) possesses a 'parallel' or 'horizontal' ethnic 
configuration. 16 A parallel ethnic system is one in which no 
14 He argues that sectarian conflicts in, inter alia, the 
Middle East, India, and Sri Lanka and their corresponding 
political instability are indicative of this pattern. See 
Lijphart, Power-Sharing in South Africa, p.96 
15 This argument involves a quantum typological leap, but 
Lijphart nevertheless employs it to rationalise his model's 
conflict-regulating value for South Africa. Ibid. 
16 Samuel Huntington, "Reform and Stability in a 
Modernizing, Multi-Ethnic Society". Politikon 8, 2 (December 
1981), p.9 
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single group dominates the others and that intergroup 
transactions do not reflect a structure of ordering or hierarchy 
between segments. 17 Conversely, a system in which ethnic 
differences coincide or otherwise serve to reinforce class 
differences (e.g. South Africa, Burundi, Guatemala) will result 
in the creation of a 'hierarchical' or 'vertical' ethnic 
configuration. 18 A rigid social stratification is inevitable 
when there is a coincidence between ethnic and class cleavages, 
and is almost invariably characterised by minority group 
domination. 
Hierarchically-defined ethnic conflicts are less susceptible 
to management because inherent group conflict is perpetuated and 
entrenched by minority control over the state apparatus; the 
conflict is therefore more intense than in parallel ethnic 
configurations (where the distribution of and access to economic 
and political resources among groups is more equitable). Horowitz 
argues that the extreme polarity of hierarchical ethnic systems 
is a consequence of the symbiosis between the superordinate and 
subordinate strata: 
the unequal distribution of worth between superiors and 
subordinates is acknowledged and reinforced by [the 
system's] elafiorate set of behavioral prescriptions and 
prohibitions. 
It is this "unequal distribution" which poses the greatest 
17 Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict, pp.21-24 
18 Huntington, "Reform and Stability", p. 9 
19 Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict, p.24 
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obstacle to conflict regulation in hierarchical ethnic systems; 
its rigid nature makes the search for compromises and a political 
middle-ground more difficult because the groups hold incompatible 
perceptions of their position in the ethnic structure of 
relations. 20 In parallel systems, however, it is notably easier 
to obtain accommodation because "relative group worth is always 
uncertain, always at issue. 1121 Furthermore, the structure of 
ethnic relations is more equitable and consociation can be more 
successfully applied to such cases because, as Huntington 
contends, the required accommodation 
implies autonomous communities with elites who can 
recognize the elites of other communities as equals and 
who occupy reasonably secure pos~tions in established 
communal stratification systems. 
Similar perceptions in horizontally ordered multi-ethnic polities 
are much rarer because the ruling segment does not attribute 
equal status to the subordinate segments. It is because the 
dominant segment is able to rule unilaterally that the prospect 
of sharing power in a democratic dispensation is unpalatable, 
thereby rendering negligible the likelihood of successful 
intergroup bargaining. Thus, it is necessary for the modified 
model to recognise the dichotomous nature of multi-ethnic systems 
in order that the model's relevance to systems afflicted by 
ethnic competition be evaluated more assiduously. 
20 Ibid. 
21 Ibid. 
22 Huntington, "Reform and Stability", p.1'* 
But is conflict in either type of multi-ethnic system 
necessarily easier to manage than ideological conflict, as 
Lijphart maintains? There is considerable evidence to the 
contrary. Ethnic conflict creates an adverse political 
environment for democratic regulation because invariably 
"outcomes are valued more than procedural norms", and group 
behaviour will reflect zero-sum strategies as "we-they" 
perceptions supercede the democratic tenets of equity, justice, 
and an adherence to the 'rules of the game' . 23 In multi-ethnic 
societies, multiple cleavages usually serve to reinforce one 
another (especially in hierarchical systems) but the ethnic 
cleavage becomes the pre-eminent arbiter of societal division. 
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The resultant social bifurcation between dominant and subordinate 
strata impacts negatively on the viability of democratic 
frameworks because one-party systems (or in some cases, such as 
in South Africa, exclusionary politics) are the inevitable 
corollary of ethnically bifurcated social structures. 24 The 
value and interest dissensus between the superordinate and 
subordinate segments is so severe that democratic cognates of 
mutual trust, goodwill, and legitimacy are not in evidence. 
Concomitantly, the ruling group is likely to have used violent 
means to establish its dominance and relies on violence or the 
23 Alvin Rabushka, "Prescriptions for the Plural Society: 
Theory and Practice in the South African Context". In Rhoodie 
1978, pp.181-182 
24 Samuel Huntington, "Social and Institutional Dynamics of 
One-Party Systems". In Huntington and Moore, p.11 
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threat of violent coercion to subjugate the subordinate group and 
sustain its political and economic supremacy. 
The historical abuse of the ethnic detenninant by competing 
political elites accords ethnicity and race high levels of 
emotional intensity, especially since ethnic differentiation is 
the most readily available method of denying resources and 
privileges to entire segments of society. This, in turn, has 
forced political entrepreneurs to exploit the ethnic criterion as 
a means of consolidating their power bases. Which is to say, the 
democratic transfonnation of a system characterised by 
hierarchical ethnic conflict is made more problematic because 
even if the dominant group is ousted and replaced, the new regime 
has usually acquired political power by mobilising its support-
base under its own catalogue of ethnic symbols and leaders. 25 
Segments which do not share or identify with these new symbols 
and leaders become 'out-groups', and their disaffection has 
potentially destabilising consequences for the introduction of 
democratic institutions and processes. 
But what precisely makes ethnic conflict more difficult to 
regulate democratically than class or religious conflicts? The 
answer lies in recognising and understanding the dynamics of 
intragroup politics in multi-ethnic systems. Religious and class 
25 This was the case during early Zimbabwean independence. 
ZANU-PF replaced the white settler group in power but at the 
expense of alienating most of the Ndebele-speaking community 
whose leader, Joshua Nkomo, was antagonistic toward the Shona-
oriented ZANU-PF. 
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conflicts are generally the products of power struggles between 
organisations and political parties with hierarchical structures 
of authority, i.e. a hierarchy which exists within groups and not 
between groups. 26 These structures enable class and religious 
leaders to engage more effectively and readily in acts of 
political accommodation because they are assured of support from 
their respective followers: 
a Roman Catholic is, by defintion, someone who accpets 
the authority of the Church. Although ... Bishops may 
have trouble with lay organizations that want to be 
'more Catholic than the Pope' -- more intransigent than 
the official line -- they can usually be brought to 
heel by an instruction being issued to the 
faithful .... [T]hey are in a difficult position to make 
an effective challenge because the distinguishing 
characteristic of a Roman Catholic is precisely that he 
accepts the autho~ity of the Pope, and more generally 
of the hierarchy. 
Barry notes that the experience of the Protestant Church and 
working-class movements in Europe is similar though perhaps not 
as binding as the Catholic experience, with leaders more easily 
replaced and followers more likely to dissent; nevertheless, he 
finds that control exists "to the extent that the leaders [can] 
take part in consociational arrangements with confidence that 
they can 'deliver' their supporters. 1128 
Conversely, ethnic conflict is a struggle between 'solidary 
groups', memberships of which are usually bound to ascriptive 
26 Barry, "Political Accommodation", pp.502-503 
27 Ibid., p. 502 
28 Ibid., p.502-503 
89 
criteria and leaderships of which are not binding. 29 As a 
result, one of the problems confronting ethnic elites who 
undertake accommodative behaviour is that their actions can be 
cast as a treacherous compromise of ethnic group interests by 
those seeking to usurp the leadership of the group either wholly 
or partially. 30 Thus, a consociation composed of competing 
ethnic elites is likely to disintegrate 
when increasing social mobilization undermines the 
authority of leaders who negotiated the arrangement and 
new, younger leaders appear with more explicitly 
communal appeals. 31 
The prospect of this ethnic 'out-bidding' would pose enormous 
problems for an ethnically or racially segmented consociational 
system. As Milne documents in his survey of Guyana, Fiji, and 
Malaysia, the process of outbidding involves a solicitation of 
support to an ethnic group by a non-consociated intragroup 
leaderdership capable of doing so because, unlike the consociated 
faction, it is not obliged to accommodate other groups. 32 Under 
such conditions, it would become more difficult for the 
consociated elite to deliver its supporters because of the fear 
of being undercut or outbidded by the rival leadership. 
Political accommodation would therefore suffer and the risk of 
democratic breakdown would heighten as the consociated elites 
29 Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict, pp.574-576 
30 Barry, "Political Accommodation", p.502-503 
31 Huntington, "Reform and Stability", p.14 
32 Milne, Politics in Ethnically Bipolar States, p.184 
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would strive to consolidate their weakened power bases by 
becoming less amenable to compromise. Ethnic elites are thus 
constrained from engaging in coalescent behaviour in ways that 
class and religious elites are not because the latter are not 
susceptible to the spectre of outbidding that the former is. 
In addition, the process of defining the collective 
interests of an ethnic group also restricts the possibility of 
obtaining intergroup compromises. For class and religious 
segments there is usually an authoritative, ideological framework 
or theocracy which guides their policy objectives; 33 with ethnic 
groups, there is no need for 
[an] elaborate theoretical argument ... to establish that 
some policy would provide material and symbolic 
gratifications for the members of one group while 
inflicting deprivation and degradation on the members 
of another. 
Conversely, 
religious and class issues allow more scope for the 
leaders to impose their interpretation of the 
~ollect~ve interests of their followers than do ethnic 
issues. 
Because members of ethnic groups are less dependent on leadership 
elites to articulate what is in their interest it subsequently 
becomes more difficult for ethnic elites to engage confidently in 
accommodative behaviour; 35 they cannot guarantee that their group 
33 For example, contending class 
dictated by, say, Marxist-Leninist 
principles, respectively. 
interests could be broadly 
analysis and free-market 
34 Barry, "Political Accommodation", p.502, p.505 
~ Ibid., pp.502-503 
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members will always countenance their brokering. 
Lijphart's model assumes that for every conflict group there 
will simply be one political party and one static leadership 
elite. This assumption ignores the complexities of what Horowitz 
terms the "configuration of intra-ethnic competition". 36 The 
prospect of intragroup leadership challenges is far more frequent 
in systems of ethnic conflict, and is consequently a constraining 
influence on the elites' ability to enter into patterns of 
intergroup bargaining behaviour. Thus, the dynamics of intra-
ethnic competition are generally counterproductive to 
accommodation: multi-ethnic grand coalitions would encourage 
greater intra-ethnic competition by rendering consociated elites 
political targets for the unconsociated(s) to enlarge their power 
base and stymie power-sharing arrangements through outbidding. 37 
Democratic immobilisme is the inevitable product of such a 
political environment because, after broadening its power base, 
the unconsociated elite will be under tremendous pressure not to 
compromise with other groups. 38 
Finally, Barry maintains that the fundamental difference 
separating ethnic conflict from other types of conflict is that 
in many instances (Basques in Spain, Dinkas in the Sudan, Tamils 
in Sri Lanka, Parti Quebecois in Quebec) a mobilised ethnic group 
36 Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict, pp.57~-576 
37 Ibid. 
38 Barry, "Political Accommodation" , p. 50 5 
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seeks sovereign independence from the extant territory; 39 whereas 
non-ethnic struggles are generally predicated on strategic 
disputes concerning the role of the state in the individual's 
public life and distributive issues. 
The preceding has sought to illustrate the difficulty with 
implementing consociational democracy in ethnically fragmented 
polities. However, this is not to rule out its viability 
altogether in such systems; nor is it intended to suggest that 
gJJ,_ class and religious conflicts can be democratically 
regulated. Determinations of this nature can only be made on an 
system-by-system basis, at which time an array of contributing 
factors (economic conditions, the convergence of interests 
between groups, and the role of violence) can be taken into 
consideration. The foregoing distinctions are included to draw 
attention to the types of conflict that consociational democracy 
has managed in the past and those that it would have more 
difficulty with regulating were it to be transposed elsewhere. 
The modifications to the model will contribute to a better 
comprehension of the orientation and intensity of societal 
conflict in South Africa, the ultimate goal of which is to 
ascertain its susceptibility to democratic regulation and whether 
or not consociation is a legitimate, viable solution. 
39 Ibid., p.503 
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Structured Elite Predominance 
It is recalled that the condition of structured elite 
predominance is required to ensure effective support for elite 
brokering, i.e. to guarantee that the elites can deliver their 
flock. Given the import of intragroup competition in ethnically 
salient conflict polities, it is necessary to make several 
observations about its impact on elite predominance. The 
competitive nature of intra-ethnic political organisation and 
mobilisation will certainly circumscribe the elites' collective 
latitudes for compromise. Rival intragroup leaderships will 
engage in a constant struggle to co-opt each other's supporters, 
which makes the prospect of shifting intra-ethnic coalitions a 
likely feature under consociational assumptions of power-sharing. 
It is therefore more difficult to evince structured elite 
predominance in a multi-ethnic system because rarely will there 
exist one legitimate leadership representing a definite set of 
ethnic group interests. In fact, there can be as many intragroup 
factions as there are populist-oriented strategies or leaders to 
acquire state power. The bargains and concessions made by a 
consociated ethnic elite are correspondingly less reliable, as it 
may be forced to renounce such deals in a bid to counter more 
hardline, exclusively ethnic demands of the unconsociated groups. 
Under such conditions, mass passivity and generally low levels of 
politicisation will be elusive. Intragroup ethnic competition 
creates an environment in which ethnic outbidding occurs 
publicly; with various factions vying for support of the optimal 
9~ 
(or strategic) number of group members, the public debate quickly 
degenerates into emotional appeals for the advancement of base 
group interests. Consequently, the scope for rational 
politicking -- the essence of consociational assumptions about 
decision-making and governing -- is severely diminished by the 
emergence of such zero-sum perceptions and behaviour. 
With these problems in mind, Chapter Four will assess the 
dynamics of contemporary intragroup organisation and mobilisation 
in South Africa, and speculate how they might impact on 
consociation. 
Elite Attitudes and Value Consensus 
As discussed in Chapter One, elite attitudes comprise the 
critical component of consociation. For a consociation to prove 
viable, all contending elites must be committed to operating 
within the extant system; no consociated group should propose or 
seek radically different political or economic paradigms by which 
to guide the system's operation. This conviction must also be 
coupled with the institutionalisation of compromise and consensus 
as a means of countering political immobilisme and systemic 
breakdown. Accordingly, rationality and pragmatism sho~ld 
prevail over ideology and dogmatism, which are wholly 
unsusceptible to compromise. In a consociation, no group should 
possess a legislative 'hidden agenda' for the simple reason that 
no single group should be in a position to impose its political 
and/or economic vision on the others. The elites must be aware 
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of their own political limits, concentrating on what can be done 
rather than on what ought to be done. It is this cognisance 
which becomes the prime motivating force for coalescence: if 
concessions and compromise are not forthcoming, then the system 
cannot function multilaterally, i.e. democratically; a group or 
an alliance of groups will forcefully acquire the military and 
political instruments of power and inevitably employ coercion or 
the threat of coercion to exclude from the policy-making process 
groups it deems threatening or contrary to their interests. Yet, 
Lijphart never adequately discusses the incentives for political 
accommodation beyond the spectre of systemic breakdown. More 
needs to be elucidated about the factors which cause 
authoritarian oligarchies to transform themselves into more open, 
democratic dispensations. 40 
The process of systems' transitions to democracy is 
important to address because Lijphart's model is prescriptive 
only to the extent that it offers a normative paradigm of 
behaviour and structure; no strategy proposing how a system 
should move from a state of limited political freedoms to 
40 A recent anthology devoted exclusively to democratic 
transformations provides a useful framework for analysing this 
process in its various forms. See Guillermo O'Donnell and 
Philippe Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule 
Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies (Baltimore, 
1986) 
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consociation and beyond is provided. 41 Nor is the question of 
~ ruling elites are compelled to embark on a path of political 
uncertainty and potential instability explicated. The dilemma 
for some ruling elites under presssure for democratisation may be 
between one of holding on to their power and risking its total 
usurption or pre-empting such a loss by offering to share or 
devolve some of it with previously excluded groups. Or the 
ruling group may think that a concession or some form of desired 
behaviour must first come from the group(s) which does not share 
in power, the compliance with which ultimately removing the need 
for the political domination to continue and opening the way for 
a power-sharing arrangement. 42 What must be borne in mind, 
however, is that under authoritarian conditions of government, 
the power of transition is overwhelmingly in the hands of those 
in de facto control of the state apparatus. Only with the right 
combinations of conviction, coercion, and timing, will the ruling 
group be persuaded to accept the process of democratisation. It 
is by no means an easy task, and is usually predicated on the 
belief among the ruling elite that change is required as a means 
of averting greater (perhaps violent) challenges to its monopoly 
of power. 43 
41 One of the first attempts to explore the significance and 
problems germane to democratic metamorphisis was -Dankwart Rustow, 
"Transitions to Democracy". Comparative Politics 2, 3 (April 
1970), pp.337-363 
42 Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict, p.581 
43 Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict, pp.577-578 
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.. •t,<f.11,..Wt..~d&ilc.!'.-"~~a:io\».,i,..._,,._.~...-..~.,.tl.:,z~:,~ .... .,r., ... ,i'l)IJ:l~-~.~..,.;r.~b~~~~~~~,r 
97 
To understand why a ruling oligarchy would (or would not) 
assent to a power-sharing arrangement, Chapter Four will examine 
the political objectives of South Africa's major political forces 
and Chpater Five will survey some of the possible conditions that 
may provide incentives to democratisation. In addition, how and 
under what conditions would groups be excluded from the grand 
coalition? Are they tolerated, and if so, to what extent? If 
not, what would be the costs of suppression for democracy in 
South Africa? The problem for consociation would be if the 
unconsociated group seeking violent overthrow of the system also 
comprised a significant fraction of the populace (it need not be 
necessarily more than one-half); then, the costs of suppression, 
both in terms of lost legitimacy and unstable government, would 
undermine consociation to the point where it would be unworkable. 
This, of course, is speculation, but it is mentioned to draw 
attention to the challenges posed by transplanting the model in 
societies undisposed to conflict resolution. 
The presence and tolerance of oppositions will, to a large 
degree, be determined by the systemic scope of overarching 
loyalties (itself a reflection of the political culture), which 
Lijphart proposes as a favourable condition for consociation. 
The condition should be expanded to include an assessment of the 
contending groups's convergence of values and interests. It is 
because levels of systemic legitmacy are a product of value 
convergence that 
[t]he creation of political institutions involving and 
reflecting moral consensus and mutual interest 
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is ... necessary for the maintenance of community in 
complex society. 44 
Normative models of government and power-sharing are not by 
themselves sufficient to ensure political stability because 
"constitutions reflect rather than alter power relationships. 1145 
Transplanting conflict regulating structures that have been 
successful in other systems is futile if such structures do not 
mirror intergroup relationships; structures must synthesise with 
commonly-shared perceptions of their utility and legitimacy. It 
is the degree of convergence of interests which will determine 
how South Africa's consociated groups would be able to 
accommodate one another, if at all. Furthermore, what interests 
do the various groups have in common, and are they significant 
enough upon which to build lasting and effective political 
relationships? What are some of the cultural barriers? Are 
there commonly-shared cultural icons, historical experiences, or 
prominent leaders? To understand better how this condition would 
impact on consociation, a country's past modes of conflict 
regulation and the various roles of segmental actors in them need 
to be evaluated. 
Sl.mmary 
This chapter has sought to isolate the salient assumptions and 
44 Huntington, Political Order, p.10 
45 Heribert Adam, "Possibilities and Limits 





prescriptions of the consociational model. The questions raised 
and conclusions drawn constitute a framework with which to 
analyse the viability and utility of consociation in South 
Africa. Chapter Four will examine the contemporary South African 
conflict by focusing on those social, economic, and p~litical 
factors which pose the greatest problems for the implementation 
of consociation. The paper ends with a short conclusion about 
the prospects of a consociational government overseeing the 
transition to black majority-rule. 
Chapter Four 
Consociational Democracy for South Africa: 
Static and Dynamic Interpretations 
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Stability, Repression, and Contro l 
Since the colonial period, and particularly since Britain ceded 
independence in 1910, successive white minority governments have 
ruled over South Africa's black majority by authoritarian and 
exclusionary means. 1 The implementation of apartheid, the legal 
separation and stratification of races into a four-tiered ethnic 
hierarchy, has been fundamental to the perpetuation of white 
hegemony. Its institutionalised inequities and exploitation have 
been buttressed by the ruling group's reliance on violence or the 
threat of violence to exact compliance. However, the poverty, 
humiliation, and frustration which apartheid metes out to the 
black community have combined with a heightened political 
consciousness to spur a significant mobilisation, one that has 
presented a sustained challenge to the National Party's authority 
to govern exclusively . 
The formation of the United Democratic Front (UDF) in 1983 
and its guiding role in the 1984-86 township uprisings created 
the most profound crisis of legitimacy for white domination thus 
far. Although the National Party did not face imminent 
revolutionary ouster, a number of black urban areas and strategic 
sectors of the economy were unequivocally destabilised. The 
government's response to the opposition was to invoke a State of 
Emergency, thereby conferring upon itself, inter alia, the power 
1 In this paper, "black" refers all 
the same political and economic rights 
and "African" refers only to those 
language speakers. 
people who do not share 
as the white community, 
who are native African 
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to detain any political opponent and to suppress virtually all 
popular black organisations . The State of Emergency regulations 
(now in their fourth year) coupled with the amended Internal 
Security Act (1982), have enabled the Security Forces to contain 
black protest, which began largely as a response to the 
introduction of a new constitutional dispensation in 1983. The 
South Africa Constitution Act (1983) established a tricameral 
system of government based on state-defined ethnic distinctions 
which offers limited power-sharing and segmental autonomy over 
matters of "group (or own) affairs" to the Coloured and Asian 
communities, but ultimately ensures the perpetuation of white 
domination over the central government by wholly excluding the 
participation of Africans, who comprise almost three-quarters of 
the country's population. 
The most obvious consequences of the government crackdown 
have been the notable downturn in opposition activity and 
manifestations of so-called "unrest 11 • 2 Comparatively speaking, 
the polity is stable, the revolution for which township activists 
were calling now a chimera. But stability in South Africa is 
illusory: it is obtained through the state's systematic and 
gratuitous use of repression and violent coercion. 3 Rather, the 
2 Reported instances of public violence dropped from 8,156 
in 1986 to 1,973 in 1987. At the same time, there was a ~9% 
decrease in the number of politically-related deaths. SAIRR, 
Race Relations Survey 1987-88, pp.22-23 
3 By the end of 1987, an estimated 2,987 mostly black 
unrest-related deaths were recorded, with thousands more injured 
and more than 30,000 detained by the white security apparatus. 
Although many of the structures comprising the Security Forces --
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government exerts "control" over the system. 4 The stability 
cannot be separated from the inequitable policies and violent 
methods by which it is wrought in South Africa. On the surface, 
and pro tempore, the system may be characterised as "stable", but 
it lacks the sine qua non of a bona fide stable polity, i.e. the 
legitimacy of 85% of the population who are denied an effective 
contribution to the system's operation. Long-term stability, of 
the type enjoyed by most industrially advanced nations, is 
elusive without a popular legitimacy reflecting "support [for] 
the activation of commitments for the implementation of decisions 
r 
binding on the collectivity.",.) So although there has been a 
diminution of overt challenges to National Party rule, the South 
African system cannot, strictly speaking, be viewed as stable 
because an overwhelming majority of its citizens perceive the 
present constitutional order as illegitimate and demand its 
removal. 
the SAP, the SADF, local law enforcement officials, and the 
Railways Police -- are staffed by members of ethnic groups other 
than the dominant white segment, these structures are 
nevertheless controlled by the Nationalist government. See South 
African Institute of Race Relations, Race Relations Survey 1987-
88 (Johannesburg, 1988), p.23 
4 For an in-depth discussion of the differences and 
relationship between stability and control, see Ian Lustick, 
"Stability in Deeply Segmented Societies: Consociationalism 
Versus Control". World Politics 31, 3 (April 1979), pp.325-344 
5 Juan Linz, "Crisis, Breakdown, and Reequilibration". In 
Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan, (eds.), The Breakdown of Democratic 
Regimes (Baltimore, 1978), p.16 
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The white government maintains its systemic control through 
a variety of authoritarian, co-optive, and exclusionary 
strategies. With these instruments of control, the government is 
able to maintain its domination of the political, military, and 
economic spheres, but systemic conflict -- if no longer reflected 
in a destabilising, sustained black opposition -- nevertheless 
dictates the policies and behaviour adopted by the regime to 
preserve itself . The political conflict, inescapably defined in 
racial terms, influences the policies of the state and vice 
versa; it is the root of the underlying crisis of legitimacy, its 
resolution the linchpin of an enduring, genuine systemic 
stability. 
Prescriptive Social Science 
South Africa's acute intergroup dissensus is the product of an 
amalgam of complex social, racial, political, and economic 
conflicts, the normative reconciliation of which has been the 
object of intense study in the academic community. The magnitude 
of the problems plaguing South Africa are awesome; their 
intensity and inter-connectedness enhance their resilience to 
conventional forms of resolution. Indeed, it is the severity of 
the South African conflict that compells social scientists to 
formulate constitutional prescriptions for its management. 
As part of this process, the consociational model was 
proposed by some liberal academics in the last decade as a 
framework for transforming South Africa's racial oligopoly into a 
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fully inclusive democratic dispensation. 6 Most who advocate the 
model as a possible solution to the country's enduring conflicts 
do so because they take as their point of departure the ruling 
group's indomitable belief that majority-rule would lead to 
unavoidable and "totally unacceptable" black domination. 7 To 
these proponents, consociational democracy represents a second-
best alternative, one which recognises the value of the 
democratic process (hence, potentially attractive to blacks) and 
the realities of racial power politics in South Africa (hence, 
potentially attractive to whites). Consequently, they argue that 
the choice for the relevant South African political elites is 
between either (i) sharing power or (ii) risking the escalation 
of violence and even civil war that the present political impasse 
will inevitably induce, i.e. between consociational democracy and 
no democracy. 8 
The theory's utility as a framework of conflict regulation 
in South Africa has been widely debated, with some critics 
dismissing its normative value because the country prima facie 
6 Chief among its proponents were Frederick van zyl Slabbert 
and David Welsh, South Africa's Options: Strategies for Sharing 
Power (Cape Town, 1979); and Laurence Boulle, South Africa and 
the Consociational Option: a Constitutional Analysis (Cape Town, 
1984-) 
7 The Times (London), May 5, 1989. 
8 This view is Lijphart's principal justification for the 
model's relevance to the South African conflict. See Arend 
Lijphart, Power-Sharing in South Africa (Berkeley, 1985), p.109 
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fails to fulfill any of the model's favourable conditions. 9 
These criticisms offer generally static interpretations of the 
model's viability: in South Africa, there is no multiple balance 
of segments, there is no value convergence between the contending 
groups, and there is no economic cross-cutting -- therefore, the 
model is irrelevant. 10 Moreover, it is reasoned that the South 
African polity is simply too fragmented to function under 
consociational assumptions of government. 11 
A critique has yet to emerge, however, which systematically 
assesses not only the inherent structural obstacles to the 
implantation of consociational mechanisms, but also one which 
elucidates the fundamental flaws of consociational government in 
ethnically-defined hierarchical systems. The purpose of this 
chapter, therefore, is to undertake both a static application of 
the consociational model to South Africa and an evaluation of 
some of the dynamics of extreme ethnic and economic conflict 
which would make a consociational transformation of South Africa 
9 See Marinus Wiechers, "Possible Structural Divisions of 
Power in South Africa". In John Benyon (ed.), Constitutional 
Change in South Africa (Pietermaritzburg, 1978), pp.107-118; A.J. 
Venter, "Consociational Democracy". In D.J. van Vuuren and D.J. 
Kriek (eds.), Political Alternatives for Southern Africa: 
Principles and Perspectives (Durban, 1983), pp.274 - 292; Nie 
Rhoodie, "Value Consensus as a Prerequisite for Consociational 
Federalism in Southern Africa". In van Vuuren and Kriek, pp.466 -
4.86 
10 Anthony de Crespigny and Peter Collins, "Evaluation of 
Constitutional Proposals for Southern Africa". In van Vuuren and 
Kriek, pp.436-445; and Wiechers, "Possible Structural Divisions 
of Power in South Africa", p.112 
11 Rhoodie, "Value Consensus", pp.478-481 
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problematic. Ultimately, the task is to highlight some of the 
complexities involved with conflict regulation in South Africa 
and to identify those aspects of the conflict which inhibit and 
those which may, under certain conditions, facilitate its 
democratic resolution. 
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Favourable Conditions Applied to South Africa 
This section will apply the conditions which the modified model 
isolated as favourable to the success of consociation -- a 
multiple balance of segments, the presence of external threats, 
historical traditions of political accommodation, and value 
convergence for system maintenance among contending groups -- to 
South Africa . It is designed to offer a static analysis of the 
theory's relevance to conflict regulation in South Africa. 
Multiple Balance of Segments 
The consociational model stresses the importance of a multiple 
balance of segments because it ensures that no single segment 
possesses, or otherwise has access to, resources which would 
allow it to govern unilaterally. If segments are of 
comparatively equal size , then contending elites will be more 
favourably disposed to accommodate each other because no group 
has the power (economic or military) nor the legitimacy 
(numerical preponderance) to ignore competing interests. 
The problem with applying this condition to South Africa is 
that voluntary group association -- a fundamental precept of all 
democratic systems -- is pre-empted by the Population 
Registration Act (1950). This legislation classifies all South 
Africans in a four-tiered ethnic hierarchy which is then used to 
allocate varying levels of political rights, educational and 
economic opportunities, and access to government services among 
"ethnicities". It is the theoretical foundation of apartheid. 
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With group identity defined in ethnic terms and assigned by the 
state, it is difficult to predict how South Africans would align 
themselves politically if the principles of voluntary association 
and proportional representation were introduced. 12 Consequently, 
it is difficult to ascertain how many politically salient 
cleavages would form or, more importantly, whether they would be 
of relatively equal size. 
However, in order to assess the model's facilitating 
conditions, it is necessary to make some speculative 
observations. Because apartheid involves the systematic 
exploitation of blacks, 13 a democratic South Africa government 
will, at least initially, be compelled to redress past economic 
discrimination. Indeed, economic issues and policy objectives 
may be the most salient arbiter of post-apartheid political 
alignment. And because discrimination is racially defined, it is 
likely that many economic interests in a post-apartheid system 
would reflect current racial cleavages. It is not a crude 
simplification to argue that most whites will want to retain 
their present levels of affluence, while most blacks, recognising 
their acute economic deprivation vis a vis whites, will want to 
share in the wealth that for so long has been controlled and 
monopolised by whites. Accordingly, in the immediate post-
12 Lijphart, Power-Sharing in South Africa, p.50 
13 The impact of economic deprivation on political 
accommodation will be addressed in greater detail further in the 
chapter. 
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apartheid period of a democratic South Africa, the likelihood 
that major political parties would significantly cross-cut racial 
cleavages is not strong. 14 At the same time, it must be noted 
that the emergence of one white and one black mono-ethnic blocs 
is also not likely. 15 Present ideological divisions within the 
black community, while exacerbated by the National Party's 
strategies of divide-and-rule, political co-optation, and the 
homeland scheme, will not disappear the moment full universal 
political particpation is introduced in South Africa. Moreover, 
it is reasonable to presume that ideological differences within 
the black community that for a variety of reasons are now merely 
latent could intensify as the political process is freed of its 
restrictions on political mobilisation (and with that, there 
would be an inevitable increase in the number of politically 
salient cleavages). While almost all blacks share an interest in 
economic redress, there are diverse agenda and personalities 
within the black community which could conceivably inhibit the 
emergence of one segment representing all black economic 
interests; the fluidity, volatility, and complexity of black 
politics in South Africa may undermine the potential for unity. 
The most contentious conflict in black politics exists 
between collaborationists (those that either support the National 
Party's policies or legitimise them by participating in apartheid 
14 Lijphart, Power-Sharing in South Africa, p.122 
15 Lijphart, Power-Sharing in South Africa, p.122 
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structures) and non-collaborationists (those seeking to intensify 
the systemic crisis of legitimacy through varying strategies of 
violent destabilisation, political non-participation, civil 
disobedience, and consumer boycotts). The internecine violence 
between members of the traditional Zulu movement Inkatha and UDF 
supporters in the Natal Midlands is, due to its severity, the 
most obvious example depicting current intra-black power 
struggles and schisms. Inkatha's Mangosuthu Gatsha Buthelezi's 
advocacy of free-market principles, denunciation of international 
economic sanctions against South Africa, and willingness to 
govern in the non-independent "homeland" of KwaZulu conflict with 
the isolationist, class-motivated tactics of the ANC-UDF 
alliance, and clash still further when contrasted against the 
hardline socialist platform of the PAC. Generally speaking, 
there seems to be at least some potential for political diversity 
were South African blacks permitted to organise and to compete 
freely. However, this diversity does not necessarily pre-empt 
the formation of a united black opposition, especially one which 
seeks as its common goals the elimination of apartheid, the 
extension of the franchise to blacks, and economic redistribution 
of resources. So, even if sections of the black community 
fragment when permitted to organise freely, certain shared 
interests (such as resource redistribution) may bind these 
diverse black groups together, particularly over the short-
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term. 16 
The major incentive for intra-black accommodation and unity 
in a consociational framework would be that greater leverage vis 
a vis the white community could be obtained in the negotiation of 
black economic redress. Thus, for reasons ostensibly linked to 
the moral and economic imperatives of a post-apartheid system, it 
is likely that there would manifest a considerable degree of 
common purpose among otherwise competitive black groups. Even if 
some of the more radical (Pan-Africanist Congress) and 
conservative (Urban Council Association of South Africa) black 
political organisations were not allied with the economic 
interests of an ANC-led coalition, the latter would still 
represent the majority of black opinion and thereby constitute 
the preponderant segment in a consociation. Moreover, an ANC-led 
alliance of black groups would create a definite imbalance within 
the context of a grand coalition. The principal white grouping, 
presumably led by the present National Party with marginal 
support from some constituents of the Democratic Party (whose 
economic interests would be better protected by supporting the 
majority white segment than peripheral white parties), would be 
numerically swamped by an ANC-led bloc. The numerical imbalance 
between supporters of ANG-allied segments and supporters of 
16 Cf. clauses (0) through (U) of the ANC's Constitutional 
Guidelines for a Democratic South Africa (August 1988) and Gibson 
Thula, "The Constitutional Alternative for South Africa 
(Inkatha)" . In Frederick van zyl Slabbert and Jeff Opland (eds.), 
South Africa: Dilemmas of Evolutionary Change (Grahamstown, 
1980), p.4-1 
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Nationalist-allied segments could be as high as four to one. 
Therefore, although it is difficult to determine how the 
introduction of proportional representation would impact on black 
political alignment, it is not likely that South African 
political segments would balance each other in a consociational 
democracy, especially on fundamental economic issues which would 
tend to pit white interests against black interests. 
Furthermore, the potential imbalance would be sufficiently 
extreme to ensure that the ANC - alliance would perceive 
consociation negatively. With electoral support estimated 
between three and four times greater than that for the National 
Party alliance, the ANC-led grouping would consider as inadequate 
a dispensation which accorded a much smaller grouping the power 
to veto any of its legislative initiatives. 17 The economic 
changes that are necessary to ensure an equitable, legitimate 
political order will require concessions by whites because the 
system that consociation seeks to transform has historically 
benefited them. Major efforts by the ANC to undertake an 
economic restructuring (specifically, laws directed at 
redistributing the white community's concentration of wealth and 
nationalising the mines and other industries) could feasibly be 
frustrated by the equally-weighted legislative power of a 
significantly smaller white segment. If the minority veto were 
applied to obstruct these efforts, then blacks would perceive 
17 David Welsh, "An Overview". In The Road to a Just 
Society (Johannesburg, 1978), p.7 
consociational democracy as a tool for perpetuating the racial 
inequalities of wealth and power. 18 The opportunities for 
procedural immobilisme would be legion if consociational 
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democracy were transposed on such a skewed segmental imbalance. 
Therefore, the significant racial imbalance in South Africa and 
severe, racially-defined economic deprivation combine to inhibit 
the possibility of a balanced consociation . 
External Threats 
For the presence of external threats to influence consociational 
democracy favourably, consociated elites must perceive their 
regional environment similarly and must agree ont (i) what is 
destabilising to their system and (ii) what the correct response 
to such threats should be. Although recent developments such as 
the December 1988 Tripartite Agreement between South Africa, 
Cuba, and Angola have appreciably improved regional stability, 
South Africa's internal groups still hold conflicting perceptions 
about what constitutes a "threat". 
Currently, the white security apparatus' overriding 
obsession is the neutralisation of the "total onslaught" of 
"communism", an all-encompassing misnomer which has been imputed 
to almost every black political movement that has sought the 
18 Nthato Motlana, "From South Africa to Azania" . In Robert 
Rotberg and John Barratt (eds.), Conflict and Compromise in South 
Africa (Cape Town, 1980), p.~3 
abolition of apartheid. 19 By providing the ANC and the South-
West African Peoples' Organisation (SWAPO) with refuge and/or 
material support, the governments of Angola, Zimbabwe, Zambia, 
and Mozambique have at varying times abetted the "communist 
onslaught" which threatens the Western, Christian values that 
Pretoria alleges to uphold. 20 The Nationalists have also 
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launched military incursions into these neighbouring countries to 
attack SWAPO and ANC base camps. Needless to say, the 
perceptions held by the government and internal anti-apartheid 
groups toward the liberation groups' military presence in the 
region are contentious. However, it is presumed that much of the 
current dissensus would dissipate once freedoms of association, 
movement and assembly were introduced, presently banned 
organisations including the ANC and the PAC were legalised, and 
the relevant elites were convinced that the system was undergoing 
a truly democratic transformation. The threat of "communist 
onslaught" would no longer be a concern of the National Party, as 
the liberation movements would be legitimate participants in the 
political process and not extra-systemic antagonists. In 
addition, it is not plausible that any of the regional SADCC 
governments could undertake a serious military challenge against 
South African armed forces nor would there exist any reason for 
19 Frederick van zyl Slabbert, From Apartheid to Reform: The 




them to do so with the collective goal of black political 
inclusion achieved . Although the geopolitics of Southern Africa 
are remarkably fluid , it is reasonable to submit that no external 
threat exists now nor in the forseeable future sufficient to 
compell the relevant black and white elites of South Africa to 
reach a mutual accommodation. Consequently , it is highly 
unlikely that the external threat condition would have a positive 
impact on a South African consociation: either no significant 
threat would exist or the probability that black and white elites 
would perceive it similarly is extremely low . In both cases , it 
does not encourage political accommodation. 
Historical Traditions of Political Accommodation 
In contemporary South Africa, there has never been genuine 
bargaining between the legitimate elites of mass-based racial 
segments . Many conflicts were and are, in fact, "managed" by 
state coercion or the threat of state coercion . Furthermore, the 
the frequency and sites of intergroup contact have been solely 
determined by whites, and their policies of enforced racial 
separation and economic exploitation have bred ignorance, 
hostility , and distrust between ethnic groups. Consequently, 
because domination and subjugation depict the country's 
intergroup relations, the attitudinal prerequisites for 
consociation -- goodwill and a willingness to accommodate - - are 
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nowhere in evidence. 21 This is particularly jarring because 
there is not simply an absence of intergroup conciliation: there 
is a pattern of violence and coercion unilaterally meted by the 
superordinate group against the subordinate group. The enmity 
created by such an oppressive and unequal framework of group 
relations seriously undermines the prospect for future political 
accommodation. 
Huntington claims that a society's political institutions 
usually reflect its collective political behaviour. 22 In the 
present South African system, there is an absence of 
institutional channels for the democratic regulation of 
intergroup conflict. 23 Because the mediation of conflict is not 
treated as a multilateral process by the National Party, 
compromises for and concessions to the unenfranhised are not the 
units of regulation. The institutions which the government has 
established to mediate political conflict and assuage demands for 
representation (inter alia, the erstwhile Coloured Representative 
and South African Indian Councils, the quasi-representative 
tricameral parliament, and the Joint Management Committees) are 
not even remotely perceived as legitimate by those they purport 
21 van zyl Slabbert and Welsh, South Africa's Options, p.115 
22 Samuel Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies 
(New Haven, 1968), pp.9-12 
23 Lawrence Schlemmer, "The Devolution of Power in South 
Africa". In Rhoodie (1978), p.369 
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to represent. 24 Similarly, even at the highest level of "power-
sharing" institutions such as the white, Asian, and Coloured 
Council of Cabinets and the President's Council, the Nationalists 
have ensured that no effective decision-making occurs without 
their explicit sanction. 25 
The modified model of consociational democracy asserted that 
while historical traditions of accorrunodation between groups could 
only benefit consociation, their absence did not necessarily 
preclude a successful consociation. Moreover, there is the 
possibility that the violence may, in some cases, even encourage 
accorrunodation. However, the current dynamics of intergroup 
violence in South Africa are such that the ruling group relies on 
violence to maintain its political supremacy and is, more 
importantly, capable of containing both the activities of the 
ANC's military wing, Umkhonto we Sizwe, and the sporadic counter-
violence of the subordinated groups; consequently, the competing 
groups in South Africa do not value the role of violence in the 
conflict equally. It is the National Party's supreme control 
over the state apparatus (hence, its virtual monopoly of 
violence) which prevents it from valuing the cessation of 
24 Voter participation in the inaugural Asian and coloured 
parliamentary elections in 198~ was below 18% for both. William 
Gutteridge, South Africa Evolution or Revolution (London, 
1986), p.~; Theodor Hanf et al., South Africa: The Prospects of 
Peaceful Change (Cape Town, 1981), pp.389-390 
25 Laurence Boulle, "The New Constitutional Proposals and 
the Possible Transition to Consociational Democracy". In van zyl 
Slabbert and Opland, p.32 
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violence in coincidence with the ANC. 26 Violence and the threat 
of violence are fundamental to the government's ability to coerce 
compliance with their 'rules of the game'; the level of counter-
violence perpetrated against it is not sufficient for it to value 
negotiations with the ANC positively, i . e. the costs of the 
present violence to the white community simply are not high 
enough to induce the desired accommodative behaviour. (The role 
of escalated violence and the effects on the ruling group's 
attitudes toward accommodation are discussed in Chapter Five.) 
Thus, there is no tradition of genuine political accommodation in 
South Africa and the violence which does manifest is not 
sufficient to ensure the necessary incentives for negotiation and 
compromise. 
Value Convergence for System Maintenance 
The historical subjugation of blacks by whites in South Africa , 
the product of systematic racial discrimination and economic 
exploitation, severely limits the possibility of even minimal 
levels of over-arching loyalties between racial segments. 
Since the latter quarter of the 19th century, and 
particularly since the 1902 British victory in the Anglo-Boer 
War, Afrikaner political and intellectual elites have embroidered 









Oliver Tambo observes, it is unlikely 
would foreswear violence because it 
and economic systems from which whites 
30, ~ (July-August 1985), p.33 
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creating an "ideology of identity", the attainment and 
perpetuation of ethno-political supremacy became a paramount 
concern. 27 Central to this process is the National Party's oft-
articulated entreaty to whites about the perils of relinquishing 
political control to blacks. 28 The "swart gevaar" and the "rooi 
gevaar" are simplistic yet effective propaganda tools designed to 
impress upon Afrikaners, and more recently whites in general, 29 
the threats posed by the theoretical introduction of universal 
black suffrage. Ruling whites have therefore sought political 
solutions which avoid "domination" by proposing the conferral of 
political autonomies to racially-defined groups; only group-
oriented dispensations can ensure that their political and 
economic pre-eminence endure, as each "group" may deliberate over 
matters of its exclusive concern. 30 The ensuing group isolation 
and insulation averts direct, violent, and prolonged intergroup 
conflict, but the regulation is obtained only by exclusive white 
27 Hanf et al., Prospects of Peaceful Change, p.37~ 
28 The new National Party leader, F.W. de Klerk, while 
hailed by some in government cirles as more pragmatic than his 
predecessors, recently re-iterated the ruling whites' hostility 
to the concept of majority-rule. The Times (London), May 13, 
1989. 
29 Anglophonic whites comprised ~0% of total votes cast for 
the National Party in the May 1987 white election. The 
broadening alliance between white Anglos and Afrikaners leads 
Schlemmer to conclude that theirs is the only significant 
intergroup accommodation in South Africa. See Schlemmer, "Social 
Implications of Constitutional Alternatives in South Africa". In 
Benyon, p.269 
30 Africa Report 3~ (March-April 1989), p.11 
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domination of the political and military structures and the 
extension of nominal 'power-sharing' or power devolution to black 
government agents at the regional and local levels. Thus, for 
many whites, sharing power is equated with losing power because 
it would entail an irrevocable diminution in its ability to 
regulate intergroup conflict. 31 
Government perceptions are disseminated through the state-
controlled media, thereby affording it the power to mould public 
perceptions about the conflict, specifically black political 
activity. As a result, many whites adopt the government view 
that political negotiation with blacks is desirable and 
necessary, but not with "communist" organisations such as the 
ANC. A recent survey conducted by Frankel concluded that, while 
experiencing a sharp rise in favour of negotiation, 58% of white 
voters did not believe that the ANC should be permitted to 
participate in political negotiations with the National Party. 32 
In another poll, it was revealed that only 22% of the white 
electorate desire the non-racial democracy that is the touchstone 
of the ANC constitutional vision. 33 Thus, the majority of whites 
31 Mburumba Kerina, "Plural Societies and Constitution-
Making". In Rhoodie ( 1978), p. 309 
32 Southscan, June 16, 1989. An earlier study undertaken in 
the mid-1980s indicated that while 85% of whites favoured 
negotiations with blacks only 3.6% thought the ANC should be 
included. See Frederick van zyl Slabbert, The Dvnamics of 
Reform: Patterns of Resistance and Revolt (Cape Town, 1987), 
pp.4.-5 
33 Weekly Mail, May 25-31, 1989. 
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are willing to devolve some political power to blacks, but only 
under the former's terms, i.e. only to those black leaders and 
groups it deems acceptable. 
What allows whites to view genuine negotiation with 
legitimate black leaders so contemptuously? To begin with, the 
political turmoil of recent years has not been sufficiently 
destabilising to warrant a significant constitutional rethinking 
among Nationalists. Dahl argues that a government's toleration 
and recognition of its challengers is indirectly proportional to 
its capability to employ violent methods of suppression. 34 
Accordingly, it is reasonable to argue that the National Party 
will only be forced into negotiating with popular black elites 
when it is no longer capable of exacting compliance. 35 Yet, this 
is not presently the case, nor will it be in the immediate 
future. The current costs of domination do not exceed the 
benefits; the white community is not suffering (either 
psychologically or materially) from the unprecendented black 
opposition since 198~. The white military, security, and 
political apparatus remains in firm control, challenges to its 
paramountcy cowed by harsh executive and police powers. Until 
the complacency of whites is disturbed, there is little prospect 
of the Nationalists turning to models of genuine power-sharing. 
As Southall succinctly observes: 
34 Robert Dahl, Polyarchy (New Haven, 1971), p. ~9 
35 Robert Schrire, "Power and Power-Sharing in South 
Africa". In The Road to a Just Society (Johannesburg, 1978), p.7 
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it presumes a remarkable calculation of long-term 
benefits on the part of the majority of whites that 
they should rationally conclude the necessity of 
concessions to the oppressed ifi order to search out an 
uncertain political stability. 
Indeed, it is because the spectre of an "uncertain political 
stability" (such as would prevail in a consociational system) is 
so much less attractive for whites than the "certainty" of the 
status quo that constitutional alternatives hold such little sway 
for them. Consequently, under present conditions of control, it 
is unlikely that whites would perceive consociational democracy 
positively. 
Not surprisingly, then, the Nationalist government has 
publicly rejected consociational theory as a method of resolving 
South Africa's political conflict. It reasoned that it "would 
serve no useful purpose, or may even cause confusion, were one to 
commit oneself to a specific academic model". 37 In response to 
domestic and international pressure to democratise, the National 
Party has instead opted to tinker with the mechanics of the 
apartheid state without fundamentally altering the inequitable 
distribution of power and wealth between blacks and whites. Its 
limited reform programme of the 1980s is guided by the assumption 
that continued economic prosperity and political stability are 
36 Roger Southall, "Consociationalism in South Africa: The 
Bu the le z i Commission and Beyond" . .:J...::oc..:u=r=n=a=l,..__....;o=f=----=-M=o:;..;d=e=r=n,..__-=A=f::..:r=-=i=c=a=n 
Studies 21, 1 (March 1983), p.9~ 
37 Department of Foreign 
A New Dispensation for 
(Johannesburg, 1982), p.2 
Affairs, Constittuional Guidelines: 
Whites, Coloureds, and Indians 
mutually dependent; the Nationalists realise the need for both 
but not at the expense of relinquishing their monopoly of 
power. 38 Instead, they have implemented a set of reforms which 
seek to facilitate economic growth through the abolition of 
certain economically restrictive statutes -- job reservation, 
prohibitions on trade union activity and collective bargaining 
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and other quasi-reforms such as the Abolition of Influx Control 
Act (1986) and a loosening of certain provisions in the Group 
Areas Act (1950). 39 The underlying premise held by the ruling 
group is that by providing at least some relief from apartheid, 
it is offerring to satisfy a measured amount of rising black 
expectations, thereby diminishing the possibility of a 
radicalised black community bent on revolutionary takeover. 40 
Central to this strategy is the government's desire to co -
opt some members of the black community. 41 The recently proposed 
Constitution Second Amendment Bill would allow the State-
President to appoint blacks to ministerial and deputy ministerial 
38 Michael Sinclair, The Effect of Economic Growth on Social 
and Political Change in South Africa (Washington, 1986), p.31 
39 The benefits derived from the removal of influx control 
and the "pass laws" are, in fact, offset by the retention of 
Group Areas and the Homeland CitizenshiP Act (1970) and by the 
acute housing shortages which, combined, restrict blacks' freedom 
to move and work wherever they wish. The proposed Free 
Settlement Areas Bill involves the creation of some non-racial 
residential zones, but is contingent upon the approval of white 
residents if the zone to be de-racialised is presently "white". 
40 Sinclair, The Effects of Economic Growth, p.31 
41 Heribert Adam and Kogila Moodley, South Africa Without 
Apartheid (Berkeley, 1986), pp.197 - 199 
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posts, while the creation of the National Statutory Consultative 
Council is promoted as a forum in which African leaders could 
collaborate with whites on decision-making issues important to 
both "groups". In addition, the National Party has recently 
released a "Five-Year Plan" for black political participation at 
the national level. The plan involves the inclusion of blacks in 
present governmental structures (without the introduction of 
formal franchise rights) and the creation of an "open group" 
category under the Population Registration Act. 42 The guiding 
principle of national level decision-making would be group 
consensus obtained through concurrent majorities, with each group 
exercising an equal vote viz. the others; if no consensus can be 
reached, then the issue would be arbited by a constitutional 
court. 43 The plan is the institutional complement to the 
conciliatory rhetoric of the National Party's new leader, 
Frederick de Klerk. Expected to succeed Pieter Botha as State-
President, de Klerk has propounded a vision of "co-government" 
for issues of "common interest" to all race groups while 
remaining committed to the concept of the self-government on 
issues of "group interest". 44 In this regard, the government 
exposes its undying commitment to the notion that political 
issues are racially divisible and in the process ignores the 
42 Washington Post, June 29, 1989. 
43 W h . t P t J 2 9 as 1ng on os , une , 1989. 
44 The Times (London), May 13, 1989. 
unequivocal economic interdependence of all South Africans by 
seeking to institutionalise ethnic politics. 45 Thus, the 
Nationalists can claim that the political process includes all 
groups (thus, nominally democratic), yet still retain ultimate 
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decision-making authority, thereby ensuring that support will not 
be lost to the ultra-rightist Conservative Party. 46 Their 
objective hardly differs from the constitutional mould set during 
the early reform period by the 1982 President's Council 
recorcunendations. The progenitors of the present constitutional 
system, the Council's proposals in effect sought "to streamline 
[black] diffusion within the framework of domination, to 
neutralise them and steer them into minimally disruptive if 
mildly reformist channels. 1147 In effect, political participation 
will be slowly broadened while the dynamics of the white power 
monopoly endure. The problem, as stated at the beginning of the 
chapter, is that systemic legitimacy will be elusive until the 
government is reconciled to genuine negotiation with the 
legitimate leaders of the black corcununity. The current 
restrictions on the franchise and black political organisation 
and mobilisation prevent genuine black leaders from engaging in 
45 Robert Schrire, "The Just Political Order". In 
van der Horst (ed.), Race Discrimination in South Africa 
Town, 1981), p.11 
Sheila 
(Cape 
46 Laurence Boulle, Limiting State Power: Policv and Public 
Participation in South Africa (Durban, 1987), p.7 
47 Philip Frankel, "Consensus, Consociation, and Cooptation 
in South African Politics". Cahiers d'Etudes Africaines 80, 4 
(1984), p.481 
--- ~, ~ ~~--~oe-=;-
.._,,.,'~.,~~~~-'1.ii(t;.L;;,,-,,--,;,,d;ti\it~~~l~~~~~ t"'!H 
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the negotiations that the government allegedly desires to hold. 
Moreover, the present neutralisation of black dissent will exact 
higher costs over the long-term as black frustration and anger 
with white intransigence heighten. Democratic alternatives are a 
chimera in South Africa until ruling group perceptions shift on 
this fundamental point. 
It is readily apparent that despite an expected change in 
leadership the Nationalists are wedded to the belief that South 
Africa's systemic conflict is one between "communities" with 
rigid group identities and that therefore majority-rule is, in de 
Klerk's view, "totally unacceptable" because it would entail the 
"domination" of blacks over whites. 48 It is these assumptions 
which guide the ruling group's thinking on constitutional issues. 
When contrasted with the political aspirations of black 
liberation movements, it is clear that there is virtually no 
convergence between contending black and white constitutional 
visions. 
Dominant Black Constitutional Visions 
South African blacks almost universally reject the present 
constitutional order. Separate and unequal development coupled 
with the denial of meaningful representation have fostered this 
48 The Times (London), May 13, 1989 
perception of illegitimacy. 49 Their collective ethnic 
"identities", imposed by a state-defined system of ethnic 
classification, cannot be viewed as genuine; 50 instead, their 
political aspirations are bound by shared oppression, and a 
'political ethnicity' has been forged, one that unites most 
blacks regardless of their regional, religious, and linguistic 
differences. 51 
The ANC, by far the most popular black political 
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organisation despite its outlawed status, promotes the concept of 
non-racialism and denounces the government's contention that 
South Africa is "composed of mutually incompatible peoples whose 
survivial and freedom is dependent on political and geographic 
segregation. 1152 While the ANC believes it is impossible to offer 
a detailed constitutional blueprint for a post-apartheid South 
Africa until all South Africans are free to contribute to its 
creation, its 1955 Freedom Charter and its recent "Constitutional 
Guidelines for a Democratic South Africa" both adopt as their 
point of departure the principle that political participation 
must occur within common democratic institutions and be based on 
49 Michael Savage, "Patterns of Group Interaction in South 
African Society". In Leonard Thompson and Jeffrey Butler (eds.) 
Change in Contemporary South Africa (Berkeley, 1975), p.283 
50 Heribert Adam, "The Pre-Conditions for Peaceful Change", 
pp. 2-1,i. 
51 Adam and Moodley, South Africa Without Apartheid, pp.29-
30 
52 Southscan, June 23, 1989. 
an equally weighted universal franchise in a nonracial, multi-
party unitary system. 53 Consequently, constitutional proposals 
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which refer to racial distinctions or confer upon racial segments 
certain "group rights", will be rejected by those blacks allied 
with the ANC through the UDF. 54 
In a post-apartheid South Africa, the ANC claims it would 
"practise a liberatory intolerance towards those who propagate 
C'C' 
racism and even those who stand for ethnic representation. 11 "" As 
the ANC's legal affairs head, Zola Skweyiya, notes: 
obviously the National Party would have no place in 
[our] society .... We see parties like Inkatha and the 
bantustan parties as contributing nothing. Their 
tribal, ethnic base will act against the whole concept 
of a united, democratic South Africa.~ 
Moreover, the ANC-allied and quasi-banned UDF believes that 
traditional parliamentary representation reflects a "very limited 
53 David Niddrie, "Building on the Freedom Charter", Work in 
Progress 53 (April-May 1988), p.3-4 
54 See Motlana, "From South Africa to Azania". In Robert 
Rotberg and John Barratt, Conflict and Comoromise in South Africa 
(Cape Town, 1980), p.38: "I have no objections to [the present] 
constitution, except where it refers to race." Voter 
participation in the incipient tricameral parliamentary system 
for the Asian (House of Delegates) and Coloured (House of 
Representatives) "groups", respectively, is indicative of how 
little legitimacy is accorded to the extant "group-based" 
dispensation among blacks. Only 18% of eligible Coloured voters 
and 15% of eligible Asians cast their votes, as anti-apartheid 
groups such as the UDF canvassed both communities to boycott 
elections that legitimised a system of ethnic politics. 
Gutteridge, South Africa: Evolution or Revolution, p.4 
55 Hermann Giliomee, 
September 12, 1987, p.6 
"Quo Vadis, the ANC?" Cape Times, 
56 Qouted in Niddrie, "Building on the Freedom Charter", p. 4 
I 
129 
and narrow idea of democracy"; its prime concern is not so much 
the replacement of white with black but rather to have "control 
over all areas of daily existence, 1157 especially in the economic 
sphere. 
Although Lodge claims that a substantial portion of UDF 
supporters are class-motivated and "inspired by a socialist 
vision 11 , 58 the movement's intellectual organ, Isizwe, articulates 
an ambivalence toward entrenching a specific economic ideology in 
its platform: 
there are different classes with different interests 
among the oppressed. While they are united around the 
immediate task of destroying national oppression, their 
long-term interests are not identical .... they do not 
all look ~o socialism as the solution to our 
problems. 
Despite the diversity of opinion among blacks within the Mass 
Democratic Movement about the specifics of economic policy, it is 
clear that fundamental economic restructuring for most blacks is 
a sine qua non of any just political order in South Africa. 60 
57 United Democratic Front, Democracy and Government (Cape 
Town, 19 8 7 ) , p. iJ, 
58 Tom Lodge, "The United Democratic Front: Its Leadership 
and Ideology". Paper delivered at symposium, University of the 
Witwatersrand, August 1987, p.17 
59 "National Democratic Struggle", Isizwe, 1, 2 (March 
1986), p.32 
60 The ANC "Constitutional Guidelines" focus strongly on 
this aspect of post-apartheid society. Clauses (L) and (0) vest 
the state with "the duty to protect the right to work" and with 
"the right to determine the general context in which economic 
life takes place and to define and to limit the rights and 
obligations attaching to the ownership and use of productive 
capacity," respectively. 
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Consequently, the ANC's "Constitutional Guidelines" refer to the 
obligation of a post-apartheid government "to take active steps 
to eradicate speedily, the economic and social inequalities 
produced by racial discrimination. 1161 With economic and 
distributive issues paramount concerns of the black liberation 
movement, any constitutional alternative to apartheid must allow 
for significant state arbitration and involvement. As Moseneke 
argues, 
the right to development ... is probably more crucial 
than the right to vote; not as a favour which somebody 
hands out, but a right that you can claim and 
enforce ... anything less is goi~ to in effect 
perpetuate the present system. 
It is this desire among blacks to undertake a fundamental 
economic restructuring which makes consociation an unattractive 
alternative for many of them. 63 
Inkatha 
Although it is by far the most popular, it would be dishonest to 
depict the ANC/UDF as the representative of black aspirations. 
Chief Mangosuthu Gatsha Buthelezi leads Inkatha, a political 
movement of traditional Zulu-speakers. Many Zulu-speakers shun 
Buthelezi's blatant ethnic appeals, but his free market-oriented 
61 See "Constitutional Guidelines", clauses (H) through (J). 
62 E.D. Moseneke quoted in Johann van der Westhuizen and 
Henning Vil j oen ( eds . ) , =A.____.B=1.=· 1=1--=o=f.__....,R=i=· =g=h._.t=s.____,f=-o=r=----=S...,o...,u=-t=h,.,,___,._,A=f=r'""i=c=a 
(Durban, 1988), p.1~9 
63 Sam Nolutshungu, Changing South Africa (Cape Town, 1982), 
pp.27-3~ 
Inkatha organisation is, with one million dues-paying members, 
nevertheless one of the largest and best mobilised black 
political movements. 64 Buthelezi is unequivocally anti-
apartheid, but he opposes the system through the KwaZulu 
"homeland" government, one of ten mono-ethnic bureaucracies 
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created by the Nationalists's African decolonisation scheme. He 
relies on the patronage privileges provided by his participation 
in the "homeland" structures to consolidate his support-base, and 
is therefore constrained in his dealings with the Nationalists in 
ways that groups like the UDF, which rejects such structures, are 
not. 65 
However, the regional influence of Inkatha in Natal is 
considerable. It must be a participant in the negotiations 
toward a new constitutional system because there can be no 
enduring stability in South Africa without its acquiesence. 66 
The unrest which rocked much the rest of the country between 
198~-86 occurred on a much smaller scale in Natal (due ostensibly 
to Buthelezi's formal denunciation of violence), 67 while at the 
same time the civil war that rages in the townships of 
Pietermaritzburg continues as Buthelezi and his "warlords" 
64 Michael Massing, "The Chief". The New York Review of 
Books, February 12, 1987, p.17 
65 
pp.6-7 
van zyl Slabbert, P~a~t-t~e-r=n=s-~o~f~~R=e~s-i=· s=t~a=n-c~e~~a=n~d~R~e~v~o~l~t, 
66 Massing, "The Chief", pp.16-17 
67 Hanf et al., The Prospects of Peaceful Change, p.278 
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attempt to assert their political dominance over UDF-allied 
groups. But just as Buthelezi and Inkatha cannot be ignored in 
the formulation of any new constitution, there are indications 
that his collaboration with apartheid institutions is incurring 
significant harm to his political stature and that he cannot 
afford to seek a political accommodation with the Nationalists 
independent of the ANC. Particularly costly to Buthelezi has 
been the rejection of the 1982 Buthelezi Commission power-sharing 
proposals by both the UDF and the National Party. 68 So, although 
there may have been a point in the past when there was at least a 
possibility of a constitutional agreement between Inkatha and the 
Nationalists, it is no longer feasible; the international and 
domestic redisposition toward the ANC and its constitutional 
vision are now too strong. Recognising the limitations to his 
political power, Buthelezi may be realising there is more to gain 
by allying Inkatha with the MDM -- at least with respect to 
direct constitutional talks with the government. Indicative of 
68 Convened in 1982, the Buthelezi Commission comprised a 
group of academics, politicians, and business leaders which 
sought a power-sharing arrangement between the Natal Provincial 
Administration and the homeland government of KwaZulu. Encouraged 
by good relations between the white and African regional 
institutions of government in Natal, its final report proposed a 
system of power-sharing based on ethnic group representation that 
would evolve from the existing political structures. The 
Commission's recommendations have had little impact on the rest 
of the country's major political forces. The Nationalist 
government did not participate in their formulation and, for 
class-motivated blacks, the proposals dealt only with issues of 
racial imbalance rather than with the more urgent need to 
redistribute wealth. See Southall, "Consociationalism in South 
Africa", p.82 
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this new approach is the recent agreement between black moderates 
and militants on a set of pre-conditions which the National Party 
must meet before constitutional talks can commence. 69 
Consequently, with Inkatha moving toward a reconciliation with 
the non-racial movement's negotiation strategy with Pretoria, 
there is virtually no evidence of over-arching loyalties between 
the National Party and the major black elites. 
It is the divergent perceptions about the resolution of 
material conflict that expose the significant interest chasm 
between white and black South Africans. The conflict on this 
issue reflects the larger fundamental differences about the 
normative constitutional framework for South Africa. The 
severely fragmented political culture poses obvious problems for 
a consociational government and for socio-political integration 
in general. 70 To be sure, the absence of shared interests 
between whites and blacks is a corollary of apartheid, but the 
political dissensus will not be bridged by the systematic 
abolition of racist legislation; the problem is not simply one of 
differing interests, but rather one of mutually exclusive 
constitutional visions. 71 For both sides, the other's 
alternative is unacceptable -- there would be no over-arching 
M washington Post, July 11, 1989. 
70 Lawrence Schlemmer, "Need and Criteria for a 
Constitutional Dispensation". In van Vuuren and Kriek, p.499 
New 
71 This popular interpretation is discussed at length by 
Adam and Moodley, South Africa Without Apartheid, pp.248-255; and 
Hanf et al., The Prospects of Peaceful Change, pp.376-378 
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loyalty for either framework. 
Summary 
The foregoing static application of Lijphart's favourable 
conditions to South Africa illustrates the structural and 
attitudinal incompatability of the polity and its constituent 
groupings with the model's basic prescriptions. However, in his 
promotion of the model's utility for democratic conflict 
regulation in South Africa, Lijphart insists that "even if most 
or all of the favourable factors are lacking, it is still 
possible to have a successful consociation" ( ! ) . 72 This assertion 
reflects Lijphart's loose adherence to generally accepted 
principles of social science methodology. In effect, he is 
arguing that if a system fulfills the model's favourable 
conditions then the possibility of a successful consociation is 
high; and yet, paradoxically, he also argues that if a system is 
bereft of the favourable conditions it is still possible to have 
have a successful consociation. 73 It may then be asked, of what 
relevance are the "favourable" conditions if consociation is 
possible without them? The preceding discussion, however, also 
illustrated that certain "favourable" conditions would, in fact, 
be detrimental to consociation, especially the probable segmental 
imbalance and the value dissensus between the major political 
72 Lijphart, Power-Sharing in South Africa, p.116 
73 David Laitin, "South Africa: Violence, 




In an effort to provide a thorough evaluation of 
consociational possibilities in South Africa, it is necessary to 
accept for the purposes of illustration Lijphart's proposition 
that the favourable conditions are not necessary and to examine 
instead some of the dynamics of the South African conflict in 
light of the modifications made to the consociational model in 
Chapter Three. It is only by surveying these dynamics that the 
limited utility of the consociational model for the management of 
extreme group conflict can be portrayed. 
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Ethnic Conflict Management 
The modified model of consociational democracy maintains that the 
possibility of successfully managing conflict either by 
consociational mechanisms or otherwise is contingent on the 
intensity and type of conflict and its susceptibility to 
multilateral regulation. 
South Africa is unequivocally a multi-ethnic system . The 
state-defined ethnicities are: a single white group of various 
European origins but comprised ostensibly of two communities, one 
English-speaking and one Afrikaans-speaking; a mixed-race 
"Coloured" group (a product of miscegenation between white 
settlers and indigenous Africans) which is in turn divided into 
five subgroups -- Cape Coloured, Cape Malay, "Other Coloured", 
Griqua, and Chinese,; an Asian group which includes Indian and 
"Other Asiatic" (mostly descended from indentured slaves brought 
to South Africa from India in the 19th century); and an African 
group subdivided into ten ethnic segments based on tenuous 
linguistic differences. 
Due to the ethnically determined socio-economic status of 
these groups in South African society, typologically the country 
is a hierarchical (or vertically-defined) multi-ethnic system. 
The problems associated with conflict regulation in hierarchical 
systems were delineated in Chapter Three. The most salient 
characteristic of this type of system is the wholly unequal 
structure of human relations which is generally characterised by 
ineluctable group identities. When salient ethnic divisions are 
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re-inforced by deep class cleavages, intergroup accommodation 
becomes difficult to obtain as political activity is perceived 
solely in zero-sum terms . The coincidence of ethnicity and class 
in hierarchical systems precludes basic democratic precepts such 
as legitimacy and rotation of power between groups because the 
ethnically-defined power configuration is grounded in entrenched 
inequality and is usually buttressed by ruling group coercion. 
It is necessary to evaluate the present ethnic hierarchy in 
South Africa by exploring the magnitude and the fundamental 
dynamics of societal conflict. It is only when these factors are 
isolated that their impact on consociational techniques of 
conflict regulation can be assessed. 
Principal Dimensions of Group Conflict 
South Africa is described by one observer as "a land of shifting 
paradigms" in which it is difficult to affix an analytical 
locus. 74 That there is conflict is to state the obvious. The 
difficulty arises, however, when one attempts to pinpoint the 
conflict's sources and thrusts because the country is racked by 
an array of intense cleavages. Although most of these cleavages 
are mutually re - inforcing, race and ethnicity are the prime 
determinants of societal bifurcation. 
The racial cleavage between black and white South Africans 
coincides with cleavages in political rights, standards of 
74 van zyl Slabbert, From Apartheid to Reform, p.3 
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education, levels of urbanisation, occupational roles, income, 
social status, custom and tradition, and, to a lesser degree, 
language. Indeed, South Africa represents an extreme case of 
racial hierarchy because Horowitz's "unequal distribution" of 
privileges and governmental services is a direct result of the 
white group's manipulation of ethnic and racial criteria. The 
abuse of ethnic variables to allocate disproportionate shares of 
state resources to groups suggests perhaps that South Africa's 
paramount conflict is cast in racial and ethnic terms. Yet, 
racial and ethnic conflict in South Africa and the corresponding 
crisis of legitimacy it induces are rooted not so much in 
cultural differences between segments (though there are many), 
but rather in the struggle for control of scarce economic 
resources. As van zyl Slabbert and Welsh argue, 
the salience of race [is] not derived so much from any 
intrinsic qualities pertaining to race itself, but from 
the structured and ~nstitutionalised inequalities 
associated with it. J 
The experience of the Coloured group illustrates this important 
distinction. Until the emergence of the Black Consciousness 
Movement in the 1970s, its cultural identity was strikingly 
similar to that of the (white) Afrikaners: they shared the same 
language, religion, and cuisine, in addition to other cultural 
affinities. Yet, the two "groups" occupied different strata in 
the socio-economic hierarchy as a consequence of legalised racial 
discrimination meted out by the Afrikaner-dominated National 
75 van zyl Slabbert and Welsh, South Africa's Options, p.93 
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Party. 76 Although it would be spurious to suggest that there are 
no significant cultural differences between various segments of 
South African society, ethnic and racial conflict is to a large 
degree artificially created by a state-defined system of racial 
classification; rather, it is a corollary of the unequal 
distribution of a broad range of political and economic rights 
which are racially apportioned. The salience of race and 
ethnicity in South Africa is therefore a consequence of this 
unequal distribution and not principally a cause of it. 
Nevertheless, the conflict is cast in ethnic terms because 
ethnicity is not 
simply a matter of tribalism, but much more an 
instrument of group mobilisation in societies where, 
typically, the impact of colonial rule, economic 
development, education and missionary activity has been 
uneven, and groups either maintain their privileges or 
gain further political resources for t~e purpose of 
overcoming their relative deprivation. 
Thus, the historical manipulation of ethnic "identity" in the 
evolution of intergroup relations, in the development of the 
economy, and in the structure of the constitutional system is the 
major cause of its enduring nature. Because the present system 
is founded on principles of racial group dominance, political 
activity is defined in ethnic terms. For the most part, the 
political struggle is between racially exclusive "haves" and 
"have-nots". Indeed, recent research affirms that ethnicity, 
76 Adam, "The Preconditions for Peaceful Change and 
Intergroup Accommodation in a Divided Society", p.4 
77 van zyl Slabbert and Welsh, South Africa's Options, p.36 
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while not exclusively paramount, will continue to impact on any 
future constitutional change or state restructuring. 78 Any 
political dispensation which is proposed as an alternative to the 
present system must recognise that the ruling white group has 
created an inequitable distribution of rights and privileges 
determined by ethnic criteria which, in turn, serve to buttress 
the entire unequal struture of group relations. 79 
The structured inequality ensures antagonism and violence 
between the country's ethnic segments. Although intergroup 
conflict in South Africa is the result of the current system's 
entrenched ethnic and economic stratification, it would be naive 
to suggest that ethnic conflict will abate once legalised 
inequality -- i.e., the array of discriminatory legislation which 
falls under the rubric of "apartheid" -- is abolished and an 
equitable, fully inclusive democratic system is introduced. To 
the contrary, after the abolition of apartheid, the stakes of the 
acquisition of political power will intensify as previously 
subordinated groups seek to redress past economic discrimination; 
the struggle for control of the political and economic 
instruments of power will provoke a commensurate rise in the 
occasions for conflict. Many group interests will be unavoidably 
defined in racial terms because past discrimination was practised 
78 Gerhard Totemeyer, "Ethnicity and National Identification 
within a (South) African Context". Politikon 11, 1 (June 1984), 
pp.43-54 
~ Ibid., pp.50-51 
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racially. In addition, the legacy of the "homeland" system will 
ensure that, in some cases, regional economic development issues 
will be defined in ethnic terms owing to the geographic 
concentration of 30-40% of Africans in the ten mono-ethnic 
"homelands". BO That group definitions are imposed by the white 
regime does not diminish the strong possibility that post-
apartheid political mobilisation will be organised racially as 
black groups strive to gain access to the white monopoly of 
wealth. Consequently, the political agenda will, to a 
significant degree, reflect racial group interests. In effect, 
the success of a new constitutional order would be predicated on 
the "extent to which [its] constitutional arrangements can take 
account of colour in order to move away from it. 1181 This 
discussion of ethnicity is not intended to over-represent its 
importance, but merely to note its probable salience following 
democratisation. 
To understand how past discrimination will impact on future 
political dispensations and conflict-regulating techniques more 
needs to be discussed about past and present economic conflict 
and its impact on the racial bifurcation. Once this aspect of 
the South African conflict is addressed, the utility and 
adaptability of consociational mechanisms in systems racked by 
extreme ethnic and economic conflicts can be properly evaluated. 
BO SAIRR, Race Relations Survey, p.10 
81 Boulle, South Africa and the Consociational Option, p.139 
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Structured Economic Inequality 
With a framework of racial discrimination initiated during the 
colonial period and formalised under a system of (white) 
parliamentary sovereignty since 1910, successive white 
governments have systematically excluded the black community from 
a meaningful role in the country's political administration and 
economic development. 82 The passage of the South Africa Act 
(1909) by the British parliament ceded independence to South 
Africa and effectively prevented blacks from participating in 
political structures. Except for limited franchise rights in 
Cape Province (which were withdrawn for Africans in 1936 and for 
Coloureds in 1956), South African blacks had no voting rights. 
Instead, a provision was made for their representation by a fixed 
number of white parliamentarians and the Black Administration Act 
(1927) empowered the (white) Prime Minister to implement by fiat 
any policy concerning "native affairs". Whites' control of 
political, bureaucratic, and military structures enabled them to 
pass a series of statutes which sought to limit the socio-
economic development of the black community as a means of 
elevating the socio-economic position of the white working-class 
and ensuring the perpetuation of white economic hegemony. 
82 For an excellent survey of this period, see John Dugard, 
Human Rights and the South African Legal Order (Princeton, 1978), 
pp.1-105 
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Central to this strategy was the promulgation of the Native Land 
Act (1913), the Development Trust and Land Act (1936), and the 
Group Areas Act (1950) which apportioned the entire South African 
territory among ethnic groups. Africans, comprising 72% of the 
total population, were officially restricted to owning and 
residing in not more than 1~% of the land; conversely, whites, 
16% of the population, were allotted 86% of the land. 
Until its abolition in 1986, the system of influx control 
and pass laws, together with the Development Trust and Land Act, 
formally regulated the movement of African labour from the 
indigent rural "reserves" to the more affluent urban centres. 83 
The regulation of African labour was underpinned by the Promotion 
of Self-Government Act (1959) which further divided "African" 
lands into first eight and then ten administrative entities based 
on linguistic differences and the spatial framework established 
by the Land acts. Although many had no cultural, familial, or 
territorial ties to the homeland to which they were assigned, 
millions of Africans were forcibly banished to these areas, most 
of which are infertile and devoid of natural resources, 
industrial infrastructure, and commercial base. 84 Administered 
83 The state still retains legalistic variants of influx 
control, enabling it to 'repatriate' Africans to their officially 
designated 'homelands'. Moreover, the retention of fundamental 
apartheid statues -- the Land acts, the Grouo Areas Act, the 
Homeland Citizenship Act (1970) -- combined with severe housing 
shortages for blacks in the urban centres nullify most of the 
freedoms its abolition was alleged to have provided. 
84 Some current estimates put African unemployment in the 
homelands at 50%. See Sinclair, The Effect of Economic Growth on 
Social and Political Change in South Africa, p.5; SAIRR, Race 
by African agents of the white regime, the "homelands" thus 
became territories in which impoverished Africans were forced to 
reside "subject to the needs of white farmers and industrialists 
for [their] labour. 1185 The balkanisation of African territory 
was designed to encourage an internal decolonisation of 
independent African states, thereby removing the need for the 
National Party to devolve or to relinquish political control over 
"white" territory. 
Symptomatic of white avarice is the profound spatial 
economic inequality between African rural regions and the urban 
centres. 75% of the country's capital stock is concentrated in 
three major manufacturing centres (PWV, Durban, and the Cape 
Peninsula), which collectively comprise only 32% of the 
population . 86 And whereas two-thirds of South Africa's total 
economic output is produced in only 10% of the country's 275 
magisterial and economic districts representing slightly more 
than one-quarter of the total population, the African 
"homelands", in which it is estimated that perhaps 36% of all 
Africans (or 28% of the total population) actually reside, 
Relations Survey 1987-88, pp.293-300 
85 The reserves/homelands are primarily "areas of black 
occupation that remained after the military and political defeats 
of the various African communities and kingdoms." See Robert 
Schrire, "The Homelands: Political Persepctives". In Robert 
Schrire (ed.) South Africa -- Public Policy Perspectives (Cape 
Town, 1982), p.115 
86 Jill Nattrass, The South African Economy -- Its Growth 
and Change (Cape Town, 1981), pp.9~ - 97 
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produce a mere 3% of the national economic output. 87 ( Even 
within the African community there is a significant urban-rural 
gap: per capita disposable income is more than three-fold greater 
for urban Africans than for rural Africans.) 88 Moreover, the 
Nationalist government directly controls 4-5% of all capital stock 
and controls a further 13% indirectly through its parastatals. 89 
Such involvement in the country's economic system provides the 
state with plentiful resources to allocate for the purposes of 
patronage and cooptation. The government's high degree of 
intervention allows it to broaden its power base by securing 
(mostly white) supporters who then have a vested interest in the 
regime's perpetuation. Furthermore, because the government 
controls such a significant portion of the economy, it infuses 
profits back into the urban areas from which they were generated 
(and in which 90% of all whites reside), thereby exacerbating the 
spatial economic skew. 90 Thus, the "capital gap" between the 
urban and rural sectors widens as capital accumulates in already 
developed urban areas while economic development in the homelands 
87 Nattrass, The South African Economy, p.29 
88 R1366 versus R388. SA Outlook, 119, 14-12 (February 1989), 
p.24. In 1975, 40% of African families living in the homelands 
earned less than RSOO annually, while the figure for African 
families in the metropolitan areas was 4-.3%. See Mike McGrath, 
"Global Poverty in the South African Economy", Social Dynamics 
10, 2 (June 1984), p.41 
89 Nattrass, The South African Economy, p.84-
90 Pamela Freer, South Africa to 1990 
(London, 1986), p.27 
Growing to Survive 
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(hence, the economic advancement of rural Africans) stalls. 91 
As a consequence of the Group Areas Act and an acute housing 
crisis for in the black community, many Africans are prevented 
from leaving the economic destitution of the homelands and 
seeking employment in the urban centres. 92 By restricting the 
free flow of labour from the economically underdeveloped 
'homelands', the natural processes of African urbanisation and 
integration into South Africa's industrialised economy are 
retarded. Figures reflecting African urbanisation lie between 
the official estimate of 33% and a more realistically determined 
figure of 1,i.3%. 93 Conversely, rates of urbanisation for whites, 
Coloureds, and Asians are 90%, 77%, and 91%, respectively. 94 
This skew is indicative of the dual economies that exist 
independently of each other in South Africa. 95 The urban areas 
are characterised by a modern, industrialised economy owned and 
controlled by whites and dependent on migrant black labour. In 
the "homelands", the economy is almost entirely based on 
91 Ibid., pp. 91,i.-97 
92 Leonard Thompson and Andrew Prior, South African Politics 
(New Haven, 1982), pp.57-65 
93 Government figures do not include the populations of the 
four nominally independent homelands -- Transkei, Bophuthatswana, 
Venda, and Ciskei. In addition, accurate data are difficult to 
obtain because many Africans are reluctant to admit their illegal 
presence in urban centres to government census-takers. These are 
1980 figures cited in Freer, South Africa to 1990, pp.27-28 
94 Freer, p. 27 
95 Schrire, "The Homelands", pp.118-121 
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subsistence agriculture and the informal sector. It is because a 
large portion of the African population is forced to reside in 
the latter, that inequalities between Africans and whites in 
other socio-economic categories also manifest. 
The artificial levels of urbanisation coupled with key 
apartheid statutes -- inter alia, the Reservation of Separate 
Amenities Act (1953) and the Extension of University Education 
Act (1959) -- have impeded the socio-economic advancement of the 
black community. These statutes limit blacks' access to 
employment, housing, health care, and education, which in turn 
causally affect their birth rates and their levels of 
politicisation and social mobilisation. A recitation of some 
relevant statistics illustrates the extreme socio-economic 
disparities between whites and blacks. Africans constitute 74% 
of South Africa's estimated 35.2 million inhabitants (with 
whites, Coloureds, and Asians accounting for 14%, 9.5%, and 2.5%, 
respectively), 96 but they fill only 29% of the country's skilled, 
technical, and professional occupations, while whites occupy 59% 
of such positions. 97 Moreover, Africans' share of skilled jobs 
has risen by only 5% (whites' dropped by 8%) since 1960, despite 
an increase in their proportion of the total population. 98 
96 Estimated 1987 figures. SAIRR, Race Relations Survey 
1987-88, p.10 
97 1980 figures cited in Central Statistical Services, 
Bulletin of Statistics 20, 4 (Pretoria, 1987), p.2.3 
~ Ibid. 
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Correspondingly, because Africans account for disproportionately 
fewer skilled jobs than whites, an unequal distribution of wages 
and salaries between whites and blacks occurs. The average 
working white South African earns almost four times more than the 
average working African (R16,821,t. versus R4,368) with Asians and 
Coloureds occupying the middle strata with incomes of R8,608 and 
RS,868, respectively. 99 Even these statistics under-represent 
the magnitude of income differentials between races because they 
account for only those who are employed. 10° Calculated on a per 
capita basis and factoring unemployment rates for both racial 
groups, white income becomes almost ten times greater than 
African income. lOl Al though the disparity of racial shares in 
income continues to narrow, it nevertheless remains enormous and 
has profound consequences for the control and distribution of 
political and economic resources for each group. 102 
99 CSS, Bulletin of Statistics (Pretoria, 198 5) , p. 2. 5 
too The number of black unemployed is estimated to be between 
three and four million or between 21-25% of the economically 
active population (EAP). Charles Simkins, "The Economic 
Implications of African Resettlement". Saldru Working Paper, 
No.iJ,3 (Cape Town, 1981), p.39. White unemployment, conversely, 
is negligible, with any long - term unemployed white officially 
referred to as "mentally or physically handicapped". See, 
Economist Intelligence Unit, South Africa 1987-88 (London, 1988), 
p. 20 
lOl Michael Gavin, "The High Cost of 
(ed.), APartheid in Crisis (New 
Consequently, the scientific index 
inequality, the Gini co-efficient, 
highest of the 57 countries for which 
SA Outlook, 119, 1412 (February 1989), 
Reform". In Mark Uhlig 
York, 1986), p.233. 
of income distribution 
for South Africa is the 
statistics are available. 
p. 21,t. 
102 Even if an optimistic figure of 3. 5% annual GDP growth is 
calculated into an economic forecast, per capita black income 
11,i..9 
A further ramification of the gross income inequality is the 
amount of disposable income or 'private consumption expenditures' 
it provides each racial group. Although the skew in this 
category is not as distorted as it was fifteen years ago, whites 
still possess 59% of all disposable income; Africans, only 28%. 103 
This disparity ranks the white standard of living among the 
twelve richest in the world, and the rural African community's 
among the poorest. 104 In addition, poverty and unequal access to 
health services affects racial mortality: white males live an 
average of 66 years (twelve more than the average African), while 
white females live an average of 74 years (17 years more than 
African women). 105 It was recently estimated that one-third of 
all African children under 14 are underweight and stunted due to 
chronic malnutrition, 106 and an African infant is six times more 
likely to die before the age of two than a white infant (the 
figure ballons to 14 times for babies in the African "homeland" 
of Transkei) . 107 
will still only be one-eighth of per capita white income in the 
year 2000. See Sinclair, The Effect of Economic Growth, p.33 
103 Freer, South Africa to 1990, pp.19-20 
104 Levels of rural African disposable income approximate 
those in Burma and Uganda. See Gavin, "The High Cost of Reform", 
p.233 
105 Economist Intelligence Unit, South Africa 1987-88, p.11 
106 
Africa". 
J.D. Hansen, "The Child Malnutrition Problem 
Carnegie Conference Paper No.208, Saldru, UCT. 
in South 
107 Catholic Institute of International Relations, South 
Africa in the 1980s -- State of Emergency (London, 1987), p.63 
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Unequal standards and extent of formal education between 
whites and Africans also serve to intensify the economic 
cleavage. Relative to the rest of the continent, African rates 
of literacy in South Africa are high -- 66% overall -- but white 
literacy is almost universal at 99.2%. 108 These figures are 
ostensibly a product of the disparate levels of state funding 
allocated to both races' separate school systems. Even with 
steep increases in monies for African education after the 1976-77 
Soweto school riots (a six-fold increase between 1980-86), state 
expenditures per white student are still almost seven times 
greater than that allotted to each black student. 109 Likewise, 
the student-teacher ratio for Africans is ~1:1, but only 19:1 for 
whites. 110 The seriousness of the inequality cannot be overstated 
because the extent and standards of education ultimately 
determine the quantity, quality, and skills of individuals 
entering the formal economy. Limited, inferior education 
restricts the ability of blacks to obtain skilled, managerial, or 
administrative positions, while past and present discrimination 
(especially in the corpulent state sector) have prevented many 
qualified blacks from assuming such positions. In either case, 
unemployment or underemployment results and the 
108 Freer, South Africa to 1990, p.~9 
109 Government spending on white and African education, 
respectively, is almost equal -- but there are seven times more 
African students. SAIRR, Race Relations Survey 1987-88, pp.161-
162; Sinclair, The Effect of Economic Growth, p.6 
11° CIIR, South Africa in the 1980s, p.63 
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institutionalisation of racial inequality endures. 
Problems of Extreme Economic Conflict 
The foregoing illustrates how the South African system of race 
relations is not simply hierarchical. More relevant to the study 
of the conflict and its susceptibility to democratic regulation 
is that the bifurcation is marked by extreme racial disparities 
in land ownership, regional economic development, access to 
housing and education, employment and income, all of which are 
ensured by the system's legal underpinnings and the use of state 
violence to quash challenges to the prevailing political order . 
Due to the severity of the inequality, it is apparent that 
although race determines societal stratification, economic 
inequality is fundamental to systemic conflict and the pervasive 
crisis of legitimacy: 
the division can be seen to be functionally inter-
related within the overall pattern of political 
conflict generated by the capitalist development of the 
country .... A specific kind of class struggle there 
undoubtedly is, namely one in which the classes are 
groups of varying histories and ethnic origins who 
enter the modern society with varying rights and 
degrees of rightlessness .... All the various groups and 
segments in this society are held locked together, 
albeit in bitter conflict, not solely by the 
institution of government, but by a rapidly expanding 
economy fl?d exploitive labour system on which it 
depends. 
Racial separation was designed principally to ensure the white 
community's economic supremacy over blacks. The roles filled by 
111 John Rex, "The Plural Society: The South African Case". 
Race 12 (1971), pp.~11-~12 
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each in the economic sphere, moreover, parallel those that exist 
in the political sphere , reflecting and reinforcing the system's 
pattern of hierarchical race relations. 112 Severe economic 
inequality deepens and entrenches the racial and ethnic cleavage 
by according the present ethnically-defined political structures 
higher degrees of illegitimacy. Consequently, the political 
conflict in South Africa fundamentally concerns the underlying 
economic conflict which has been structured so as to pit white 
interests against black interests. 
The crux of group conflict in South Africa is therefore not 
simply one of contending ethnicities, but rather more 
significantly one that centres on a particular constitutional 
system that institutionalises a grossly unequal distribution of 
rights , resources, and opportunities among its citizens. Indeed, 
the distributive skew has created a profound material conflict, 
the resolution of which is fundamental to the stability for which 
any post-apartheid government must strive. 
Economic Conflict and Consociational Democracy 
In his monograph of consociational possibilities for South 
Africa, Lijphart underestimates the severity of the economic 
polarisation and the problems it poses for the model's success. 
He claims that "unresolved class issues have never seriously 
threatened civil peace and democracy" in the European cases, 
11 2 
p. 390 
Schlemmer , 11 The Devolution of Power in South Africa", 
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asserting that the crucial determinant of democratic stability is 
bound to the elites' collective assumptions about the self-
denying prophecy, i.e. by the dictum of rational choice, 
contending elites would rather rule together than risk the 
probability of a race war. 113 It is here that Lijphart makes two 
erroneous assumptions. 
First, none of the segments in the European consociations 
ever experienced the extreme degree of economic deprivation that 
exists between whites and blacks in South Africa. Accordingly, 
European elites never sought the radical restructuring of their 
respective economic systems as necessary requirements for 
stability. Almost all were reconciled to operate politically 
within the extant legal and economic frameworks which had 
preceded their consociational experiments. What makes conflict 
in South Africa so intractable is that the economic deprivation 
of apartheid has created one segment which seeks the total 
dismantling of a constitutional system that the other segment 
desires to more or less retain. There is absolutely no reason to 
conclude that consociation would be able to reconcile the current 
dissensus. That the oppressed segment also comprises a majority 
of the population only compounds the conflict between it and the 
ruling segment. This point leads into Lijphart's second false 
assumption about South African political reality. The country's 
ruling group exclusively benefits from the present constitutional 
113 Lijphart, Power-Sharing in South Africa, p.98 
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arrangement -- it provides it virtually unfettered systemic 
control. Bereft of any serious military challenges to its 
domination, the ruling white elite is not affected by the self-
denying prophecy: the breakdown of the current system is not 
imminent, therefore why would the National Party be compelled to 
share power democratically when it can govern authoritatively? 
Moral imperatives notwithstanding, the incentives to seek a 
political accommodation are simply not in evidence. (Chapter 
Five will briefly discuss the prospects for such incentives under 
certain hypothetical conditions.) However, for the purposes of 
this analysis, let it be granted that the National Party would 
accept consociation as a political alternative. The principal 
task for a consociational democracy or any democratic 
dispensation seeking stability in South Africa would be to 
resolve or at least to regulate the economic conflict. How this 
would be undertaken constitutes perhaps the greatest problem 
facing the future of the country. 114 
In his promotion of consociational democracy for South 
Africa, Lijphart calls for "a substantial narrowing of the socio-
economic gap," but he does not suggest how or even when this must 
occur. 115 Others state that a "radical restructuring" would be an 
114 Some critics, such as Huntington, argue that systemic 
stability and fundamental socio-economic restructuring are 
incompatible goals because the former, within a democratic 
framework, assumes economic stability through cross-cutting and 
low levels of relative deprivation between groups. See 
Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, pp.45-59 
115 Lijphart, Power-Sharing in South Africa, p. 99 
implicit corollary of the model's implementation in South 
Africa, 116 and that legitimacy will only be obtained in a 
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dispensation which ensures equal access to economic opportunities 
and benefits for all . 117 Some go further, warning that any post-
apartheid "government that was even remotely responsive to black 
sentiment could hardly fail to redistribute or even nationalise 
land and other assets. 11118 Recent constitutional guidelines 
released by the African National Congress (ANC) stipulate that 
the expropriation and nationalisation of certain strategic areas 
of the economy should be a fundamental state prerogative. 119 Even 
the free market-oriented Inkatha movement claims that the white 
community must recognise that its virtual monopoly of wealth must 
be appropriated and divided in order to secure an equitable 
redistribution. 120 But if rapid socio-economic changes are 
desired, could they be obtained within context of a fledgling 
coalition of heretofore antagonistic groups? And if so, what 
would be the impact on potential stability? 
It is clear that the consociational model would be an 
ineffective framework for narrowing the existing economic gaps 
116 Rhoodie , "Value Consensus" , pp. 4, 7 2 - 4, 7 3 
117 van zyl Slabbert and Welsh, South Africa's Options, p.75; 
Schrire, "The Just Political Order", p.16 
118 Nolutshungu, Changing South Africa, p.106 
119 See Clauses (0) through (U) of the ANC's Constitutional 
Guidelines for a Democratic South Africa (August 1988). 
120 Gibson Thula, "The Constitutional Alternative for South 
Africa (Inkatha)". In van zyl Slabbert and Opland, p.t,i.1 
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between blacks and whites. It is doubtful that consociational 
mechanisms could be adapted to undertake the far-reaching and 
rapid economic restructuring which is necessary to the success of 
a post-apartheid system. 121 Consociation has been successful in 
other polities because either those systems were affluent enough 
to ensure an economic stability or muted class divisions cross-
cut segmental cleavages. Thus, consociation 
is not a system which is particularly well-suited to a 
country where vast socio-economic differences 
exist ... or where the nature of the developmental 
problems which are invol~ed make central planning and 
urgent action necessary.kc 
An equitable restructuring of the South African economic system 
would require a de facto transfer of wealth from the white group 
to the black group. There is a host of factors and conditions in 
South Africa which would make the necessary economic 
redistribution difficult to obtain under consociational 
assumptions of power-sharing. 
First, economic restructuring could be stymied by the 
principle of proportional representation. 123 Questions of 
structural changes to South Africa's economic system ipso facto 
require shifts in the orientation of the system, i.e. either 
121 
Azania". 
See, inter alia, Nthato Motlana, "From 
In Rotberg and Barratt, pp.42-43 
South Africa to 
122 Wiechers, "Possible Structural Divisions of Power in 
South Africa". In Benyon, p.112 
123 Lijphart states that proportionality is "the operational 
definition of fairness in the distribution of public funds and 
appointments to the public service." Lijphart, Power-Sharing in 
South Africa, p.8 
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significant levels of state planning and intervention or a 
greater reliance on unfettered market forces to determine the 
creation, control, and distribution of systemic wealth. There 
will undoubtedly be some conflict over economic policy in post-
apartheid. 
Some democratic theorists argue that a free market (or 
capitalist) economy is the fairest and most efficient means of 
apportioning national income in a divided society because it 
relieves the government from deliberating contentious issues of 
economic planning. 124 To vest the state with centralised control 
over the economy intensifies perceptions among groups (especially 
smaller groups which would presumably exert less influence over 
decision-making) that the domination of the state apparatus is 
the over-riding objective; heightened political competition 
merely reinforces the existing intergroup antagonisms, makes 
compromises more difficult to obtain, and contributes to further 
instability. It is reasonable to assume that South Africa's 
white community would generally favour a market-oriented approach 
because it would preserve present levels of white control of 
fixed capital assets -- property, manufacturing and industrial 
infrastructure -- and therefore the prospect of relinquishing 
political power would not be so unpalatable. Yet, this approach 
views economic conflict regulation in a vacuum; it does not 
124 "Democracy can be maintained in a plural society only 
through a system of [income assignation] that leaves a bare 
minimum of assignment to the legislature." See Dan Usher, The 
Economic Prerequisite to Democracy (Oxford, 1981), pp.32-~2 
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account for how past economic injustice has created a significant 
skew in the socio-economic development of contending groups and 
why a redistribution would be a corequisite of post- apartheid 
stability. To ignore the existing inequality by allowing for the 
retention of present levels of accumulated capital in white hands 
(which would be the case, at least over the short-term, under a 
free - market system) would be to acquiesce to its perpetuation. 
In this respect, a state-directed redistribution of wealth 
would be attractive to those groups who have not shared in the 
country's affluence because it would confer upon the executive 
the power to determine the scope and pace of the distributive 
process; it is by far the more popular strategy adopted by 
African governments in the post-colonial period. Although the 
economic benefits of state intervention into the economy are not 
always unequivocal, following the exploitation of colonialism the 
desire of newly independent African governments to obtain a more 
equitable distribution has been an undeniably crucial 
psychological requirement to systemic legitimacy. 125 Any major 
black elite cannot be seen by its supporters to control the state 
apparatus and yet forego the attendant benefits of overseeing the 
allocation and distribution of systemic weal th. 12b 
Admittedly, this depiction is a simplistic rendering of 
racial perceptions, but it nevertheless underscores a fundamental 




obstacle to a consociational government in South Africa. There 
is a strong possibility that groups would conflict over the basic 
orientation of the economic system; present levels of deprivation 
between blacks and whites suggest that post-apartheid political 
parties would be wedded to critical economic interests based on 
past racially-defined privilege and discrimination. Consequently, 
under the auspices of a consociational-style grand coalition, how 
could an economic system be proportionately represented? It is 
inconceivable to divide a polity's economic system into segmental 
spheres of influence, with each segment determining the dynamics 
of state involvement in the system in proportion to its numerical 
preponderance. 127 Al though an economy may operate under different 
combinations of state and marketplace determinants (as is 
presently the case in South Africa), it would not be amenable to 
widely divergent assumptions about the creation and distribution 
of wealth. 
Accordingly, before consociation can be considered there 
must first exist a minimum level of intergroup consensus toward 
the orientation of the economic system. It is doubtful that 
widespread legitimacy (hence, stability) for consociational 
democracy would manifest if support for both the political 
institutions and the socio-economic order were lacking. 128 The 
127 Nolutshungu, Changing South Africa, pp.27-3~ 
128 Linz argues that levels of systemic stability mirror the 
degree of legitimacy of the prevailing socio-economic system. 
See Linz, "Crisis, Breakdown, and Reequilibration", p.12 
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creation of fully inclusive democratic institutions in South 
Africa would not by itself ensure the rectification of economic 
inequality: a recognition, expressed by all groups, that the 
existing structure of distribution is inequitable and a desire to 
alter fundamentally the distributive process would be a sine qua 
non of a post-apartheid system. 129 Indeed, the UDF believes that 
any "democratic system that does not recognise the need to right 
the historical injustices of apartheid cannot hope to succeed. 11 130 
Such a conviction would have to be shared by all major political 
forces in South Africa for consociational democracy to be 
effective. 
Why the white community would view the redistribution of 
wealth reluctantly is tied to the second problem of implementing 
proportional representation into South Africa's state apparatus. 
That the government owns and controls 58% of the nation's capital 
stock, either directly or through parastatals, means that it 
exerts tremendous influence over the creation and distribution of 
weal th and patronage. 131 The distribution of patronage by the 
Nationalist Party has been crucial to its capacity to attract and 
retain its support-base. Any move to an equitable constitutional 
arrangement would be forced to correct the racial imbalance which 
129 Doug 1 as , D=-=e....,v"""e~l=-o=-p=i=n=g"---=D....,,e=m=o"""c=r=a=c....._y, pp . 6 0 - 61 ; see 
Nolutshungu, Changing South Africa, p.30; Schrire, "The 
Political Order", p.16 
130 UDF, Democracy and Government, p. 6 




currently exists in the civil and military services. 132 An 
estimated 32% of all economically active whites (~0% of all EAP 
Afrikaners) are employed by the state, parastatals, and 
supporting institutions. 133 How would consociation correct the 
racial imbalance? Lijphart never suggests how this could be 
undertaken without politically destabilising consequences for a 
consociation. 
The operationalisation of proportional representation in 
South Africa's state bureaucracy could be undertaken in three 
different ways -- none of which bodes well for the stability of 
the system. First, were it to involve the spontaneous 
retrenchment of white employees to levels proportionate to their 
numbers vis a vis other racial or ethnic groups, it would 
alienate significant numbers of whites. These alienated whites 
would then, as some have already done in response to the National 
Party's current "reform" programme, support other groups who are 
deemed more vigilant protectors of their (white economic) 
interests. Reasonably assuming that the National Party would be 
the principal white political grouping in a consociation, the 
process of intraracial undercutting would make it increasingly 
vulnerable to attacks by unconsociated white groups such as the 
132 Of approximately 1.7 million employees in the public 
service, 62% are black but most occupy lower level unskilled 
positions. SAIRR, Race Relations Survey 1987-88, pp.325-328 
133 van zyl Slabbert, 
Resistance and Revolt, p.9; 
pp.325-328 
The Dvnamics of Reform: Patterns of 
SAIRR, Race Relations Survey 1987-88, 
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Conservative Party. (This, in turn, assumes that the 
Conservative Party would not be included in the grand coalition: 
its strength as an alternative to the National Party would be 
predicated on its rejection of power-sharing with black groups.) 
As a result, the National Party would be less favourably inclined 
to offer further concessions as it feared an increasing erosion 
of its support-base and the possibility of legislative 
immobilisme would therefore heighten. 
The second approach to correcting the racial imbalance would 
have equally negative effects on the success of the consociation. 
It would involve the gradual removal of whites and their eventual 
replacement with blacks. This process would be too incremental 
and any black group which agreed to it would be susceptible to 
the same outbidding that would be experienced by the National 
Party under the first proposition. For black groups, however, an 
incremental black-white substitution is particularly offensive. 
It is because they occupy subordinate economic positions viz 
whites that the control of the state bureaucracy and its 
attendant manipulation for the purposes of patronage and resource 
allocation is a supreme political objective for blacks. 134 As the 
discussion in Chapter Three noted, the prospect of ethnic 
outbidding in a consociational democracy is extremely 
destabilising. For a black group to participate in a 
dispensation which offers anything less than immediate 
134 Lai tin, "South Africa: Violence, Myths, and Democratic 
Reform", pp.267-268 
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representation and control over the bureaucracy in proportion to 
its numerical preponderance would almost assure its demise as the 
principal broker of popular black interests. Either way, the 
elites that are seen to be occupying the political middleground 
(which is, after all, normative behaviour in a consociational 
democracy) will suffer the most. 135 
Moreover, due to the historical suppression of black 
opposition activity, black political consciousness and the 
mobilising strategies of mass-based groups such as the UDF place 
a premium on individual action. The UDF has premised its 
struggle on the virtues of mass participation, its organisational 
structure rooted in the concept of direct democracy through 
numerous referenda and constant accountability . 136 Because its 
members are involved in almost every stage of the decision-making 
process, the mobilising thrust of the UDF is antithetical to the 
"passive docility and ignorance" of consociational democracy: 137 
[p]opular initiatives have played too important a role 
in the UDF's own development for its ordinary 
participants to be reduced to the role of a passive 
chorus .... such a constitutency would be very difficult 
to demobilise in ;~e event of a retreat from radicalism 
after liberation. 1 
135 Ibid. 
136 United Democratic Front, Democracy and Government ( Cape 
Town, 1987), p.~ 
137 Ibid. 
138 Tom Lodge, "The United Democratic Front: Leadership and 
Ideology". Paper delivered at University of Witwatersrand 
symposium, August 1987, p.17 
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Accordingly, the ability of the ANC - UDF elite to offer 
concessions to whites would be severely constrained. The 
consequences for a consociational democracy would be debilitating 
and its prospects for successfully regulating intergroup conflict 
highly doubtful. 
Finally, the third approach would involve the expansion of 
the state to incorporate blacks into the bureaucracy without 
necessarily (or at least not immediately) removing whites. Since 
acquiring power in 1948, the National Party has enlarged the 
civil and military bureaucracies in part to employ their 
constituency and therefore to secure implicit support for 
continued white domination. As beneficial as the strategy has 
been for Nationalist interests, it has limitations because, as 
Simkins notes, the 
[b]enefits of the patronage state must always be the 
prerogative of the minority; otherwise the quantum oh 
patronage allocated per capita must become neglible. 9 
That is to say, a post-apartheid South African state would not be 
capable of supporting a network of patronage for all groups to 
the degree that currently exists in the white group. To wit, 
only 38 (or 2%) of the 2,827 positions in the top five levels of 
government are filled by blacks. 140 It is simply not fiscally 
feasible to extend to the black community the levels of state 
employment that a significant portion of the white community 
139 Charles Simkins, Democracv and Government: A Post-
Leninist Perspective (Cape Town, 1987), p.5 
140 SAIRR, Race Relations Survey 1987-88, pp.325 - 328 
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enjoys; the strains on the system would be overwhelming as monies 
that would otherwise be directed toward education, health care, 
and infrastructure are used to underwrite a bloated and redundant 
bureaucracy. 
All three possible approaches to the incorporation of 
proportional representation into a South African consociation 
would prove either problematic or altogether unfeasible. The . 
redistribution of wealth on a scale that is necessitated in South 
Africa (and envisioned by most black groups) has never been 
undertaken in a consociational system. Consociational 
democracy's inherent decision-making ploddingness and 
incrementalism are obstacles to such a fundamental 
transformation. Moreover, the inclusion of the minority veto 
would allow whites to prevent the necessary changes (such as 
affirmative action-type programmes) demanded by redistribution. 
An equitable redistribution of wealth in South Africa implicitly 
assumes that blacks will gain at the expense of whites. But 
unless whites assent to a partial transfer of its wealth and 
other reallocative shifts, the prospect of redistribution under 
consociation is highly unlikely. 
Summary 
This chapter has sought to present a thorough application of the 
consociational model to South Africa. The first half illustrated 
that none of the conditions favourable to stable coalition was 
evident: owing to factors related to the underlying economic 
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conflict, there would be scant probability of a multiple balance 
of segments; there is no evidence that an external threat would 
exist sufficient to induce mutual accorrunodation; there are no 
historical traditions of accorrunodation and, more significantly, 
intergroup relations are regulated by coercion or the threat of 
coercion; and there is virtually no convergence between the major 
white and black constitutional visions. The second half sought 
to elucidate some dynamics of extreme ethnic and economic 
conflict which would undermine the viability of consociation. 
The white group's ability to veto any legislation which seeks to 
redistribute or restructure systemic wealth would cause most 
black elites to view consociation as an inadequate mechanism for 
obtaining a just socio-economic order. And black elites which 
were seen to be occupying increasingly accorrunodationist positions 
would be vulnerable to outbidding by competing elites who 
denounce consociation as an unacceptable compromise. 
Therefore, under present conditions, consociational 
democracy is a wholly irrelevant model of conflict management in 
South Africa, providing neither the legitimacy nor the stability 
that the system requires. 
-- - . - ~ -
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Incentives to Accommodation 
Chapter Four sought to illustrate that under present conditions 
consociational democracy is impracticable in South Africa. The 
static application of the model showed that none of the 
favourable conditions for consociation is evident and that, most 
important, no major white or black elite valued consociation 
positively. The dynamic analysis isolated and identified some of 
the obstacles South Africa's hierarchically-defined ethnic 
configuration pose for the implantation of consociational 
democracy and for democratic regulation in general. Although the 
constitutional visions of the National Party and the ANC diverge 
sharply on fundamentals, it is helpful to surmise how a political 
accommodation between the two may be possible in the future and 
whether or not consociation could offer a viable power-sharing 
alternative if the necessary accommodative intentions were 
forthcoming. This chapter will attempt to highlight some of the 
social, economic, and demographic trends in South African society 
which may favourably influence major black and white elites to 
seek a political accommodation. 
It has already been suggested that the National Party will 
only seek political alternatives to the present system in 
cooperation with genuine black leaders when it is forced to. 
Currently, its ability to wield unilateral control of the state 
apparatus through a variety of repressive strategies is not 
sufficiently threatened. But there are indications that certain 
factors (mostly linked to the prospect of economic stagnation if 
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not depression and increased urban violence) may induce a 
significant re-thinking on the issue among the ruling whites and 
perhaps an acceptance by the ANC of some temporary form of 
government that falls short of its majoritarian ideal. 
Population Growth and Economic Stagnation 
When population growth projections for whites and blacks in South 
Africa are contrasted, it is manifestly clear that in the coming 
decades whites will constitute an increasingly smaller proportion 
of the total population. The African population is expected to 
grow at an annual rate of 2.8% into the next century, while the 
figure for the white community (which includes immigration) is 
pegged at 1.5%. 1 At these rates, by 2010 blacks will comprise 
over 90% of the total population while whites will account for 
less than 10%. 2 
With the economy striving to meet the increased demands of a 
rapidly growing population for housing, employment, and 
education, and the white population declining relative to the 
black population, blacks will be needed to fill those skilled and 
administrative positions that were once the virtually exclusive 
domain of whites. As greater numbers of blacks replace whites, 
the government will become increasingly dependent on a 
bureaucracy staffed by blacks to oversee the administration of 
SAIRR, Race Relations Survey 1987-88, pp.11 - 12 
2 Extrapolated from data in ibid. 
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white rule. The problems posed by this dependence are obvious. 
It will simply become more difficult for the Nationalists to 
exact control over the system because their capacity to cultivate 
and to maintain agents loyal to their regime in control 
institutions such as the civil bureaucracy, the Security Forces, 
and the SADF will diminish. 
Concomitantly, the level of African urbanisation, currently 
estimated at ~0%, is expected to surge to 75% during the same 
period. 3 Even now, one million people (mostly Africans) are born 
in or move to the metropolitan areas every year. 4 It has already 
been noted that urbanisation facilitates an individual's access 
to education, training, and employment, and enhances political 
consciousness. Accordingly, as black urbanisation increases, 
there will be a commensurate rise in black socio-political 
expectations and bargaining power vis a vis the white community; 
their ability to mobilise and to employ tactics of economic 
obstructionism -- strikes, stayaways, consumer boycotts -- will 
improve, thereby providing increased leverage over the South 
African economy and the state in general. 5 
Compounding the strains created by rapid urbainsation are 
some disturbing economic trends. As a consequence of South 
Africa's dual economies and key apartheid legislation such as the 
3 Johan Degenaar, "Reform, Quo Vadis?". Politikon 9, 1 (June 
1982), pp.12-13 
4 Freer, South Africa to 1990, p.30 
5 Sinclair, The Effects of Economic Growth, pp.25-26 
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Group Areas Act and influx control, there is a chronic shortage 
of black housing. Although there is a shortfall of 500,000 
units, only 70,000 new housing units are being constructed 
annually when 150,000-200,000 are needed just to keep the backlog 
at current levels. 6 Moreover, as the white population gets 
older, the black population gets younger. ~5% of the black 
community is under the age of 18. 7 When this generation becomes 
economically active, they will place enormous demands on the 
government and business community to create jobs. Indeed, South 
Africa will require 5% annual economic growth simply to keep 
black unemployment at present levels of ~0%. 8 Under present 
conditions, 5% annual growth in GDP is unlikely, especially since 
international economic sanctions have severely curtailed South 
Africa's access to foreign capital markets: the net capital 
outflow from South Africa between 1985-87 was R18 billion and GDP 
growth ranged between .5% (1986) and 2.7% (1988). 9 Even if South 
Africa could maintain the economic growth patterns of the 1975-
1987 period, by 2000 55% of the EAP would be unemployed and 67% 
6 Ibid., p.6 
7 Ibid., pp.2-3 
8 Accurate unemployment rates are difficult to obtain and 
vary widely according to region and source. The figure of ~0% 
includes those blacks employed in the informal sector. COSATU, 
the black trade union, estimates black unemployment at 50%. New 
York Times, November 13, 1988. In 1982, the President's Council 
estimated black unemployment at 30% of the EAP. Weekly Mail, 
March 10-16, 1989. 
9 New York Times, November 13, 1988; The Star, January 6, 
1989. 
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of those that were employed would be active only in the informal 
sector of the economy. 10 In addition, during this period it is 
not likely that the income gap between whites and blacks will 
diminish significantly -- dropping from 9:1 to an estimated 
8:1. 11 The narrowing of the income differential between the 
races will be inhibited by a drop in new fixed investment (caused 
by lost confidence in the economy) which will subsequently limit 
its growth, hence its ability to create new jobs for the 
burgeoning ranks of employment seekers. 12 
Disinvestment, boycotts, loan credit freezes, and stagnant 
gold prices have confined economic growth in the 1980s to an 
13 annual rate of 1.1%. As the Economist Intelligence Unit's 
country report for South Africa observes, there is 
no prospect in the foreseeable future of being able to 
create sufficient productive job opportunities in the 
modern sector of the economy to absorb the coming 
generation of work seekers.r4 
As economic conditions worsen, black anger, white immigration, 
and capital flight will increase. Correspondingly, the costs of 
maintaining the present system through the political repression 
of the black community will also rise. Faced with a 
lO SAIRR, Race Relations Survey 1987-88, pp.292-300 
11 Sinclair, The Effects of Economic Growth, p.33 
12 Using constant value 1985 rands, new fixed investment 
plummetted from R33 billion in 1981 to R23 billion in 1987. The 
Star, July 20, 1988. 
13 Freer, South Africa to 1990, p.8 
14 Ibid. , p. 4,4, 
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progressively unstable political and economic climate -- a direct 
consequence of international economic isolation -- the 
Nationalists will be under tremendous pressure to negotiate with 
blacks. Yet, until this point, there would be no reason for them 
to think that it needed to. The dilemma is that the longer 
negotiation with blacks is avoided, the greater is the 
probability that the economy will stagnate. Blacks may become 
increasingly radicalised as a result of continued white 
intransigence and the prospect of uncontainable urban terrorism 
will heighten; and with both, a diminution of the chances for 
establishing a political common ground will occur. It is not 
inconceivable that, under chaotic economic conditions, daunting 
socio-demographic pressures, and continued political strife, the 
ruling whites may be forced to abandon control of the state in 
toto. The unilateral conquest of the state apparatus by 
revolutionary means, however, bodes ill for the economic growth 
that South Africa desperately requires. Revolutionary conquest 
would result in the "severe haemmorrhage of physical and human 
capital," to the point where a strong economic growth rate (i.e. 
3.5-5%) would be unattainable. 15 Such a retardation of economic 
growth would set back the redistributive agenda of the liberation 
groups indefinitely. 16 
To rectify the current inequalities in wealth and income is 
15 Charles Simkins, Democracy and Government: A Post-
Leninist Perspective (Cape Town, 1987), pp.6-7 
16 Ibid., pp.6-7 
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both possible and necessary. However, it is clear that to 
achieve a relative equality between racial groups requires strong 
economic growth. Thus, the longer negotiation is suspended, the 
greater the chances that critical economic and distributive 
issues will go unresolved or even unaddressed. If these issues 
are ignored, political stability and democracy will be elusive in 
South Africa. 
Accordingly, one of the chief incentives for the government 
and the ANC to negotiate is the damage continued violent conflict 
will wreak on the economic system. The past century of 
industrialisation and capitalist development has created an 
economic interdependence between whites and blacks, albeit 
unequally structured. Research by Hanf et al. suggests that 
"economic advancement" is the overriding concern of black 
workers. 17 This is inferred from the respondents' desire to see 
a proportional allocation of public monies -- government 
services, education, health care -- to the black community rather 
than a unilateral appropriation of private assets (98% of which 
are owned by whites). 18 The conclusion drawn is that in South 
Africa both whites and blacks will be adversely affected by the 
destruction of the economic system. Moreover, the prospect of a 
slow, painful economic reconstruction in the wake of a race war 
17 Theodor Hanf, Heribert Weiland, and Gerda Vierdag, South 
Africa: The Prospects of Peaceful Change (Cape Town, 1981), 
pp.368-370 
18 Ibid. See also, Hermann Giliomee, "Trying to Find Sense 
Among the Paradoxes". Cape Times, May 5, 1988, p.8 
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should provide a sufficient incentive for both to negotiate with 
each other now. 
For the Nationalists and their constituency, the most 
obvious benefit of negotiating now is that they would be 
bargaining from a position of strength. 19 To suspend 
negotiations until the black liberation groups have (militarily 
or psychologically) forced the National Party to act 
accornrnodatively would run the risk of acceding more concessions 
in the longer-term, as these groups would then perceive its 
capitulation as a sign of weakness. Furthermore, although the 
government has been able to contain the combined military 
challenges of Urnkhonto we Sizwe and Poqo easily, there is a 
determined effort by these group to maintain the violence because 
it exerts crucial psychological pressure on whites. Indeed, 
Oliver Tarnbo has stated that 
while [apartheid] is there, we must intensify our 
struggle, which will result in an escalation of 
conflict .... (i]t's going tQ be quite impossible to 
avoid civilian casualties.29 
The ANC need not win its military campaign against the 
government; the fact that it is incapable of an overt military 
takeover is beside the point. As Huntington observes in the 
South African case, black "revolutionary violence does not ... have 
19 van zyl Slabbert and Welsh, South Africa's Options, p.123 
20 Margaret Novicki, "Interview: Oliver Tarnbo". Africa 
Report 30, 4 (July 1985), pp.32-33 
to be successful to be effective. 1121 All that is required for 
the ruling group to alter its perceptions toward political 
negotiation is for it to fragment over how to deal with the 
increasing level of violence directed at it. 22 As the costs of 
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racial domination rise with the deterioration of the economy and 
the spectre of intensified urban terror, so will the number of 
strategies proposed to ensure its adaptation to the changing 
environment. Defections both to the left of the party and to the 
right will result, but it is conceivable that a majority of 
Nationalist supporters would pressure their leadership to make 
some fundamental concessions to the black community regarding 
political rights. 
For the black liberation groups, it could be many years 
before the combined effects of demographic, economic, and social 
trends force the National Party to negotiate. In the meantime, 
their campaigns of economic and political destabilisation could 
pre-empt concessions from the government over the short to 
medium-terms. Under increasing attack from the ultra-rightist 
Conservative Party not to cave in to "communist" intimidation, 
the Nationalists would need to portray an image of being an ever-
vigilant protector of white interests in an effort to retain its 
support-base among whites. 23 
21 Huntington, "Reform and Stability", p.11 
22 Ibid. 
23 The Conservative Party's constituency is generally 
restricted to blue-collar, rural and semi-rural Afrikaners, i.e. 
those whites who stand to lose the most from black liberation. It 
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If the ANC is not capable of gaining a military victory over 
the white government but at the same time the latter is 
confronted by a plethora of socio-economic conditions which will 
inevitably undermine its ability to maintain the present system, 
negotiation will become the only viable means of resolving the 
political stalemate. 24 Following this assumption, consociational 
democracy (or at the very least some form of coalition between 
the significant white and black leaderships) poses the best means 
of transforming the system from racial oligopoly to the only form 
of government that can ensure the necessary legitimacy in South 
Africa: black majority-rule. A no-win situation for both sides 
coupled with the prospect of a shrinking economy unable to meet 
the increased demands placed upon it by a rapidly expanding 
population may force both to accept a political compromise 
embracing the second-best alternative to their resepctive 
constitutional visions. 25 
It is perhaps only at this point, when both sides realise 
the futility of continued strife, that consociation could fill a 
useful role for conflict regulation in South Africa, but even 
is not likely that it could expand 
areas to the level required to pose 
to the National Party's political 
official opposition, it nevertheless 
of government reform. See Giliomee, 
the Paradoxes", p.8 
its power base into the urban 
a genuine electoral challenge 
hegemony. However, as the 
restricts the scope and pace 
"Trying to Find Sense Among 
24 Heribert Adam, "Implications for the May 1987 White 
Elections". Address to the Cape Town Press Club, May 11 1987, p.9 
25 Rudolf Hilf, "Consensus Politics". South Africa 
International 18, 1 (July 1987), pp.15-16 
176 
then only in a very limited sense. As discussed in Chapter Four, 
consociational democracy is an inadequate framework in which to 
undertake the economic restructuring which the South African 
system so desperately requires for legitimacy. Accordingly, 
consociation can never be used as a political end in itself, but 
rather a means to an end. Since the only truly legitimate 
constitutional system for South Africa is one based on political 
equality and majority-rule, the question is: once the necessary 
attitudinal prerequisites manifest, how can the present system be 
transformed? 
Rustow observes in his seminal work on democratic 
transformations that 
a country is likely to attain democracy not by copying 
the constitutional laws or parliamentary practices of 
some previous democracy, but rather by honestly facing 
up to its particular conflicts and by devising or 
adapting effec~ive procedures for their 
accommodation. b 
It is the uniqueness of South Africa's present political impasse 
which will make its transition to democracy different from both 
the experiences of industrialised nations and post-colonial 
Africa. In South Africa, consociation could become a 
transitional mechanism for realising majority-rule by providing 
the institutional bridge between racial oligopoly and non-racial 
democracy. However, a number of caveats should be made. 
First, the State of Emergency must be lifted; political 
rights and freedoms should be universally distributed and 
2b Dankwart Rustow, "Transitions to Democracy", p. 35iJ:. 
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protected; and the tricameral and homeland systems should be 
dismantled. (It is presumed that the unbanning of organisations 
such as the ANC would precede any systemic transition because no 
legitimacy can be obtained for any constitutional dispensation 
without their contribution.) 
Second, a political timetable should be agreed to by the 
major political groups. Consociation must not be seen as an 
indefinite obstruction to majority-rule; the only conceivable way 
in which it will gain any legitimacy among blacks is if its 
temporal nature is guaranteed and that it will be followed by the 
instoration of majority-rule. 
Third, at the same time that it should only be employed as a 
tranistory mechanism it is vital that the consociated elites make 
some effort toward rectifying the current levels of economic 
inequality. It is spurious to hope that consociational democracy 
can do more than merely provide a forum in which blacks can be 
shown that, at the very least, attempts by the major (including 
white) elites to correct the inequality are being undertaken. 
The severity of the economic inequality is such that irrespective 
of who is in power inequality will endure. Indeed, the process 
of redistribution will be slow as it is. For instance, the 
desire to integrate and equalise black education to the level of 
white education would require a trebling of state expenditures 
for education, thereby consuming an estimated ~0% of the state's 
total annual budget; it would also require the introduction of 
17,000 new teachers every year until 2000 simply to get black 
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student-teacher ratios down to the white level. 27 Moreover, an 
equitable economic redistribution is likely to occur over a 
period of decades rather than years. Slabbert and Welsh predict 
that it is 
highly doubtful that, short of applying the most 
authoritarian methods, inequalities in income 
distribution could be reduced t~ reasonable dimensions 
in much less than a generation. 
However, a transitory consociational government need not 
necessarily achieve economic equality to be effective in 
obtaining stability and legitimacy. Rather, what is crucial is 
to convey the image to a mobilised black population that policy 
initiatives designed to redress past discrimination are being 
adopted, i.e. the system is now working in their interest. It is 
hoped that the abolition of apartheid laws coupled with a 
sustained effort to improve education, training, economic 
opportunity, and access to health care and other facilities for 
blacks will have an important symbolic value sufficient to 
engender the legitimacy necessary to equilibriate the polity. To 
this extent, it is the perception that fundamental public policy 
changes are occurring (even if substantive results are elusive 
over the short-term) that is most critical to a transitory 
consociational government in South Africa. 
27 In 1983, 78% of black educational instructors were 
considered underqualified and in the year before only 6,100 new 
teachers were certified. See Freer, South Africa to 1990, pp.~8 -
50. 
28 van zyl Slabbert and Welsh, South Africa's Options, p.127 
179 
The equilibration which consociation may provide would have 
profound implications for the economic resuscitation of the 
system. The collective perceptions of the international 
community (and particularly the United States) that South Africa 
was truly moving along the path of democratisation would be 
sufficient to secure the lifting of economic sanctions, the 
infusion of foreign capital, and perhaps even the endowment of 
economic development aid. However, it is only when the major 
South African elites prove to foreign governments that they have 
reached a political settlement which ensure? stability that 
confidence in the economy will return, growth will be expected, 
and the system can begin to meet some of the demands of a rapidly 
expanding, urbanising population. 
Thus, the relevance of consociation to South Africa is 
limited. Under present conditions, it is not a form of 
government which would provide an enduring legitimacy. Rather, 
it may provide stability to a transitional government by offering 
major South African elites time and a forum in which to transform 
the system from racial oligopoly to non-racial majoritarianism. 
In South Africa, consociation is impracticable for any other 
purpose. 
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